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7INTRODUCTION
The challenges faced by Central and Eastern European states in the
democratization process have been considerable. Planned economies needed to
be replaced by market economies, and the extreme political centralization
prevalent in all states was to be ended. However, closely following those initial
steps, the transformation of the executive and the judicial branches of the
government sector needed to be accomplished, being probably as important as
the restructuring of the economy for sustained development. After the initial
economic reforms, aimed at creating a viable private sector, the long-term
economic development depends largely on the policies adopted and
implemented by public officials in the public sector (so even World Bank 1997:
165). Sustainable economic and social development in developing countries
mostly fails “because governments have failed to fashion appropriate roles for
the state in development; they have been unable to organize and manage
systems that identify problems, formulate policies to respond to them,
implement activities in pursuit of policy goals, and sustain these activities over
time” (Hilderbrand and Grindle 1997: 31). In the scholarly literature starting in
the late 1980s, the crucial role of the state in economic development has been
accepted more and more (for early accounts see Killick 1989 and Wade 1990;
for later works, e.g., Chang and Rowthorn 1995). The crucial role of the public
administration in policy implementation was rapidly recognized also by the
institutions of the European Union. Whereas in the original “Copenhagen
criteria” for potential new members of the union, much stress was put on the
economic restructuring and political criteria, the focus quickly shifted to the
capacity of the public administrations to implement the European Union
policies (see, e.g., Dimitrova 2002).
Despite this dire need, the transformation of the governance structures has
not been easy; and considerable failures have been witnessed. This dissertation
deals with several aspects of the “governmental” side of the transition
process — the creation of viable governance systems appropriate for the newly
democratized states. The focus of the thesis is on the transition in the Central
and Eastern European countries, whereas the Estonian case has been used as the
main example. Estonia fits the purpose of describing governance reforms for
two main reasons — it is a former republic of the Soviet Union, facing major
change. At the same time, it was an aspiring member of the European
organizations, first the Council of Europe and then later the European Union.
This makes Estonia an interesting object of comparison for the Central
European countries that were somewhat more advanced in the beginning of the
transition process. However, even though the role of European Union for
transition in Estonia is acknowledged, the Europeanization is not the focus of
this thesis, but rather the transition as such.
8This introduction presents the main dilemmas that the dissertation deals
with, and provides some of the sources that could be used for further references.
No complete account of the discourse and literature on governance and law in
transition states is sought. The starting point, the concept of governance, needs a
more thorough introduction, though.
Governance, state and law
The leading theme in this dissertation is the transition of governance. This
concept is a widely popular term in public administration during the last decade.
Although the notion of governance is used by scholars studying various other
fields (most notably, corporate governance and global governance), it is the
literature on the developments in the public sector where this usage has
flourished.
Governance may thus mean different things. Hirst (2000: 14–19)
distinguishes between ‘five versions of governance.’ Rhodes (2000: 55–64)
gives ‘seven definitions of governance.’ Governance is the term even used by
the New Public Management scholars (e.g. Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Yet,
almost all of those definitions (even including corporate governance and global
governance) have something in common. Namely, governance denotes a more
decentralized, a non-hierarchical, rather a network-based approach to making
and implementing policies, be it inside or in between organizations. In the
public sector concept, governance most often refers to the “inter-organizational
networks of state and non-state actors” jointly engaging in “co-governance or
‘co-steering’ activities in the various policy sectors” (Sibeon 2000: 291).
Governance is characterized by “interdependence, resource exchange, rules of
the game and significant autonomy from the state” (Rhodes 1997: 15). For
many public administration scholars, governance is a concept that helps to avoid
the supposedly out-dated word ‘government,’ as the government is charac-
terized by the hierarchical decision-making process and unilateral authority
upon the civil society — something modern governance is supposedly better off
without.
This sharp contrast between government and governance is wrong, or at least
misleading (Drechsler 2003a). Those terms are actually not contradictory.
Although a western scholar discussing governance in his or her advanced
democracy may often not speak of the government, the central role of it in the
networks of various kinds is simply assumed. Further, the role of government-
enacted laws in governance cannot be underestimated. Although governance
denotes more flexibility and less authoritative rules, the basic constitutional
structures are not deemed obsolete. In fact, some definitions of public
governance put the legal aspect in the forefront — governance can be viewed as
“regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that
constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and
9services through associations with agents in the public and private sectors” (Hill
and Lynn 2004: 4). The concern with legality and legitimacy and the
importance of values such as rule of law distinguish governance from public
management, which is more related to the business-like technocratic values
(Kickert 2002: 1472).
Governance and transition
In the transition context, the important role of the government when speaking of
governance is even more visible than in advanced democracies. In fact, when
various international institutions such as the World Bank promote “good
governance,” they usually and foremost focus on the good government (World
Bank 1992), although the reduction of hierarchical state power is also desired. It
is the combination of strengthening legitimacy and authority of the state,
creating efficient administrations, and the appropriate distribution of authority
between private and public sectors that is a necessary precondition of getting
good governance in a developing society (Leftwich 1993). The balanced
approach to development has often been neglected by practical reform
politicians in developing countries, who call for the dismantling state structures
and extremely liberal policies (e.g. Grindle 1997: 4).
Why is the strong state so crucial for achieving good governance in
development? Various reasons, most of them applicable not only to developing
but also to advanced democracies, are put forward.
First, the existence of the “rules of the game” such as basic constitutional
framework or rules for private property rights are needed if markets were to
function at all. Unless contractual rights are enforced by a central authority, the
participants on the market cannot conclude those contracts with any certainty
that the contracts will be fulfilled. It has been pointed out that the existence of
the basic institutional framework has been the central reason why western
capitalist economies have been able to develop so successfully (North and
Thomas 1973; Williamson 1985). Creating, through constitution and laws, the
basic institutional framework under which exchanges between different actors
may take place is among the first tasks for a nation in transition (see, e.g., König
1992). This framework includes the basic rules of the game relating to the
treatment of people, especially the protection of human rights including the
protection of minimum social guarantees and minority rights. Only a strong
state, not governance networks can adopt the framework and more importantly,
guarantee the realization of this framework in practice.
Second, governance networks capable of formulating policies do not appear
immediately. Thus, crucial policies necessary for the newly democratic state do
not emerge through governance networks, as such networks do not exist right
after the transition.
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Third, governance networks are not the place to solve problems such as
ethnic conflicts, as the unhappy experience of several countries in Eastern
Europe demonstrates — it is the government who has failed in those situations.
It is inevitably the role of the government to devise appropriate policies in
certain fields, leading to difficulties discussed in the essays of this dissertation.
Fourth, governance through mostly non-state actors and networks seriously
undermines the legitimacy of the state and may diminish trust in public
agencies. This distrust may easily carry over to the policy areas where the
government is the sole legitimate policymaker and policy implementer such as
law and order. Moreover, the tight networks involving both public and private
actors may lead to a closed and secretive policymaking within the ‘iron
triangles.’
Obviously, the state in transition is not as strong as needed (Drechsler 2000).
The pre-transition governments were certainly big, in the sense of carrying out
functions affecting the society in many more ways than the governments of the
advanced democracies do. This, however, does not mean that the government
was strong in the sense of having the capacity to formulate and implement
policy, or to efficiently perform routine administrative functions (e.g. Grindle
1997: 3). The governments have only little experience with democratic
policymaking, as the experience most officials have is usually not appropriate
for a democratic state. Moreover, due to its overly intrusive nature the pre-
transition government is strongly but justly associated with the negative view
towards regulation and steering through central state bodies at all.
The previous discussion demonstrates that the transition states face severe
difficulties in ensuring sustainable development. First, development presupposes
strong and efficient governments that do not exist. Second, the creation of strong
and effective government is not ‘popular’, due to the previous experience, but
also due to the misconceptions about modern notions of governance. Probably
only conscious and enduring reform efforts by the elites are able to overcome
those difficulties and strengthen the government (or, ‘enhance state capacity,’
another widely used term in this context). This means that one needs to put
effort into many different areas. At least three dimensions are often pointed out:
human resource development, organizational strengthening, and institutional
reform (Grindle 1997: 9). This dissertation mostly deals with two of those three
fields — human resource development and institutional reform. The focus of
this dissertation is especially on the reform of institutions and macrostructures,
including the formulation process and contents of major policies addressed at
the specific concerns of a transition country, such as Estonia.
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Replacement of public officials
Many of the difficulties for the transition countries arise from sheer inexpe-
rience. The Soviet civil servants hardly knew how to create successful policies,
or even how these would look like on paper. This created the need for replacing
them with new ones (III), and looking at the foreign experience (I, II). This
section deals with the former, and the next section with the latter question.
If the negative image of the pre-transition public administration was true, the
image of a civil servant is even more so. The Soviet emotionless bureaucrat has
been the object of much ridicule and contempt. The powerful nomenklatura is
often viewed upon as something utterly undemocratic and undesirable for the
post-transition period. The civil servants were not a professional and impartial
administrators of government policies, but rather integral parts of the
suppression machinery of the Communist Party; whereas the highest levels of
the administration were usually occupied by high party officials (Verheijen
1999a: 2–4). The policymakers and policy advisors from the Soviet times were
obviously not equipped with the necessary skills to overcome the important
problems and solve the imminent tasks facing the nation. Moreover, the
legitimacy of those decision-makers was usually seriously hampered. For
example, in Estonia, the first elections produced the winner under the slogan
“Clean the Place!” (“Plats puhtaks!”), denoting the desire to get rid of the old
functionaries. Lustration practices, i.e. “procedures for screening persons
seeking public positions for their involvement with the communist regime”
(Letki 2002: 530), have been widespread.
Among the more famous civil servant replacement policies was enacted in
the Eastern Germany after the unification. Undoubtedly facilitated by the
unique situation where new officials could be shipped in from the West, most of
the leadership positions were filled with new personnel (Drechsler 2003b: 45–
55; Derlien 1993). The changes were not limited to this country, however. The
‘de-communistation’ of the Bulgarian administration brought sweeping changes
in the top tiers of the administration, even though an official law to prevent
former communists to hold top posts was not enacted (Verheijen 1999c: 96–
100). In Estonia, even though the slogan of cleaning the place was not im-
plemented in public administration in full (Randma 2001: 121), the replacement
of public officials was still rapid. By 1994, 73% of the higher level officials had
been in office for less than three years, and altogether 37% of the public
officials having been replaced (Sootla and Roots 235: 240). In Romania, some
of the ministries saw almost a complete turnover among senior bureaucrats
(Nunberg 1999a: 86). Of course, the change in personnel was not widespread in
the Eastern Europe, rather to the contrary. In many instances, the composition
of the public service did not change considerably, and so the old elites
continued to dominate civil service even after transition (Vanagunas 1999: 228;
Nunberg 1999b: 257).
12
This aspect of developing human resources — replacement of former public
officials — has caught surprisingly little attention from the public admi-
nistration reform literature. Mostly, one writes about the initiatives aimed at
institutional reforms such as creating a professional and neutral civil service,
usually through a Civil Service Act (e.g. Meyer-Sahling 2001; Wiatr 1995;
Verheijen 2003), but also about training, performance management, and
ensuring adequate compensation (SIGMA 1995; Verheijen 1999b; Nunberg and
Barbone 1999: 35-47; Randma-Liiv forthcoming). Even when one talks about
the need to instill new values in the civil service, one rarely mentions large-
scale personnel replacements (for example, this question has not been brought
out by Jenei and Zupkó 2001: 89-90; an exception is Nunberg 1999b).
There are three main and usually uncontested benefits of administering
large-scale dismissal and replacement programs among civil servants in a
transition process. Namely, the new civil servants probably enhance the
legitimacy and prestige of the administration in the eyes of the public, in the
eyes of the politicians, and they probably also bring new ethos into the state
apparatus.
As already mentioned, the legitimacy of the transition states suffers greatly
due to the intrusive nature of the pre-transition regime. If the old civil servants,
once an integral part of the suppressing regime, continue to hold power over
people, the trust in the new government may fall quickly. In fact, some evidence
suggests that the trust in civil servants is indeed influenced by the attitudes
towards the previous regime. Due to the fact that former nomenklatura cadres
make up a considerable proportion of Russian civil servants, the “commonly
held view is that little, if anything, has changed in the practices of the state
bureaucracy since the demise of the communist system” (Kotchegura 1999: 38).
Surveys conducted in Central and Eastern Europe show considerable support for
the removal of former communist party members from positions of influence,
with roughly 50% of the people supporting this goal (Letki 2002: 536). The low
prestige and legitimacy of the administration is dangerous for several reasons.
The people may alienate from the state. They may be unwilling to participate in
the political process. They may feel less compelled to perform their duties, such
as paying taxes. And last, but not least, it is extremely hard to recruit motivated,
qualified and ethical people to such a civil service (Vanagunas 1999: 229).
The legitimacy of the administration in the eyes of the politicians is
important because otherwise the policy advice would not be taken seriously, and
the mistrust in the capacity and willingness to implement newly enacted reforms
may seriously hamper democratic development. This argument is essentially
similar as the arguments for the spoils systems in advanced democracies
(Maranto 1998), but obtain stronger force in transition context where leftover
officials are not only a legacy of the previous party, but a wholly different
regime. It has been argued that the entrance of a large number of new
professionals into the Polish civil service was an important factor in the success
of economic reforms, as the cooperation between politicians and old officials
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was not smooth (Torres-Bartyzel and Kacprowicz 1999: 168). As a negative
example, the mid-level Bulgarian officials considerably slowed down economic
reforms. The inability of the government to influence civil servants to work for
them was among the reasons for the collapse of Dimitrov government
(Verheijen 1999c: 107–08).
The old bureaucrats may also inhibit the internal development of civil
service by continuing the previous traditions and shaping the administrative
ethos. The old officials may easily be the “bearers of an administrative sub-
culture which bears no resemblance to administrations of democracies” (Vana-
gunas 1999: 224). They are the holders of the norms of the previous nomenkla-
tura, who feel comfortable to continue previous routines, represent the
autocratic management style, who are partial and partisan, have the propensity
to use public office for private gain, operate in secrecy, and care little about the
need to efficiently and effectively serve the public (Vanagunas 1995). For
example, the resistance of the “all-powerful bureaucratic apparatus” is among
the main reasons why civil service reforms have not taken place in Russia
(Kotchegura 1999: 22). As many of the Latvian civil servants were holdovers
from the Soviet period, the administration was still dominated by strong
centralization and subordination in the mid-1990s (Vanags and Balanoff 1999:
272). Similarly, the continuing centralism and party loyalty in Lithuanian civil
service is arguably the legacy of the past (Jasaitis 1999: 301). Certainly, new
officials are not guaranteed to bring in new values, but experience seems to
demonstrate that the old officials certainly do not promote those new values,
either.
The main argument against replacing civil servants of the previous regime is
connected to their competence (Wilson 1991; Titma 1996: 67). Even though
they do not possess necessary experience for creating and implementing new
policies, they still know how to run a bureaucratic apparatus. They are very well
“the only class of individuals with significant administrative experience”
(Vanagunas 1999: 228). For example, the Bulgarian government was in serious
difficulties in finding qualified staff after ‘de-communistation’ processes
excluded officials who were tightly connected with the previous regime
(Verheijen 1999c: 107).
Wide-scale civil service replacement, as any instance of a considerable
amount of people leaving public service, has an additional risk, viz., it is the
most qualified people that may actually leave. If the officials know about the
planned large-scale dismissal, screening, or replacement efforts, the most
qualified may not want to remain to face the uncertain situation, but seek more
lucrative positions outside civil service.
This dissertation (essay III) takes a closer look at one of the arguments
contributing to the discussion of the necessity of personnel replacements. The
analysis is based on the judiciary, which provides a good opportunity to
compare “old” and “new” officials. The screening procedures among the
Estonian judiciary were significantly different from the screening procedures in
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the general civil service — all the judges had to go through a reappointment
process or they were unable to continue. In practice, several institutions along
the way had a discretionary veto power over the reappointment, among them the
rather national-minded President of the Republic. Significant turnover did take
place, yet many of the old officials remained in office. After the judicial reform,
“old” and “new” judges worked side by side.
The dissertation examines whether the actual behavior of the “old” judges
differs from the “new” ones. Many of the arguments for or against exclusion of
former officials from civil service actually make the assumption that the
behavior differs. Those who support the replacement, argue that the old officials
are unresponsive and inefficient as they always used to be. Those who support
the continuation argue that the old officials are experienced and can thus make
qualified decisions.
As to the judicial decision-making, the arguments why the behavior of the
“old” judges would differ from the “new” ones are similar. For example, this
dissertation considers the sentencing decision — whether to convict or to acquit
the defendant. During the Soviet regime, the acquittal of a person was rare, as it
was considered to be a failure of the criminal justice system. This exerted
considerable pressure on the judiciary to avoid acquittals. High conviction rates
are considered to be typical among the post-communist judiciaries and, thus, the
Soviet and post-Soviet judges are usually expected to find defendants guilty.
Further, the judges from the previous regime may want to appear more loyal to
the state than the newly appointed ones. The pressure to appear loyal to the state
during the transition may be exacerbated, as the representatives of the previous
regime may fear reprisals. This apparent loyalty, however, may prevent the
judges to perform their jobs correctly — to independently and responsibly
weigh the evidence presented to them. Newly appointed judges are expected to
pay more attention to the rights of the individual (the suspect) and be better
prepared in their mentality to overturn the prosecutor’s case in favor of the
suspect. They also feel less pressure to prove their suitability to serve the new
regime.
The dissertation looks both at the conviction rates as well as sentencing
harshness. It turns out that the difference between the “old” and “new” decision-
makers actually seems to be miniscule, if existent at all (III). The finding that
the Soviet era criminal justice system experience in itself is not a significant
determinant of judicial behavior in transitional period gives some support to the
claim that replacement in itself is no solution to the problems among public
officials.
The study does not provide arguments about the whole class of civil
servants, as it is concentrated on judging. It is also obvious that even if the
behavior of the old and new officials does not differ from each other
significantly, there are several other reasons why at least some old official
should not continue in civil service. For example, the legitimacy problems of
the old nomenklatura are serious. However, proper training and screening
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processes could actually produce an appropriate mix of experience and fresh
ideas into the civil service, whereas problems associated with the replacement in
toto are thus avoided.
Policy transfer in transition
As shown above, the elite transfer to civil service positions was possible in
Eastern Germany only. Another kind of transfer from West to the post-
communist countries has been much more common, though, and that was the
transfer of policies to replace previous ones and to address new problems.
Policy transfer (or lesson-drawing, which denotes the more practical approach
to the similar phenomenon, see James and Lodge 2003) has been perceived as a
valuable tool in helping to “catch up” with the western neighbors (e.g. Rose
1993: 111–114). In transition societies, the newly created market environment
was usually remarkably free, with little or no regulation in some of the most
crucial aspects of the market, such as corporate governance, financial markets,
or competition law. Not only the behavior of the participants in the market
needed to be regulated, but some of the crucial institutions needed to be set up,
such as private property, legal foundations of enterprise system or contract law.
The need for regulation has usually been discovered quickly. It is obvious that
those imminent tasks combined with the inexperience of the decision-makers
with the new environment force them to look abroad for guidance and
examples.
Such examples include the transfer of policies in very different fields. Even
though welfare systems are often considered as nontransferable from advanced
to developing countries due to the huge budget constraints in the latter (Rose
1993: 46–47), transfers have still taken place (e.g. Cox 1993). An interesting
case is pension reform, where countries learning lessons from abroad, mostly
Chile, range from Kazakhstan to Poland to Macedonia (Wagener 2002: 165–
167). Latvia recently almost copied its new pension system from the yet to be
implemented Swedish one (Müller 2002). Lesson-drawing is not limited to
those issues where regulation was needed fast, but also to the more fundamental
political institutions, such as constitutional institutional framework and electoral
systems (Malova and Haughton 2002).
Estonia has been no different in this respect. Many basic institutions were
based on examples from abroad. At least in the initial transition period, a strong
influence of the German legal system was strongly visible. The property law
regime was heavily based on the German civil code, the BGB. The constitu-
tional interpretation followed largely German examples (II). The civil service
reforms were also influenced by foreign ideas (Sootla and Roots 1999: 253),
even though many of the attempted borrowings, often based on the German
civil service, have not taken place in practice.
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The transfer of policies increased considerably after the accession nego-
tiations with the EU started to lift off. Probably the most important criterion for
fulfilling the requirements of becoming the member state was the harmonization
of domestic legislation with the acquis communautaire. Something often
perceived as a technical and legal process in reality involves the adoption of
numerous foreign policies in important fields (see, e.g., Jacoby 1999).
The essays in this dissertation show that almost all actors in a transition
country have the tendency to borrow from foreign experience, not just the
bureaucrats or politicians. It seems that even the courts in transition rely and cite
foreign authorities, whereas the courts in advanced democracies rely more on
domestic sources (I). The courts consider the opinions of their foreign counter-
parts persuasive in themselves and use them as an argument for similar
domestic conclusions. This dissertation argues that the increased persuasiveness
of the decision when relying on the foreign authority is actually the main reason
why courts publicly engage in comparative reasoning. During the transition,
examples from developed democracies serve not only as guidance for the
decision-makers, but also as a persuasive argument meant for those whom the
regulation (or court decision) is addressed. Some ideas in constitutional law
may thus become simply fads, just like some policies do (Bennett 1991).
There are several reasons why the transfer of policies and ideas makes good
sense for the less-developed countries. There is a severe need of introducing
new policies and creating them from scratch is costly and time-consuming.
Comprehensive analyses about the impacts of future policies are not easy to
perform, and it may seem safer to adopt an already proven program. There is
international pressure to adopt western style policies, and copying from there
leaves an impression that this has been achieved. The effect is further
strengthened by the various international advisors often promoting their home
systems and policies. The domestic actors may feel that the people want things
to be ‘like in the west’ and thus would support policies modeled after the
western countries.
Yet there are various reasons why policy transfers often fail, and in transition
context, the failures are easy to come. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 17–20)
connect failures with uninformed, incomplete, or inappropriate transfers.
Uninformed transfer occurs when there is insufficient evidence about the
program and its effects in the donor country. Just as it is difficult to assess the
impact of foreign judicial decisions (I), it is difficult to assess the effects of
foreign programs (e.g. Mossberger and Wolman 2003: 433-434). In the
transition context, this is often the case as there is considerable pressure to adopt
fashionable policies (e.g., NPM reforms or strict and closed career systems) and
no time is left to consider the programs in depth.
When an incomplete transfer occurs, crucial elements of the successful
policy are left behind. For example, Estonia has adopted the anti-discrimination
and equal pay provisions into its labor laws long ago, partly in order to
harmonize its law with the EU. However, the crucial institutions that ensure the
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adequate implementation of this provision — effective monitoring; adequate
penalties for noncompliance; and mediation are not yet fully in place. It is no
wonder that the law is largely not enforced.
Finally, an inappropriate transfer refers to the inadequate attention to the
different conditions in the different countries. The transfer of a policy from the
advanced democracy is by no means a guarantee for the success of the policy,
even if the policy was successful in the donor country. As Richard Rose
summarizes the argument, “lesson-drawing is deemed impossible in theories
assuming that every country, or even every state or city is a unique configu-
ration of culture, institutions, and history” (1993: 38). This uniqueness inhibits
transfer because the problems that the new policies are supposed to address
require unique solutions that take into account all the interrelated cultural,
institutional and historical factors.
In the context of a transition state copying programs from advanced
countries, the problem deteriorates. The copier needs policies that would bring
the country to the par with the advanced nation. The policies existing in those
countries presuppose budgetary resources, qualified personnel to implement the
policies, and at least some degree of public acceptance. Even if those conditions
exist, the question remains whether the policy will actually solve the problems
of the transition country. It is clear that the solution adopted in one country does
not necessarily tell what is going to happen in another country when the same
solution is sought (I). The probability for this to happen when policy transfer
takes place between an advanced and a developing country is even smaller, as
there are only few problems that are similar in the both countries.
This, of course, does not mean that one should never look abroad and that
learning is totally impossible. For example, this dissertation assumes that
creating a strong institutional framework (property rights, human rights, a
judicial system) benefits all transition countries. Statistical analyses demonstrate
that creating a clear institutional framework in public administration — indeed,
a Weberian one — correlates with economic growth (Evans and Rauch 1999).
The rapid economic development in advanced countries is made possible by the
strong institutional framework — another piece of evidence supporting the
assumption. However, the message is rather that one should be careful to copy
institutions or policies without comparably impressive evidence. The focus on a
single country is insufficient. Rather, ‘mixed scanning,’ a broad survey of
examples before selecting a few models for more careful analysis, is more
appropriate (Mossberger and Wolman 2003: 436).
This dissertation argues that over time, foreign examples should become less
persuasive. With growing experience in the reform process, the eagerness, but
also pressure to copy from abroad should diminish. Decision-makers learn to
analyze local needs, and the public is not persuaded by the need to adopt foreign
policies. On the contrary, foreignness may seem imperialistic and thus invoking
arguments based on foreign examples may be even counterproductive (I). Even
the arguments based on the requirements of the EU may become risky in post-
18
communist countries, especially where the support for joining the union has not
been overwhelming. Regarding the transition of the Estonian governance, this is
demonstrated by the failure of the civil service reforms that would have been
planned on the German models. The career system in civil service was never
adopted, and not because no democratic country possessed such a system, but
rather because the German example provided many negative signals. In
advanced stages of transition, lesson-drawing should be evidenced much less
often than in the initial stages.
Governance and “transition losers”
Policy transfer from advanced democracies usually involves policies not
specifically addressed to target the problems of one specific group in transition:
the “transition losers.” It is true that many of the elites retained their high status
after the transition and cannot rightly be called transition losers. However, many
ordinary people were unprepared for the social change, and faced considerable
difficulties in the capitalist system. What made the situation worse for some of
the “losers” was the fact that the transition states lacked either the ability or
willingness to adopt policies to help them. Two groups who faced this situation
usually come to mind: the poor and the minorities. Due to those two groups,
transition has been often considered a failure.
As the political process has not been sympathetic to those groups, a totally
new actor was to step up and protect their interests: the courts. As the previous
discussion already suggests, the courts face a complex task in the transition
process. The need for institutional and legal framework exemplifies their special
roles as they have to guard the minimum rules of the game, whereas in the more
advanced democracies, the existence and authority of such rules is more or less
assumed (unless a crisis such as terrorist attacks bend the rules somewhat). The
court is an important player in the governance of a transforming state, often also
stepping in for the non-existent or weak interest groups who are not able even to
exert influence regarding the very basic rules of the game. Yet, the judges in
those courts are no more experienced in a democratic system than the new
policymakers in other institutions — and firing the judges might not make a big
impact. As this dissertation argues, turning to foreign examples is of no big help
to the court (I).
The treatment of the two groups — the poor and the minorities — by the
courts through constitutional interpretation exemplifies those difficulties and
once again demonstrates how the legal framework, basic human rights, and the
strong institutional structure (represented by the courts) are crucial in the
transition governance.
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Social restructuring and the courts
The transition process has obviously created many social problems. Even
though mass layoffs, especially from the civil service, never took place in most
if not all post-communist countries (Drechsler 2003b), many previous workers
were left with inadequate skills for the new environment. The unemployment,
including long-term unemployment, rocketed, and the real salaries declined fast.
No better is the situation with retired persons, whose income has often fallen
below the official poverty line. The subjective economic well-being of people
living in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe was dismal in the early
1990s (Hayo and Seifert 2003). The health care system has become over-
burdened throughout the region (Marree and Groenewegen 1997). Cutbacks in
the social security system have been inevitable (e.g. Standing 1996). Creating
sufficient social safety nets for the transition “losers” has probably received less
attention than deserved, while being an unavoidable concern to ensure stable
democratization and economic development. Among the reasons is the
weakness of interest groups and the lack of networks helping to formulate
efficient policies (regarding the Czech welfare reform, see e.g. Seppanen
Anderson 2003)
Under this pressure, it is not surprising that the courts have got involved in
the social reforms. Remarkably many of the recently adopted constitutions
contain social rights clauses (Glendon 1992), and the new constitutions in
Central and Eastern Europe are no exception. For example, the Hungarian
constitution (art. 17) provides that “The Republic of Hungary shall provide
support for those in need through a wide range of social measures.” The
Slovenian constitution provides, among others, for the rights to social security
(art. 50), health care (art. 51), specific rights of disabled persons (art. 52). The
Estonian constitution similarly guarantees the right to health care and the right
to state assistance for those in need (art. 28). Moreover, those provisions have
been implemented in practice. Probably the most prominent examples where
those provisions have been implemented in practice come from Hungary where
the Constitutional Court has stopped various cutbacks in the system, basing its
decision on constitutional provisions (Sajo 1996). Similarly, the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal has stopped pension reforms that would have cut back
benefits (Bugaric 2001: 263–264).
The Estonian courts have been under less pressure, at least until recently. In
the first ten years of transition, the case law on the social rights provisions had
been negligible (II). Only recently, claims to health care (IV, Riigikohus 2003),
minimum income (Riigikohus 2002; 2004) and housing (II, Riigikohus 2000)
have been debated in the Supreme Court. In the health care case, the Supreme
Court argued that the constitutional provisions and international human rights
instruments show that “those who are willing to work but are unable to find
employment and suffer from need must possess at least some guarantee that
they can access health services and receive reimbursements necessary for health
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care” (Riigikohus 2003: para. 19). Often, it is the Legal Chancellor who took
office in 2000 who raises those issues into the limelight, formulating those
social problems as constitutional issues. For many, the constitution and the legal
system in general, has become a source of hope for stopping the deterioration of
the social welfare system. Thus, the courts have become a strong and natural
player in the governance of the social welfare policies.
Such a role of the courts is highly debatable (some notable examples from
the literature include Michelman 1969 regarding the U.S. Supreme Court and
Böckenförde 1992 regarding the German constitutional jurisprudence). Those in
support of the active role for the judiciary argue that social rights are indeed
basic human rights, and that the courts have to step in if the political process is
unable to provide for those rights. Arguably, the central reasons why
constitutional rights exist at all is the need to protect those groups who are
underdogs in the political process, be it during the transition or not (e.g. Strauss
1992).
Others point out that the courts cannot solve the complex social problems,
and that the effectiveness of judicial activism is especially problematic in
transition. The vague and abstract legal provisions that the courts operate with
leave almost no clues for the court on which to base their decisions (Bugaric
2001: 261-262). The courts possess much less capacity than the other branches
of government to solve complex problems facing the society as they are not
equipped with the necessary policy creation tools. Their decision would have a
polycentric effect, influencing policy areas far beyond what the court envisions,
whereas the interests that are involved do not get representation before the court
(Barber 2001). Their decisions would be costly, interfering with the parlia-
mentary budgetary discretion. The involvement of the courts in social policy
making would also infringe the constitutional separation of powers principle, as
the courts would interfere with the powers of the legislature (e.g. the U.S.
Supreme Court 1970: 487: “The Constitution does not empower this Court to
second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of
allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential
recipients. [… P]roblems presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of this Court”).
The essays in this dissertation take a middle position between those two
opinions. The complex nature of the social problems is no excuse for the courts
to avoid dealing with the problem completely — there are plenty of areas where
courts already face complex issues and still issue decisions. For example,
lessons learned from the administrative law may help the courts to adjudicate
social rights (e.g. Sunstein 2001). Due to the specific problems faced by the
transition “losers,” the courts should interfere when the core social rights are
violated and the basic resources for dignified life are not guaranteed (IV). This
includes the duty of the courts to inquire whether the other branches of
government have taken different interests into account. At least, the courts
should analyze the issue and not completely avoid the discourse (II).
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However, the overly enthusiastic interference with social policy making
would seriously undermine the balance of powers between the democratically
elected branches and the judiciary. No doubt the decisions guaranteeing social
rights would be popular among the public; but yet the court is unable to weigh
the potential long-term costs of those decisions emanating from financial
burdens on the state. The executive and legislature branches would be seen in
even a more negative light than before, and this might further diminish the trust
in the overall political system. Courts are not necessarily the “wise men” who
can avoid difficult choices that must inevitably be made in a transition process.
The courts should appreciate the difficult choices made by the parliament and
interfere only if the parliament was unwilling even to debate and consider
enhancing social standards.
Ethnic minorities and governance
The second group of transition losers discussed in this dissertation is the ethnic
minority. It is obvious that the transition is not successful if a significant
minority would face either outright discrimination or is more subtly positioned
inferiorly in the society, compared to the period before transition. The success
of transition cannot be measured with the well-being of the majority only. This
is true in any Central and Eastern European country, but especially in Estonia
where the minority makes up around one-third of the population. At least the
Estonian government has been eager to contend that no international law has
been breached (V), and no clearly visible outright discrimination exists.
The negative effect of transition on minorities and ethnic relations in general
in Eastern Europe has been well documented. The atrocities ensuing from the
break-up of Yugoslavia are the prime examples. Some of the most egregious
instances of non-violent discrimination concern the Roma, whose treatment has
led to the adoption of the General Recommendation 27 by the UN Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2000a; see also Ringold 2000).
Whether Estonia has been successful in accommodating the new
environment for the Russian-speaking minority, is doubtful (II). There is plenty
of research arguing that the Russian-speaking minorities are located on the
lower levels of social hierarchy in Estonia, or that the Estonian government has
not been successful in integrating the minorities in the Estonian society (e.g.
Council of Europe 2001; Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination 2000b). The attitude towards ethnic “others” is quite negative,
demonstrating the capacity for conflict and discrimination (Kolstø and Melberg
2002: 53–54). More importantly, whereas the Estonians view the ethnic
Russians negatively, the inverse is not true. On average, the Russians view the
Estonians in positive light (Valk and Karu 2001: 592–593). Several empirical
studies document different outcomes for the ethnic minorities. For example,
Kroncke and Smith (1999) discover significant ethnic wage discrimination
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against ethnic Russians in 1994, whereas no such effect existed in 1989. One
might even say that the policymakers are obsessed with the need to protect the
prominence of Estonian language (II) and limit the allocation of citizenship, so
that no reasonable debate over the well-being of all people living in Estonia,
regardless of ethnic origin, has been possible. The debate about the minority
situation in Estonia would considerably be improved if more of studies actually
documenting the ethnic situation were available. Many arguments in the media
reflect only opinions and beliefs, without solid grounding in the actual situation.
The belief that there is no actual discrimination is widespread among the
Estonians, both the ordinary people and top level politicians (Open Society
Institute 2001: 188). Literature that will only repeat the arguments already
known without offering further evidence of the actual situation will probably
persuade neither the researchers nor the policymakers (V).
Due to the allegations of discrimination, it is not surprising that the courts
become players in the ethnic policy process (Pettai 2002/2003). Even though
the dockets are not dominated by cases involving minority rights (Schwartz
2000: 233), several cases are notable. The Estonian Supreme Court, for
example, has declared parts of the Estonian Language Act unconstitutional,
even though for technical reasons rather than due to content (Riigikohus 1998).
It has also protected people of Russian ethnic origin from deportation where
families would have been separated (Lõhmus 2000). As this dissertation shows,
the lower courts are able to treat minorities independently and without
significant bias when handing out criminal sentences (III).
Should the courts be similarly careful to interfere as they should be careful
when protecting social rights? Probably not. Although it might be politically
risky for the courts to interfere (Pettai 2002/2003), the decision would not
produce unpredictable consequences or budgetary effects that would be similar
to the social rights decisions. However, the courts would be an important
safeguard against the unpredictable political process, and provide assurances to
the minorities that their future is safe in the transition country.
By treating the minority issue as a governance issue carries an additional
benefit besides seeing the enforcement of minority rights as a necessary
institutional framework for stable development. The process of creating
minority policies also becomes important. The integration of the representatives
of other ethnic groups in the policy process, the creation cultural autonomy
institutions and transferring powers when appropriate away from the state and
to those institutions is what modern governance is all about (e.g. Gal 2002). The
fact that there is no Russian cultural autonomy organization in Estonia should
therefore not be considered as an example of discrimination; or as an example
of the lack of motivation on the side of the Russian minority. Rather, it should
be seen as a failure to create effective governance structures. The enthusiasm to
support integration within the Estonian society, both of Estonians and the
“others,” has never existed. Many issues that are especially relevant for
governance, such as creating a representative bureaucracy or ensuring the
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necessary education for minorities, has not even been an issue debated on the
wider political agenda. Integrating minorities in the decentralized political
process would help to alleviate many of those deficiencies.
Dealing with the past
The many disappointments in the future-oriented governance reforms, or the
lack of such reforms from the political agenda for considerable time periods,
may partly be due to the fact that agendas were often dominated by issues that
dealt not with the future, but the past. Many lawyers were dealing with the
historical injustice instead of commercial law reform, for example. Besides
institutional struggles and human rights cases, transition justice was a dominant
topic in the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts (Schwartz 2000: 234–
235). Politicians for considerable time periods discussed not important policy
issues but the past crimes of the former regime, facilitated by the possibilities of
gaining political advantages over other politicians who were former communists
(Szczerbiak 2002).
Among the often mentioned aspects of dealing with the past legacy is the
issue of transitional justice. Transitional justice is a broad concept entailing
issues such as lustration (change in personnel as part of the “purification”
process), truth commissions, and retroactive or delayed criminal punishments
for the collaborators of the oppressing regime. In the Estonian context,
citizenship issues can easily be added to this list. Surely, a crucial aspect of
getting good governance is to deal with the past as smoothly as possible, always
keeping the future in mind.
In Estonia, many of those issues did not emerge very prominently in the
policy agenda. For example, the lustration process was rather informal, with no
formal investigations or official comprehensive lustration laws (III). There were
no truth commissions, and the crimes by the occupation regime were rarely
punished. The court cases have involved only very old people who allegedly
committed crimes against humanity in the 1940s and 1950s. Those who ran for
office had to take an oath that they were not part of the most repressive
machinery, but the truthfulness of the oaths were never vigorously checked. The
proposals to publicly declare the communist regime criminal emerged only in
the new millennium.
Three areas, however, were quite significant and took up a lot of time during
the political debates and later in the courts. Those areas were state continuity,
the issue of citizenship and the property rights (II). In all of those areas, an early
decision was made that the past should be restored as much as practicable.
Thus, the official doctrine of continuous Estonian State from the pre-World
War II until the current Estonian Republic has always been vehemently
defended. Emanating from this, citizenship was only granted to the successors
of the previous citizens, and the property nationalized by the Soviets in the
24
1940s was to be returned. The common characteristic of all of the three
decisions is that the political arguments were often of an absolute nature — the
state was to be viewed continuous, the citizenship could not be granted to
anyone else but the legitimate successors, and the property had to be returned,
no matter what. Of course, the practical solutions were not as strict, as the
Soviet laws continued in force, many of the immigrants did become citizens,
and the restitution of property was not always complete. However, the ideal was
clear and the exceptions were mostly dictated by practical concerns, not by what
is just and proper.
This dissertation contends that this absolute nature has its problems. The
creation of good governance necessary for Estonia should probably start from a
state concept appropriate for the present conditions, not from what the state was
decades. The fact that the political ideal was in the past might easily have
prevented some of the future oriented decisions. The property restitution is a
case in point. Estonia basically lacks a housing policy until today, even though
the need for such a policy is obvious (PRAXIS 2002). However, the debate over
housing policy immediately turns into a debate over the historical (in)justice,
the new property owners and the renters of those properties. Instead of creating
a future-oriented housing policy, one usually starts off with arguing over what
would have been the just solution in solving the previous owner-renter conflicts
after transition.
Conclusion
Governance reform is not limited to the public administration reforms, much
less to the reforms dealing with the merger of organizational units or
introducing New Public Management principles to the central government.
Governance reform means that one has to keep all potential actors — in all
branches of government, but also the interest groups and the people in mind
when designing policies. The relations between government and private sector
must receive attention — no public administration reform should be pursued as
a goal in itself, but with the view towards protecting values important in a
democratic society. For example, local government reform through merging
them may even create strong local governments (a clearly debatable
assumption; see Drechsler 1999), but endangers several aspects of good local
governance, i.e. by breaking already existing ties between local officials and
local population (see II). Governance reform is a failure if the government
becomes omnipotent and communication would not take place in networks, but
in hierarchical command lines. However, governance reform is also a failure if
stable and sustainable institutional frameworks for creating and implementing
policies such as a constitution guaranteeing effective human rights and the state
to enforce the constitutional provisions are not in place. Those are the main
lessons learned from this dissertation.
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN
Valitsemine ja õigus üleminekuriikides
Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa üleminekuriikide ees seisnud väljakutsed demokraatlikuks
riigiks muutumisel olid märkimisväärsed. Plaanimajandus tuli asendada turu-
majandusega ning äärmuslik poliitiline tsentraliseerimine tuli lõpetada. Nende
kahe esimese suure sammu järel tuli aga saavutada täidesaatva ja kohtuvõimu
ümberkorraldamine. See protsess oli reformide õnnestumiseks tõenäoliselt sama
oluline kui majanduse ümberkorraldamine. Jätkusuutlik majanduslik ja sotsiaal-
areng on ilma riigi poolt kehtestatud poliitikateta ning nende ellurakendamiseta
nimelt raske, kui mitte võimatu. Ka Euroopa Liiduga ühinemise protsess on
seda seisukohta rõhutanud. Algsete majanduslike ja poliitiliste kriteeriumide
kõrval omandas järjest rohkem tähendust kandidaatriikide administratiivne
suutlikkus Euroopa Liidu poliitikaid rakendada. Käesolev dissertatsioon tegeleb
mitme küsimusega, mis puudutab uuele demokraatiale kohaseid valitsemis-
süsteeme.
Käesoleva väitekirja juhtiv teema on valitsemine — inglise keeles kasutatava
termini governance järgi. Tegemist on moodsa mõistega, mille tõlkimise osas
eesti keelde puudub seni veel üksmeel. Governance, vaatamata mitmetähendus-
likkusele ka inglise keeles, viitab eelkõige poliitikate elluviimisel kasutatavatele
hierarhiliselt struktureerimata võrgustikele, mis vastanduvad traditsioonilisele
hierarhilisele riigikäsitlusele. Käesolevas väitekirjas on lähtutud aga eeldusest,
et selline selgepiiriline vahetegu valitsemise eri viiside vahel on ekslik. Ka
võrgustikel põhinev valitsemine eeldab riigi keskset rolli selles võrgustikus.
Üleminekuriikide kontekstis omab aga riigi keskne roll eriti suurt tähendust —
riigi tugevdamine, et oleks võimalik luua põhilised demokraatlikud ja turu-
majanduslikud institutsioonid, on esimesi hädavajalikke samme. Ilma kindla
riikliku poliitikata näiteks inimõiguste vallas võib värskelt iseseisvunud riiki
tabada lausa sotsiaalne katastroof. Sealjuures on selles protsessis eriline roll
õigusel — riigi poolt vastuvõetud reeglite kogumil. Tsiviilühiskonna arenda-
mine saab toimuda üksnes käsikäes riigi arendamisega.
Riigi ja avaliku halduse arendamisel räägitakse eelkõige kolmest valdkon-
nast: avaliku teenistuse ja inimkapitali arendamisest, organisatsioonide tugevda-
misest ning institutsionaalsest reformist. Käesolevas väitekirjas sisalduvad
artiklid tegelevad peamiselt inimkapitali ja institutsioonidega. Eriline rõhk on
poliitikate vastuvõtmise protsessil.
Paljud üleminekuriikide probleemid tulenevad kogenematusest. Avaliku
sektori töötajatel puudus üldjuhul teadmine selle kohta, kuidas luua ja ellu viia
demokraatlikus ühiskonnas kohaseid poliitikaid. Sellest kogenematusest tuli
vajadus neid teenistujaid asendada uutega (III) ning vaadata poliitikate loomisel
võõrriikide eeskujule (I, II).
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Teenistujate väljavahetamine on Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikidest kõige
levinum olnud Ida-Saksamaal, kus sellist käitumist võimaldas uute ametnike
sissevool Lääne-Saksamaalt. Muudes riikides on debatid olnud tulisemad.
Väljavahetamise pooldajad viitavad sellele, et uued avalikud teenistujad
tõstavad riigi ja avaliku halduse legitiimsust ning mainet ning et nad toovad
kaasa uue halduskultuuri, mis aitab avalike teenuste kvaliteeti tõsta. Põhiline
argument vanade teenistujate väljavahetamise vastu on seotud nende kogemuste
ja teadmistega. Organisatsioonide juhtimise kogemus oli olemas siiski ainult
endistel juhtidel ning selle kogemuse ärakasutamise vajadust toodi tihti
põhjuseks, miks suuremahulisi personali ümbervahetamise programme ellu ei
ole viidud.
Käesolev väitekiri (artikkel III) analüüsib lähemalt küsimust, kas uute ja
vanade ametnike käitumises ka reaalselt mingi vahe eksisteerib. Artikkel
tugineb Eesti kohtunikele, kelle hulgas läbiviidud reformi tagajärjel
eksisteerisid kõrvuti nii Nõukogude kohtusüsteemis töötanud isikud kui
kohtunikud, kellel taoline kogemus puudus. Analüüs näitab, et nende käitumises
oluline vahe puudub — nende poolt langetatud otsused ei erine üksteisest
millegi poolest. Artikkel ei võimalda asuda mingile kindlale seisukohale kõigi
avalike teenistujate osas ega adresseeri legitiimsusega seonduvaid küsimusi,
mistõttu kaugeleulatuvad järeldused on ennatlikud. Siiski viitavad need tule-
mused sellele, et õnnestunud (ümber)õpe ja personalivalik, mis tagavad sobiva
tasakaalu kogemuse ning poliitilise aktsepteeritavuse vahel, võib olla õnnestu-
num strateegia kui personali täielik ümbervahetamine.
Nii nagu personalivalikul, kasutas Ida-Saksamaa ka sisulise poliitika kujun-
damisel Lääne-Saksamaa eeskuju. Selline poliitikate väljavahetamine Lääne-
Euroopas levinud poliitikate vastu on omane kogu Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopale. Isegi
selliseid poliitikaid, mis pealtnäha üleminekuriigis unikaalsed peaksid olema (nt
sotsiaalpoliitika), on neis riikides kopeeritud. Puutumata ei jää ka põhiseaduse
normid (II). Võõrriikide eeskuju kasutavad peaaegu kõik institutsioonid,
sealhulgas kohtud. Võõrriigi kogemus on sellisel juhul põhiliselt abivahend
otsuse veenvuse tõstmisel, mitte niivõrd otsuse juriidilise õiguse tagamisel (I).
Demokraatia küpsedes võivad võrdlevad argumendid kohtuotsustes seetõttu
kahaneda.
Poliitikate kopeerimine ei pruugi just alati õnnestuda ning üleminekuriigid
on eriti ohtlikus olukorras. Samamoodi nagu on keeruline hinnata võõrriigi
kohtuotsuse reaalset mõju (I) on raske hinnata tavaliste programmide ja projek-
tide efektiivsust teises riigis. Üleminekuühiskonna probleemid on erinevad
võrreldes arenenud lääneriikidega, kelle poliitikad ei pruugi üldsegi mitte
kasulikud olla. Üleminekuühiskonna eripäraks on ka tugev surve moodsate
poliitikate ülevõtmiseks nagu on seda NPM-stiilis haldusreformid, mis samuti ei
pruugi tärkavale demokraatiale sobida. Üleminekuriikides peaks seetõttu igal
üksikjuhul tõsiselt kaaluma mingi poliitika ülevõtmise otstarbekust.
Mõistagi ei tähenda ettevaatus eeskujude kasutamisel seda, et riiki peaks
arendama isoleerituna muust maailmast. Käesoleva dissertatsiooni üks
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argumente on teatud institutsioonide tähtsus üleminekuühiskonnas. Nende hulka
kuuluvad näiteks inimõigused ja nende tagamiseks loodud üksused, aga ka nt.
selged reeglid avalikus halduses.
Nagu mainitud, ei adresseeri Lääne-Euroopast ülevõetud poliitikad tavaliselt
üleminekuühiskonnas aktuaalseid probleeme. Üheks selliseks valdkonnaks, mis
Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopas tähelepanu on võitnud, on ‘üleminekukaotajate’ temaa-
tika. Nimelt kaotasid teatud kindlad ühiskonnagrupid ülemineku käigus oma
senise positsiooni ja sotsiaalse staatuse. Erilise hoobi said vaesed (tihti eakad)
ning rahvusvähemused. Kuna mõlema grupi suhtes ei ole poliitiline protsess
olnud helde, on just nende gruppide puhul oluline selgete inimõigusalaste
reeglite olemasolu. Valitsemisreformi õnnestumiseks on lisaks aga vaja
institutsioone, eelkõige sõltumatuid kohtuid, kes neid inimõiguseid ka praktikas
kaitseks.
Sotsiaalse kaitse süsteemide ümberkorraldamine on tekitanud suuri prob-
leeme vaatamata sellele, et massilised avaliku sektori töötajate vallandamised
on olnud haruldased. Lisaks kasvanud tööpuudusele on tugeva surve all olnud
ka näiteks tervisekaitse ning sotsiaalabi korraldus. Sellises olukorras on just
kohtud tihti sekkunud ning asunud kaitsma inimeste põhiseaduslikke sotsiaal-
seid õigusi. Üllatavalt paljud Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riigid sisaldavad sotsiaalsete
õiguste alaseid norme ning mitme riigi kohtud on oma otsustes kindlakäeliselt
sotsiaalsete reformide vastu asunud. Kuigi Eesti kohtute roll sotsiaalpoliitika
kujundamisel oli esimese kümne aasta jooksul tühine (II), on hiljuti mitmeid
otsuseid juba langetatud, puudutades näiteks õigusi tervise kaitsele (IV) või
elukohale (II). Tihti on kohtu tegevuse aluseks olnud õiguskantsler.
Kohtute aktiivne roll on põhjustanud küllaltki aktiivse teadusliku ja poliiti-
lise debati. Kohtu tugeva positsiooni pooldajad lähtuvad sellest, et ka
sotsiaalsed õigused on fundamentaalsed inimõigused, mida kohtud kaitsma
peavad. Teiselt poolt viidatakse asjaolule, et kohtud ei ole õiged institutsioonid
tegelemaks küsimustega, mis omavad seoseid väga paljudes ühiskonnaelu
valdkondades. Lisaks olevat tegemist sekkumisega parlamendi pädevuses
olevasse eelarve- ja sotsiaalpoliitikasse. Väitekirjas olevates artiklites on võetud
vahepealne positsioon. Põhilised inimõigused tuleb tagada, tulenevalt
üleminekuühiskonna spetsiifikast tuleb need tagada ka ‘kaotajatele.’ Kohus
peaks hindama, kas teised võimuharud on põhiseaduslikke väärtusi vähemalt
kaalunud. Vähemalt ei peaks kohtud diskussiooni ise täielikult vältima (II, IV).
Rahvusvähemuste õiguste kaitsel on kohtutel olnud samamoodi tähtis roll.
Eesti ametlik positsioon on pidevalt olnud selline, et rahvusvahelise õiguse
norme ei ole Eestis rikutud (V). Samas on ametliku poliitika aluseks tihti
veendumus mitte-eestlaste keele ja kultuuri väiksemast väärtusest ning vajadu-
sest eesti keelt peaaegu et pimesi kaitsta (II). Sarnased probleemid eksisteerivad
mitmetes teistes üleminekuühiskondades, nt seoses mustlastega Kesk-Euroopas.
Samas eksisteerib vähe uurimusi, mis probleemiga erapooletult ja empiiri-
liselt tegeleks. Meediasse ja poliitilisse diskussiooni jõudvad seisukohad
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põhinevad tihti vähesel informatsioonil; sarnane probleem on ka teaduslikel
töödel, mis kaitsevad tihti ühte kindlat seisukohta (V).
Kohtute roll vähemuste õiguste kaitsjana selles keskkonnas ei tohiks olla
üllatav. Kuigi Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikides on kohtud rahvusvähemuste kaitsel
ehk oodatust vähem silma paistnud, eksisteerib siiski mitmeid lahendeid, kus
näiteks ülirange keeleseaduse nõudeid on leevendatud. Käesolevas väitekirjas
on ühes artiklis näidatud ka seda, et Eesti madalama astme kohtud ei langeta
rahvusvähemuste suhtes teistsuguseid otsuseid kui eestlaste suhtes (III).
Tõenäoliselt peakski kohtutel olema vähem takistusi rahvusvähemuste õiguse
eest aktiivselt seismisel võrreldes sotsiaalsete õigustega.
Rahvusvähemuste õigused viitavad viimasele teemale, millega käesolevas
väitekirjas on tegeletud, nimelt minevikupärandiga võitlemine. Vaatamata
sellele, et Eestis ei loodud mitmete teiste Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikide eeskujul
ametlikke ‘tõe komisjone,’ ei toimunud massilisi vallandamisi mineviku-
tegevuse pärast (III), ega hakatud kedagi Nõukogudeaegse tegevuse eest
vastutusele võtma, oli kolm valdkonda sellised, kus minevik on Eesti poliitikas
olnud kesksel kohal.
Esiteks on palju tähelepanu pööratud riikliku järjepidevuse tagamise vaja-
dustele. Ametlik seisukoht Eesti riigi järjepidevusest on kaasa toonud koda-
kondsuse omandamise järjepidevuse ning hulga kodakondsuseta isikuid.
Kolmandaks valdkonnaks, kus on minevikku tagasi pööratud, on omandireform
(II).
Käesoleva väitekirja eesmärk ei ole näidata, et tegemist on olnud väärate
otsustega. Pigem on asutud seisukohale, et mõnikord ollakse nendes kolmes
valdkonnas liiga absoluutsetel seisukohtadel. Riigi järjepidevuse küsimus on
võib-olla takistanud edasiviivaid seisukohti piiriküsimuses. Kodakondsus-
küsimus on võib-olla takistanud mõistlikku diskussiooni integratsiooniküsi-
muste üle. Omandireform on saanud võib-olla takistuseks tänapäevase
elamupoliitika teostamisel. Tulevikku suunatud valitsemine peaks lähtuma
tulevikuperspektiivist, mitte niivõrd minevikupärandist.
Käesoleva väitekirja artiklid iseloomustavad seda, et valitsemisreform ei ole
üksnes haldusreform, mis seisneb mõningate organisatsioonide funktsioonide
ümbervaatamises ja nende liitmises-lahutamises. Valitsemise ümberkujunda-
mine üleminekuriigis peab lähtuma sellest, kas reform aitab parandada inimeste
heaolu. Eelkõige on selleks vajalik piisavalt tugeva riigi loomine, kes kaitseks
põhilisi väärtusi ning kes tagaks institutsioonid stabiilseks arenguks.
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COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REASONING:
THE LAW AND STRATEGY OF SELECTING THE
RIGHT ARGUMENTS
Taavi Annus*
INTRODUCTION
The relevance of comparative law in constitutional adjudication has repeatedly
been at the center of heated debates. During the 2001/2002 term, the Supreme
Court continued to struggle with this issue. In Atkins v. Virginia,1 where the
Court invalidated the death penalty for the mentally retarded, this conflict was
at its strongest. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued forcefully:
I write separately . . . to call attention to the defects in the Court’s decision
to place weight on foreign laws. . . . In reaching its conclusion today, the
Court . . . adverts to the fact that other countries have disapproved
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders . . . I fail to see, however, how the views of other countries
regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the
Court’s ultimate determination. . . . [W]e have . . . explicitly rejected the
idea that the sentencing practices of other countries could serve to establish
the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that a practice is accepted among
our people. . . . For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we are
looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.2
Justice Scalia seconded this:
[T]he prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate “national
consensus” must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the
views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of the
so-called “world community,” and respondents to opinion polls. . . . [T]he
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serving as the host. I thank Christopher McCrudden, Nancy Maveety, Rick Hills, and
Margit Tavits for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank
the research scholars and the S.J.D. students at the University of Michigan who
provided valuable comments during the presentation of a preliminary version of this
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1
 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2
 Id. at 322–25 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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practices of the “world community,” whose notions of justice are (thank-
fully) not always those of our people, [are irrelevant].3
This stinging criticism was indeed caused by a single sentence in a single
footnote.4 In addressing the criticism of the dissents, Justice Stevens added that
although comparative arguments “are by no means dispositive,” they still lend
“further support to our conclusion that there is a consensus among those who
have addressed the issue.”5
A second major case of the term, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,6 which in-
volved school vouchers, also contained arguments relying on comparative
experience. In this case, however, the comparative arguments were outlined by
the dissenters.. Justice Stevens gave examples from the Balkans, Northern
Ireland, and the Middle East in evaluating religious funding of primary
education.7 Justice Breyer, arguing that the funding of religious schools might
contribute to “religious strife,” referred to the British and French experience:
I recognize that other nations, for example Great Britain and France, have in
the past reconciled religious school funding and religious freedom without
creating serious strife. Yet British and French societies are religiously more
homogeneous — and it bears noting that recent waves of immigration have
begun to create problems of social division there as well.8
These two cases from the U.S. Supreme Court show that debate over the use of
comparative reasoning in constitutional interpretation9 is far from concluded.
                                                
3
 Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4
 “Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” Id.
at 2249 (Stevens, J.).
5
 Id.
6
 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
7
 “Admittedly, in reaching that conclusion I have been influenced by my under-
standing of the impact of religious strife on the decisions of our forbears to migrate to
this continent, and on the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and
the Middle East to mistrust one another. Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that
was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious
strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy.” Id. at 2485 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
8
 Id. at 2506 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9
 The Supreme Court also uses comparative experience in cases involving no
constitutional law. For example, one argument put forward in support of the holding
was that “courts in other nations, applying their domestic copyright laws, have also
concluded that Internet or CD-ROM reproduction and distribution of freelancers' works
violate the copyrights of freelancers.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 n.13
(2001) (Ginsburg, J.). In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., a major
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Two issues in particular are left open in these decisions. The first issue is openly
and vehemently brought out by the dissenters in Atkins v. Virginia — namely,
whether the use of comparative constitutional law in domestic adjudication is
appropriate at all. When courts choose to accept comparative constitutional
arguments they must then address a second issue — the weight of comparative
arguments relative to other methods of analysis. It is far from clear what Justice
Stevens meant when he noted that foreign experience is “by no means
dispositive” and that, when it is consistent with other sources, it “lends further
support” to arguments supported by other interpretive methods.10
This article tries to provide answers to these two questions. It will make a
contribution to the growing literature on comparative constitutional law in three
ways. First, this paper systematically distinguishes between different uses of
comparative law. I will show how comparative experience could theoretically
contribute to solving both normative and empirical questions. However, because
normative and empirical reasoning are each based on different types of
materials, these forms of reasoning each result in unique legitimacy and
practical problems. Thus, the weight of comparative arguments vary.11 More-
over, different courts may not use employ comparative reasoning consistently,
or at the same rate as other courts. The U.S. Supreme Court may have valid
reasons for not using comparative constitutional law, whereas other courts
might have no clear justification for declining to engage in comparative
reasoning.
Second, this article outlines scholarly treatment of comparative reasoning by
social scientists, and especially by political scientists. Increasingly, critics of
legal analysis specifically highlight the deficit of interdisciplinary approaches to
legal questions.12 Even though one might not agree that interdisciplinary
analysis is the future of legal scholarship in all respects, there is no reason to
reject what other scholarly fields have to offer.
Finally, this paper distinguishes between strategic and legal purposes for
utilizing foreign materials and comparative experience. I argue that there is a
difference between what constitutes a good legal argument and what makes a
decision useful in relation to strategic goals the court might pursue outside of
                                                                                                                       
telecommunications case, the opinion referred to the experience in several European
countries. 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1696–97 (2002), (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
10
 Supra text accompanying note 5
11
 This has also been often neglected. See Ulrich Drobnig, The Use of Comparative
Law by Courts, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 17–18 (Ulrich Drobnig
& Sjef van Erp eds., 1999) (showing that the courts use both foreign rules and the
information about effects of the rules, but discussing the weight of comparative
arguments based only on the rules).
12
 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 118 (2002)
(arguing that the subfield of methodology of law should be developed by encouraging
contact between several disciplines).
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legal analysis. If comparative experience has not been used as the basis for a
court’s holding, I term this use strategic or “soft.” I will show that the courts
may invoke comparative arguments, or may specifically avoid these arguments,
because of strategic calculations, both based on institutional and individual
concerns The strategic or “soft” use enables a court to broaden acceptance of
the decision in the eyes of the public or other political institutions, or may assist
in achieving international goals. For example, strategic uses of comparative
arguments may give a court’s legal analysis the appearance of being based on
“legal” considerations when decision itself is actually motivated by political
concerns. This distinction between legal and strategic uses of foreign experience
allows me to explain the differences in practice among various courts that cite
foreign experience.
This paper begins with a brief overview of the relevant literature. The second
part of the paper outlines three uses of comparative law. The next three parts of
the paper describe the practice, strengths, and weaknesses of each approach. In
the sixth part, I describe strategic uses of comparative arguments and show that
these strategic uses might explain differences between courts in citing compara-
tive experience. I conclude with a discussion of the possible ways in which
research on the uses of comparative law can be developed.
I. Five Areas of Comparative Constitutional Scholarship
Literature on comparative constitutional law13 can be roughly divided into five
strands.14 First, there is literature on foreign countries’ constitutional law from
the perspective of an “outsider” or country evaluations on a general level.15
                                                
13
 For an earlier thorough overview, see generally James A. Thomson, Comparative
Constitutional Law: Entering the Quagmire, 6. ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 22 (1989).
14
 Casebooks are exceptions, covering different fields of comparative constitutional
law. See Mauro CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1979); VICKI JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999).
15
 See generally FRANCOIS VENTER, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON: JAPAN,
GERMANY, CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA AS CONSTITUTIONAL STATES (2000)
(comparing the constitutional law of four countries). On France, see generally JOHN S.
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1996) (giving an overview of the French
constitutional law doctrine); Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (1982) (arguing that several
constitutional issues could be solved with the help of separation of powers analysis as is
the case in France); Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France
and the United States, 49 ME. L. REV. 21 (1997) (broadly comparing the approaches of
France and the U.S. in constitutional interpretation). On Germany, see generally
EDWARD J. EBERLE & DONALD P. KOMMERS, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL
VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (2002) (analyzing the approaches of
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Such works may, but usually do not, involve “comparison” as such. Sometimes
generalized conclusions may be offered.16 A second type of literature focuses on
constitutional theory, rule of law, and judicial review.17 A third focuses on
substantive constitutional law issues, and compares approaches by different
countries, or otherwise reviews the solutions of one country from an “outsider”
perspective or for an outside reader. Such issues are very diverse, ranging from
free speech18 to affirmative action.19 Fourth, there are papers that advocate the
                                                                                                                       
Germany and the U.S. related to restricting personal freedoms); DONALD P. KOMMERS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2nd
ed. 1997) (giving an overview of the most important cases of the German Constitutional
Court); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
(1994) (providing an overview of the German constitutional law).
16
 Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 247 (2001) (arguing that the East European constitutional courts have been poor
policy-makers when deciding complex social and economic issues related to transition);
HERMAN SCHWARZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE ) (2000) (arguing that the Eastern European constitutional courts
have been helpful in maintaining the democratic system).
17
 See generally M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
(2nd ed., 1998) (describing the history of the concept of separation of powers); Ran
Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial Review vs.
Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415 (2000) (arguing that
learning from the experience of other countries can help decide constitutional issues);
HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (David Beatty
ed., 1994) (describing the various judicial review systems); J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P.
Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and its Discontents, 17 NW. J. INT’L L & BUS.
354 (1996–1997) (analyzing the constitutionalization process of the European Union);
Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 707 (2001) (describing models of judicial review).
18
 On texts involving just US-Canadian comparisons, see Ian Slotin, Free Speech and
the Visage Culturel: Canadian and American Perspectives on Pop Culture Discrimi-
nation, 111 YALE L.J. 2289 (2002); Marie-France Major, Comparative Analogies:
Sullivan Visits the Commonwealth, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 17 (1999); Donald
L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in the
United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187 (2001); Kent Greenawalt,
Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1992).
19
 E.g., HARISH C. JAIN ET AL., GLOBAL EQUALITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE (2003); Jan Lodewyk
Pretorius, Constitutional Standards for Affirmative Action in South Africa: A
Comparative Overview, 61; ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT
UND VÖLKERRECHT 403 (2001); ANNE PETERS ET AL., WOMEN, QUOTAS, AND
CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR WOMEN UNDER
AMERICAN, GERMAN AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999);
SUNITA PARIKH, THE POLITICS OF PREFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (1997); Kendall Thomas, The
Political Economy of Recognition: Affirmative Action Discourse and Constitutional
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adoption of a particular constitutional system20 or specific solutions to
constitutional problems.21 This trend has especially gained momentum after the
break-up of the Communist Block.22 These papers usually address the issue of
legal drafting23 and do not consider legal interpretation as much, following the
idea that the two questions are somehow different.24
                                                                                                                       
Equality in Germany and the U.S.A., 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 329 (1999);THOMAS
SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); POLITICS
OF POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION — A CROSS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (S.K. Mitra ed.,
1990).
20
 Consider the recent discussion over the vices and virtues of the presidential system
of government. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113
HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000); Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential
Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is Wrong To Prefer the German To the U.S.
Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 (2001).
21
 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-
COMMUNIST APPLICATION 225, 229 (Andras Sajo ed., 1996) (arguing that social rights
should not be included in a constitution); Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social
Rights Belong in a Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1233
 (1995) (arguing that a constitution should contain positive rights).
22
 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, American Advice and New Constitutions, 1 CHI. J. INT’L.
L. 173, 179 (2000) (commenting on the Draft Ukrainian Constitution).
23
 To stress the importance of comparative law when drafting statutes is actually
misleading. The benefits of comparison are the greatest when one considers the policy
underlying the statute, not the statute as such. Also, it is important to consider
comparative experience not only when drafting statutes (creating new policy), but also
when analyzing the performance of existing statutes (existing policies). Comparative
policy analysis has performed this task for a long time, and its usefulness has not been
doubted in the political science literature as much as in the legal circles. See generally
JESSICA R. ADOLINO & CHARLES H. BLAKE, COMPARING PUBLIC POLICIES: ISSUES AND
CHOICES IN SIX INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (2000); FRANCIS G. CASTLES,
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY (1999); HUGH HECLO ET AL., COMPARATIVE PUBLIC
POLICY: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHOICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (3rd. ed. 1990).
24
 Such is the view expressed by Justice Scalia in Printz v. U.S. 521 U.S. 898, 921
(1997) (“We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing one.”).
However, the arguments and methods put forward in this paper largely apply to legal
drafting as well. When drafting constitutions or statutes, the same kinds of normative
and empirical questions arise as when interpreting the law. Cf., Jon Elster,
Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 476 (“In
constitutional debates, one invariably finds a large number of references to other
constitutions, as models to be imitated, as disasters to be avoided, or simply as evidence
for certain views about human nature.”); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, DRAFTING A
CONSTITUTION FOR A NATION OR REPUBLIC EMERGING INTO FREEDOM ). (2d ed. 1994)
(describing the influence of foreign constitutions in drafting the “new” constitutions);
Rett R. Ludwikowski, “Mixed” Constitutions — Product of an East-Central European
Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B. U. INT’L L.J. 1
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The fifth strand of literature deals with comparative constitutional law as a
process or discipline and describes its value, tasks, and methods. This article
belongs to this strand of literature. More specifically, this strand explores how
courts employ comparative constitutional analysis.
Several authors have reviewed the use of comparative materials by appellate
courts.25 Some have undertaken statistical studies on citations to foreign law.26
This approach has been combined by some with a more analytical approach to
comparative constitutional law. Political scientists, relying on analytical
approaches which focus on judges’ motivations, have tried to explain the
differences between various courts’ citation practices.27 However, other than
                                                                                                                       
 (1998) (arguing that the constitution-drafters borrowed from a variety of sources).
Comparative law can be helpful, but also inappropriate, when dealing with legislative
change.
25
 Similarly, the use of comparative law generally, not only comparative constitutional
law, has been thoroughly discussed. See generally, THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY
COURTS (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999) (surveys of 12 countries and the
European Union); MARKKU KIIKERI, COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING AND EUROPEAN
LAW 77–92 (2001) (based on interviews with the judges and functionaries of the courts
in England, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Italy, and France). For the Netherlands, see T.
Koopmans, Comparative Law and the Courts, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 550–55
(1996).
26
 In Australia, see generally Paul E. von Nessen, The Use of American Precedents by
the High Court of Australia, 1901–1987, 14 ADEL. L. R. 181h (1992). In Canada, see
generally Peter J. McCormick, The Supreme Court and American Citations 1945–1994:
A Statistical Overview, 8 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 527 (1997]; Christopher P. Manfredi,
The Use of United States Decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada Under the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, 23 CAN. J. OF POL. SCI. 499 (1990); C. L. Ostberg et al.,
Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change: Explaining the Citation of Foreign
Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada, 34 CAN. J. POL.SCI. 377 (2001). In the
United States, the studies are usually combined with the studies on general citation
practices. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century
of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); James Leonard, An Analysis of
Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86 LAW LIBR. J.
129 (1994); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of
Appeals, 1850–1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121, 132–35 (1995); William H. Manz, The
Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update, 49 BUFF.
L. REV. 1273 (2001); William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and
Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002).
27
 See.C. L. Ostberg et. al., supra note 26 (arguing that the citation of foreign
precedents is a form of policy emulation explained by the individual attitudes of the
justices from the litigation strategies of the interest groups and from general values that
the justices refer to); Shannon Smithey Ishiyama, A Tool, Not a Master — The Use of
Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 1188 (2001)
(arguing that judges rely on foreign precedent because of its utility in cutting
information costs decreasing uncertainty, and providing justification). See also
Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial
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these few rare positive analyses, the literature largely focuses on whether and
how courts and other decision-makers should use comparative constitutional
law.
In evaluating the use of comparative experience, three different types of
issues are usually addressed: the systematization of the uses of comparative law,
legitimacy problems of comparative reasoning, and practical difficulties of
comparison.
Attempts to categorize uses of comparative law by courts are numerous.
Although most authors claim that there are three uses of comparative
constitutional law, there is a lack of coherency in these different approaches.
For example, Tushnet discusses functionalism, expressivism, and bricolage.28
Choudhry contends that there are three modes of comparative constitutional
interpretation: universalist, dialogical, and genealogical. Universalist inter-
pretation relies on the assumption that constitutional principles are based on
similar universal norms. The dialogical approach focuses on  assumptions
underlying constitutional jurisprudence to justify or reject the use of foreign
materials and experience. Finally, genealogical interpretation emphasizes the
similar historical backgrounds of constitutions.29 Another way of seeing the use
of comparative law is to differentiate between defining and justifying relevant
issues, and clarifying the reasoning behind comparative analysis in moral and
policy balancing.30 One can refer to “evaluative,” “intentionalist,” “textualist,”
and “authority-based” comparisons.31 One might also distinguish between
“necessary” and “voluntary,”32 between “genealogical” and “ahistorical,” and
between “positive” and “negative”33 recourses to comparative law. The court
may use comparative experience by “referring to it in dicta,” to “create a
                                                                                                                       
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J.LEGAL STUD. 499, 516–27 (2000)
(describing possible explanations for the use of comparative experience).
28
 Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999).
29
 Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 825 (1999).
30
 Louis J. Blum, Mixed Signals: The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in
Constitutional Adjudication, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 157 (2002).
31
 Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513, 519–22 (2002). “Evaluative” comparison
refers to the use of foreign materials to evaluate the likely consequences of certain
interpretation. ‘Intentionalist” comparison is used to ascertain the intent of the legisla-
tor, especially when “borrowed statute doctrine” applies. “Textualist comparisons” can
ascertain the common meaning of the terms at the time a statute was adopted.
“Authority-based” comparisons are made when the courts advance foreign statutes or
decisions as per se arguments in favor of or against a particular interpretation.
32
 Drobnig, supra note 11, at 3.
33
 David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV.
539, 550 (2001).
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workable principle of law” or to “prove a ‘constitutional fact.’’34 The court may
use comparative law in order to “find a solution” or “justify a solution,”35 as
well as for the purpose of “internal utility” or “external utility.”36 The
comparison may be “vertical” or “horizontal.”37 Or, one might distinguish
between the “general and indirect,” as opposed to “specific and direct,”
influence of comparative constitutional materials, as well as between explicit
and non-explicit uses of comparative constitutional law.38
The diversity that we see in these classifications of comparative analysis
illustrate that a systematic approach to this topic has not been developed .
Certainly, the analyses of different authors overlap. There is no significant
difference between what Tushnet calls the “functionalist” approach and the
focus of other authors on foreign experience in understanding the functioning of
legal institutions. However, none of these classifications attempts to be
exhaustive, nor are any of these classifications mutually exclusive. I will turn to
this issue in the next section of the article.
II. Legitimacy and Practicability Issues in Comparative Analysis
While most authors focus on classifications of comparative law, few actually
address its legitimacy. This is surprising, as there is a genuine dispute between
U.S. Supreme Court justices on the issue, some of whom explicitly reject the
legitimacy of comparative reasoning.39
Perhaps the most common discussion of legitimacy focuses on the universal
character of some constitutional norms, particularly human rights provisions. It
has been argued that courts should look at foreign practices because these
reflect norms that have universal character. As an example, the universal
character of human rights norms is argued to demand a universal application of
these rights.40 Drobnig, who writes about both comparative constitutional law
                                                
34
 Id. at 552–56.
35
 Koopmans, supra note 25at 550.
36
 Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, at 254–63 (2001).
37
 KIIKERI, supra note 25, at 194, 298.
38
 McCrudden, supra note 27, at 510–11.
39
 Consider the dissents in Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2002); or the majority opinion
in Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (arguing that “it is American conceptions
of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various
amici . . . that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant.”) (Scalia, J.).
40
 For a discussion, see McCrudden, supra note 27, at 527–29; Anne-Marie Slaughter,
A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, at 121–23 (1994);
Claire L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 24–25 (1998) (arguing
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and the use of comparative law in general, distinguishes between different types
of comparison, basing the legitimacy of comparative arguments mostly on the
international character of the norms.41
There are alternatives to this proposition. The question of legitimacy is the
main issue in Dammann’s analaysis.42 Dammann contends that the legitimacy
problem of the “intentionalist,” “textualist,” and “authority-based comparisons,”
is not considerable, as these analytical methods are based on traditional
interpretation techniques. In order to justify “authority-based comparisons,”
Dammann refers to the general discourse theory developed by Habermas, who
theorizes that the truthfulness of legal analysis is supported by the fact that legal
decision-makers who follow similar basic procedural rules also reach similar
conclusions.43 According to Dammann, comparative analysis is therefore
legitimate because courts in different countries follow similar basic procedural
rules.
Tushnet similarly distinguishes between uses of comparative constitutional
law. Tushnet sees no considerable legitimacy problems for functionalist or
expressivist uses of comparative constitutional law, as they do not form an
authority for the court.44 Tushnet justifies the use of bricolage, the practice of
constructing the legal argument from the arguments used by foreign courts, by
the fact that foreign materials are often used unconsciously. Bricolage is thus
nothing but a natural practice that warrants its own use.45
The practical problems of comparative constitutional law are often discussed.
These include the difficulty of comprehending foreign law,46 the tendency of
decision-makers to take cases out of their wider social and cultural context,47 the
                                                                                                                       
that the constitutions need to be interpreted in the light of international human rights
obligations).
41
 Drobnig, supra note 11, at 19–21. He has no clear explanation for applying
comparative law in “purely domestic” cases. He just presents two functions that
comparative arguments might have — to fill legal gaps or to overcome an outmoded
rule. Id. at 21.
42
 Dammann, supra note 32.
43
 Id. at 540–54.KIIKERI bases his justification for comparative reasoning also on
discourse theory. See supra note 25 at 307–14.
44
 Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1234–37.
45
 Id. at 1237–38.
46
 Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process
of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 647 (1999) (“verbal similarities
may be misleading”).
47
 MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 4–5 (2d ed., 1994)
(arguing that the legal problems are similar only on the technical level but substantively
may differ due to the differences in the political, moral, social or economic values);
Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232, 236 (1996) (the
comparativists often “forget about the historical, social, economic, political, cultural,
and psychological context which has made that rule or proposition what it is”);
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difficulty in determining the effects of laws abroad,48 and the problems of
transferring such experience into the domestic system.49 The literature fares
excellently in discussing practical problems in comparative analysis. However,
there are limits to this literature. The literature does not distinguish clearly
enough between different uses of comparative constitutional law and different
types of practical problems that emerge with these uses. Also, the literature does
not address issues that have been identified by scholars in other fields. Many of
the practical problems arising from comparative analysis arise in all
comparative studies, and have nothing to do with the legitimacy problems that
judges have to address. Discussion of comparative legal analysis would profit
immensely from an interdisciplinary approach. I will turn to these arguments
later when discussing the uses of comparative constitutional law in more detail.
Finally, existing literature is often neither explicit nor consistent in defining
what “comparative experience” means. Constitutional case-law from foreign
courts certainly is included.  However, it is less certain whether or not constitu-
tions, statutes, and other kinds of information is included in comparative
analysis. What about the text of the constitution or statutes? What about other
kinds of information from foreign systems?50 I will discuss whether different
materials are suitable for different types of reasoning and why these materials
give rise to various legitimacy and practical problems. In my own analysis,
reference to comparative constitutional law (also termed comparative or foreign
“experience”) will be quite broad, and will include the use of any kind of
information from other jurisdictions. The “information” can be contained in the
texts of constitutions, statutes, cases, government documents, but also all other
kinds of data which usually is available as either economic or social data.51
                                                                                                                       
Christopher Osakwe, The Problems of the Comparability of Notions in Constitutional
Law, 59 TUL. L. REV. 875–76 (1985) (“Public law reflects an inner relationship — a
sort of spiritual and psychical relationship — with the people over whom it operates.”).
48
 E.g., Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1265 (arguing that any number of variables could
have determined the observed outcomes, not just the law that is being discussed).
49
 Fontana, supra note 33, at 556 (arguing that the courts could hire experts to solve
such issues).
50
 Some authors are rather consistent. Consider the approach in Jens C. Dammann, The
Role of Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 14 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 513, 517–21 (2002). His starting approach is broad, as his purpose is
to develop “a general justification for comparative reasoning in the context of
interpretation”, id. at 517, and describing “comparative reasoning” as “any reasoning
that somehow refers to foreign law”, id. at 519. However, when relying on discourse
theory to develop the justification, he explicitly refers to “authority-based comparisons.”
Id. at 521.
51
 The authors are usually quite superficial when discussing this issue. Some explicitly
deal with case law. See Choudhry, supra note 29, at 824 (the goal is “to describe and
explain the interpretive methodologies used, and the normative justifications offered, by
50
This short overview of the existing literature shows its largely unsystematic
nature. Different authors discuss similar problems, but do not directly
communicate with each other. The most explicit example of this miscommu-
nication is the incoherent nature of the classification of comparative
constitutional law. Therefore, I will start my own argument from this puzzle.
III. The Three Uses of Comparative Constitutional Law by the Courts
For all practical purposes, the uses of comparative law can be classified into
three categories: soft use, comparative normative reasoning, and comparative
empirical reasoning. First, a differentiation needs to be made between “soft”
and “hard” uses of comparative experience. The former describes the process of
discussing foreign statutes, cases, or practices in the decision-making process or
in the text of judicial opinions without relying on this experience in reaching the
holding. In these instances, foreign experience is mentioned, but it has no
precedential value. The “hard” use of comparative experience, however, contri-
butes directly to the holding of the case, and possesses at least some degree of
authority and precedential value for the court. Of course, comparative
experience need not be central to a holding. In these cases, foreign materials
utilized in the opinion only add weight to the court’s argument. What is
important is that these materials have legal significance in the opinion. Their
inclusion is not just a matter of judicial rhetoric, for omission of these materials
would reduce the persuasiveness of the argument.52
The “hard” use of comparative experience serves two purposes. First, one
might acquire help in making normative judgments, either when balancing
different constitutional values or when interpreting broad constitutional
principles.53 Second, foreign materials may assist in making empirical obser-
vations and predictions about the consequences of a judicial determination.
Essentially, comparative materials may be utilized in either normative or
empirical judgments.
In making this sharp distinction between “hard” and “soft” uses, I argue that
techniques of legal reasoning such as filling gaps in laws and creating legal tests
                                                                                                                       
courts for their use of comparative jurisprudence in constitutional interpretation.”).
Some refer to social data and case law interchangeably. E.g. Tushnet, supra note 28.
52
 But see Koopmans, supra note 25at 550 (“A method consisting of relying on
comparative materials in order to justify the solution is not always interesting from a
legal point of view. Very often, the court might have used a different argument to arrive
at exactly the same decision. . . . It is more or less a matter of judicial rhetoric.”).
53
 I do not need to delve into the discussion of whether normative judgments by the
courts relying on broad principles are in themselves acceptable or not. I will be satisfied
with the observation that the courts simply rely on these principles.
51
for the analysis of legal concepts54 are in reality not merely techniques that can
be adopted with the help of comparative reasoning. For example, Jackson
recommends that the U.S. Supreme Court should look at comparative
constitutional law to “discover” the “proportionality” analysis.55 This analysis
would require balancing restrictions to constitutional rights with the aims of
such restrictions. At first sight, this might seem to be a rather technical
application of a legal test. However, adopting proportionality analysis actually
requires the adoption of a normative position carrying a certain empirical
assumption. This adoption normatively assumes that it is “right” to balance
different values in constitutional adjudication. Further, proportionality analysis
carries an empirical assumption that courts are the suitable venue for balancing
conflicting values, i.e. that certain positive consequences result from the fact
that courts engage in this balancing. One could, of course, test this empirical
assumption by analyzing available comparative evidence. Thus, it is obvious
that proportionality analysis is not a technical process, and similarly other56
“technical” issues that the courts face actually involve complex normative
judgments and empirical predictions.
It is essential to distinguish between a court’s use of normative reasoning in
contrast to empirical reasoning. Different rules govern the use of comparative
materials in each situation. Additionally, the legitimacy and practical limits of
comparative materials is different when assessing normative questions on one
hand and empirical questions on the other. For example, when making
normative conclusions, courts may, in part, rely on foreign cases, but they may
also rely on other materials. By contrast, when courts make empirical
predictions, the cases are usually worthless in themselves, as they don’t contain
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 This is where Drobnig sees great usefulness in comparative law. See Drobnig, supra
note 11, at 21.
55
 Vicki Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening
Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 583 (1999) (arguing that the U.S. courts could learn from the experience of foreign
courts such as the Canadian Supreme Court and adopt proportionality analysis).
56
 There is some support from comparative experience that courts adopting extensive
proportionality analysis might shape the policy process, giving rise to the “judicia-
lization of politics.” Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation:
Comparative Illumination of Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245
(1995) (using Canadian and French case studies and arguing that more-than-minimal
judicial review causes policy distortion and poses difficult problems for democratic
debilitation and operation of a stable and vigorous constitutional democracy); ALEC
STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000)
(arguing that the European constitutional courts have features of a “third chamber” of
the parliament); C. Neil Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder, Judicialization and the Future of
Politics and Policy, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 515 (C. Neil Tate
& Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995) (describing the increase in power of judicial
institutions around the globe).
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information about their own consequences. They only may direct the courts to
other sources.
Analyzing various uses of comparative law allows one to make recommen-
dations regarding comparative analysis according to specific type of court at
issue. Some courts might see problems in legitimizing their use of comparative
constitutional law. This however means only that these courts cannot utilize
some types of comparative reasoning (for the present purposes, normative
reasoning), whereas other uses might be perfectly legitimate in the eyes of the
court (mostly, empirical reasoning).
Having so identified the three uses of comparative law, I will turn to each of
them in more detail. The next three sections of this article provide a description
of each type of use of comparative reasoning and give examples from cases
where foreign materials have been so used. Thereafter, I will turn to the
legitimacy and practicability problems for each use and discuss the weight of
each type of comparative reasoning. I will conclude each part with a discussion
of the context where such type of reasoning could be useful.
III. ‘SOFT’ USE OF COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE
A. The Soft Use as a “Dialogue”
The “soft” use of comparative experience takes place where a court refers to
foreign materials but does not consider these material to have precedential
weight. Choudhry describes this process as dialogical interpretation, under
which the courts “identify the normative and factual assumptions underlying
their own constitutional jurisprudence by engaging with comparable jurispru-
dence of other jurisdictions”57 to “better understand their own constitutional
systems and jurisprudence.”58 Engaging in such a dialogue is a variation of
transjudicial communication,59 or the “international traffic in ideas,”60 resulting
in “cross-fertilization” of decisions.61 In the soft version of comparative
reasoning, courts evaluate foreign experience62 as a “source of inspiration.”63
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 Choudhry, supra note 29, at 825.
58
 Id.at 836.
59
 Slaughter, supra note 40, at 99; Dammann, supra note 31, 547–49. However,
Dammann himself argues that discourse theory warrants the consideration of foreign
precedent as persuasive authority.
60
 MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 158 (1991).
61
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1116–19
(2000).
62
 E.g., Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European
View, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331, 350–60 (1998) (arguing that the foreign sources constitute
a “source for ideas and solutions”).
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Soft analysis utilizes foreign decisions as “superstars amicus briefs.”64 Further,
the sources used in “soft comparison” are almost exclusively constitutional
cases, rather than state practice. In utilizing these materials, courts evaluate
foreign case law to discover a variety of approaches to analyzing constitutional
problems65 and to reject “false necessities” — legal doctrines that seem
indispensable, but really are not.66 Tushnet sees the usefulness of foreign cases
in even more general terms, arguing that “[w]e can learn from experience
elsewhere by looking at the experience in rather general terms, and then by
seeing how those terms might help us think about the constitutional problems
we confront.”67 He calls this process the “expressivist” use of comparative
experience, which helps “us see our own practices in a new light and might lead
courts using non-comparative methods to results they would not have reached
had they not consulted the comparative material.”68
Courts may realize that the decision of a foreign court is persuasive and may
adopt similar reasoning, not because the reasoning is contained in a judicial
opinion, but because of the reasoning itself.69 These uses do not mean that the
foreign experience itself is a binding or persuasive authority for the court. The
similarities between the two decisions may just be coincidental, and even if not,
the decision may have been no different had the foreign decision not existed.
The mere fact that a court has reached a conclusion that is similar to a foreign
court decision does not mean that a borrowing from the foreign court has taken
place.70
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 Koopmans, supra note 25, at 545.
64
 Shirley Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in
the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 287 (1997).
65
 Dammann, supra note 31 (taking this approach further and arguing that the
discourse theory legitimizes the use of foreign precedents as an authority for the
domestic court). “[T]here are two reasons why courts should resort to authority-based
comparisons. The fact that another court has reached the same conclusion indicates that
a particular interpretation is the result of a fairly rational discourse. In addition, a court
can 'artificially' increase the number of participants in the legal discourse underlying its
interpretation by considering the decisions of foreign courts.” Id. at 559.
66
 Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1227 (arguing that the discovery of the false necessity in
not easy).
67
 Id. at 1308.
68
 Id. at 1236.
69
 R. Y. Jennings, The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of
International Law, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 2, 9 (1996) (“There are two ways of
referring to a previous judgment: as with juridical opinion it can be used in order to
quote a passage which seems to put something rather well; but this is quite different
from citing the decision as something having those other qualities which make up a
precedent.”).
70
 Matthew D. Adler, Can Constitutional Borrowing Be Justified? A Comment on
Tushnet, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350, 350–351 (1998).
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The “soft” use of the comparative constitutional law deals mostly with
foreign case law. This is rather logical, as foreign judgments are legal
documents addressing legal issues similar to those that are in front of a domestic
judge. Therefore, the “soft” use of comparative constitutional law is the type of
comparative constitutional law that is most often referred to and probably most
often used by different courts.
It is rather difficult to identify cases that limit the use of comparative
constitutional law in “soft” ways. It is unusual for a court to discuss a foreign
case, only to admit that the discussion was irrelevant for its holding. At the
same time, courts do not refer to a foreign case as having precedential authority.
Courts use terms such as “useful,”71 “helpful,” 72 or “instructive.”73 A court
might state that it agrees with the reasoning of the foreign decision.74 It may
also mention foreign cases in passing and state that foreign courts have reached
similar results, without giving explicit reasons why the reference was inserted
into the opinion.75 Courts may declare that a foreign precedent “supports” the
court’s own conclusion or otherwise offers “guidance” in making its conclusion.
Often, such a reference is made only in a footnote.76 Sometimes the line
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 E.g., Knight v. Fla., 528 U.S. 990, 997–98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (arguing that the views of foreign courts are “useful even though not
binding”). This language has also been adopted by many commentators. See Lord Irvine
of Lairg, Activism and Restraint: Human Rights and the Interpretative Process, 4
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 350, 355 (1999) (“the jurisprudence of
constitutional courts in other jurisdictions is a useful source of guidance.”).
72
 See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697, 740 (Can.) (it is “helpful” and “useful” to
look at the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court; the experience should not be
“overlooked”).
73
 E.g., State v. Walters, 2002 (7) BCLR 663 (SA), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za;
(arguing that Tenn. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) is “instructive” in determining the test
of determining the permissibility of use of deadly force in making an arrest).
74
 For example, in Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Sec. and Another 2001, 2001
(10) BCLR 995, ¶ 45. (SA), the South African Constitutional Court stated that it would
“adopt [a] statement” from a case of the European Court of Human Rights, referring to
the reasoning why the convention contains positive obligations on the state. In Jordan v.
State, 2002 (11) BCLR 1117, ¶ 128 (SA), the court considered some of the
“considerations” of the Canadian Supreme Court “as valid in South Africa as they are in
Canada.”
75
 Carmichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995, ¶ 54 (SA) contains the following statement,
together with the referral to the relevant German case: “Our Constitution is not merely a
formal document regulating public power. It also embodies, like the German
Constitution, an objective, normative value system.” There seems to be no argument
made that the German decision was even useful, just an association to the foreign case
was considered to be useful in developing the argument.
76
 This is where many of the recent citations to foreign cases by the U.S. Supreme
Court have appeared. See also references by Justice Frankfurter in Staub v. City of
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between mere referral and acknowledging the persuasive weight of a foreign
decision is especially difficult to draw, as when courts refer to a foreign
decision and then explicitly adopt the decision’s reasoning.77
Sometimes courts discuss “helpful” foreign cases, only to admit later that the
decision of the foreign court was inapplicable due to different legal, social, or
economic circumstances. Canada has often rejected the use of U.S. precedents.78
For example, in R v. Keegstra, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly stated
that:
Canada and the United States are not alike in every way, nor have the
documents entrenching human rights in our two countries arisen in the same
context. It is only common sense to recognize that, just as similarities will
justify borrowing from the American experience, differences may require
that Canada’s constitutional vision depart from that endorsed in the United
States.79
The South African Constitutional Court in S. v. Makwanyane rejected the
potential persuasive effect of U.S. decisions on the death penalty because of the
difference in the text of the U.S. and Canadian constitutions.80 In Carmichele v.
The Minister of Safety and Security,81 the same court rejected the holding of
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,82 which pro-
                                                                                                                       
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 325–326 n.1 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and in Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251 n.1 (1946).
77
 In S v. Dodo, 2001 (3) SA 332, 39 (CC), the South African court stated that “the
gross proportionality approach adopted by the US and Canadian Supreme Courts . . .
can properly be employed and should be employed under our Constitution. For the
reasons advanced in the Canadian cases, it would not be mere disproportionality
between the sentence legislated and the sentence merited by the offence which would
lead to a limitation of the section 12(1)(e) right, but only gross disproportionality.” The
authority remains to be the constitution and its analysis; the foreign decisions are used
quite as if they were briefs by the parties  — not an authority for the court, but worthy
of agreement.
78
 David Beatty, The Canadian Charter of Rights: Lessons and Laments, 60 MOD. L.
REV. 481, 482 (1997) (“Although US authorities are frequently referred to by the Court,
it has, for the most part, treated them very cautiously and usually as not being very
helpful in fashioning solutions that are appropriate for Canada.”).
79
 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697, 740 (Can.). See also R. v. Rahey, [1987] S.C.R.
588, 639 (“While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts to refer to
American constitutional jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter
guarantees that have counterparts in the United States Constitution, they should be wary
of drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different countries in
different ages and in very different circumstances.”).
80
 S v. Makwanyane, 1995 BCLR 665 (SA)
81
 Carmichele, 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (SA).
82
 489 U.S. 189 (1988).
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vided that the constitution does not impose positive duties on the government.83
In S. v. Mamabolo, the court decided not to adopt an area of American First
Amendment in deciding a case involving the crime of scandalizing a court,
because the South African Constitution “ranks the right to freedom of
expression differently” from the U.S. Constitution.84 In Mohamed v. President
of the Republic of South Africa, the South African court discussed partly
supportive Canadian law, only to admit that South African and Canadian
constitutional provisions are different.85 The Australian High Court explicitly
rejected U.S. case law on legislative malapportionment in McKinlay v.
Commonwealth.86
Even when foreign case analyses might be supportive, courts are uneasy
about applying them.87 Courts do not cite foreign cases strictly as part of their
holding, but as an illumination of issues surrounding the case. More commonly,
courts admit that they were persuaded by the reasoning of foreign cases.
B. The Legitimacy and Weight of the Dialogue
When courts limit discussion of foreign cases to being helpful guides in
decision-making and do not rely on these cases as precedent, legitimacy issues
usually connected with the introduction of innovative types of arguments do not
arise. Technically, foreign decisions themselves have no precedential authority,
and thus no binding effect, in domestic courts.  Therefore, a court’s discussion
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 “The provisions of our Constitution, however, point in the opposite direction.”
Carmichele, 2001 (4) SA 938, 45 (CC).
84
 S. v. Mamabolo, 2001 BCLR 449, ¶41 (CC) (SA).
85
 Mohamed v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., 2001 (3) SA 893, ¶53 (CC)
(“whatever the position may be under Canadian law where deprivation of the right to
life, liberty and human dignity is dependent upon the fundamental principles of justice,
our Constitution sets different standards for protecting the right to life, to human dignity
and the right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. Under
our Constitution these rights are not qualified by other principles of justice.”).
86
 (1975) 135 C.L.R. 57, 63 (“It is simply not correct to say that provisions in our
Constitution should receive the same construction as that given to similarly worded
provisions in the United States Constitution which have a different context and a
different history, more particularly when the suggested construction is of recent origin,
reversing an interpretation previously accepted.”).
87
 In Mohamed, 2001 (3) SA 833, ¶53 (CC), the South African constitutional court
discussed the Canadian constitutional law on whether deportation into a country where
the person might face the death penalty is constitutional if the death penalty is
unconstitutional in the deporting country, only to admit that the decision of the court is
based on South African law. The Hong Kong High Court has explicitly warned against
using foreign precedent as “other domestic and international instruments are the product
of very different circumstances and situations.” R v. Town Planning Board, ex parte
Kwan Kong Ltd, 5 H.K.P.L.R. 261, 300 (1995) (Waung J).
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of foreign sources need not be justified from a legal point of view. If foreign
sources are used selectively, they do not lead to “arbitrary decision-making,”88
as long as the court’s analysis is based on legitimate authorities.
Borrowing ideas from foreign jurisprudence is, in essence, no different from
borrowing ideas from the briefs of the parties or law review articles. The fact
that a foreign court has argued for the abolition of the death penalty is usually in
itself no persuasive argument. If it were, completely different kinds of
legitimacy issues would arise.
Also, the fact that a foreign court has used certain arguments does not mean
that a domestic court needs to adopt the same arguments — they may be plainly
unpersuasive, just as the arguments in the briefs may be unpersuasive. Most
likely, the same arguments can indeed be found in legal journals or the briefs. It
is only unfortunate when the parties and the real amici would not bring the same
arguments out themselves.89 The problem, of course, is when parties ignorantly
fail to raise these arguments in their briefs. Even then, however, the court is
technically not following a foreign court’s decision, but being persuaded by
arguments, similar to reliance, for example, on law review articles.
What about considering referring to and discussing foreign case law as
persuasive authority? In contrast to precedential authority, persuasive
authorities are not binding and thus only limit the arbitrariness of the decision-
making and creation of mechanical decisions.90 Foreign precedents, thus, are
arguably not binding but persuasive.91 This assertion, however, assumes that
persuasiveness is a result of foreign authority. If we look at the courts’ practice
more carefully, we see that what is persuasive in foreign precedents is usually
the reasoning of the case, not the fact that the foreign court has reached that
specific decision. The fact that the reasoning of the foreign court was found
persuasive does not mean that the authority itself was persuasive — similar
persuasive arguments could be made in the briefs by the parties.92 The foreign
experience itself would not be a binding authority, but rather dicta. There are no
particular constraints on what the judge may enter into dicta. Rather, one should
ask, whether the dicta is practical and serves some purpose other than reaching
the holding.
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 McCrudden, supra note 27, at 507 (referring to misuse of persuasive authorities).
89
 Fontana argues that the parties should be forced by the judge to discuss, when
appropriate, the decisions of the foreign courts. Fontana, supra note 33, at 556.
90
 H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 264 (1987).
91
 Slaughter, supra note 40, at 124 (describing the use of foreign precedent as
persuasive, but not binding); McCrudden, supra note 27, at 502–3 (claiming that the
article deals with the use of foreign precedent as persuasive authority).
92
 The briefs of the parties in the South African Constitutional Court usually refer to
foreign precedent when supporting the argument. Therefore, we cannot assess whether
the court would be persuaded without the references to foreign precedent.
58
This means that judges probably discuss foreign decisions without
recognizing them as binding if some strategic considerations persuade the
judges to do so. That the use of foreign precedent is often strategic can also be
demonstrated by the fact that courts omit precedents that do not support the
holding. Even though the omission is not always intentional,93 but due to lack of
knowledge of foreign law,94 precedents are used selectively. The strategic
nature of discussing foreign cases becomes even more evident if we consider
that judges often discuss foreign decisions among themselves or with the
justices of different supreme courts.95 Whether to make these discussions public
is largely a strategic decision, as the opinion can also be written without
inclusion of these discussions. Surely, the legitimacy of “soft use” comparisons
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 There seem to exist completely intentional omissions. In Mohamed, 2001 (3) SA
833, ¶ 53 (CC), the South African Constitutional Court dealt with a case where the
South African government handed an alleged terrorist who illegally entered South
Africa over to United States’ authorities without seeking an agreement that no death
penalty would be involved if Mohamed would be convicted of crimes. The court
discussed several foreign cases, including a similar case from the European Court of
Human Rights, Soering v. U.K. However, the court referred only to the part of the
decision where the actions of the government were condemned, but not to the part
where the court, contrary to the holding of the South African constitutional court,
explicitly allowed the extradition of the person to a country applying the death penalty
as long as the penalty is carried out in conformity with due process rules. .Id. at ¶ 56.
Similar problems occurred in Prince v. President of the Law Society of the Cape of
Good Hope, 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (SA), where the court found the prohibition of the use
of cannabis for adherents of the Rastafari religion constitutional. The only reference of
the minority opinion to foreign case law or practice was to the dissent by Justice
Blackmun in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
US 872, 911 n.54 (1990), which discussed only the question of which government
interests such a prohibition might serve. The majority discussed the foreign practice
more extensively, but limited the analysis to favorable case law only. See 2002 (3)
BCLR 231,¶¶ 119–127 (CC) (S. Afr.).
94 An example comes from the European Court of Justice, where Advocate General
Tesauro used U.S. precedents on affirmative action only selectively, omitting the most
similar case with different conclusions from the ECJ holding. See Case C-450/93,
Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. I-3051 (citing Regents of University
of Cal. v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CFL
v. Webster, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469
(1989), but not citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). This has been
attributed to ignorance; not intentional omission. See McCrudden, supra note 27, at 526.
95 Fontana, supra note 33, at 548 (describing the encounters between justices of
different supreme courts); McCrudden, supra note 27, at 510–511. This applies to all
kinds of comparative materials. For example, the European Court of Justice regularly
has extensive comparative surveys made during the preparation of a case. See KIIKERI,
supra note 25, at 149. However, it is doubtful that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices
discuss precedents in the conference discussions where different kinds of arguments
prevail.
59
does not become an issue when foreign decisions are not discussed in the
published opinion, but rather used behind the scenes. Reading and drawing from
foreign case law would be a part of the “general liberal education”96 of the
judge. To compare, it is legally not permissible to omit binding domestic cases
or statutes from an opinion in this fashion.
When a court does refer to foreign materials, the question becomes whether
it is advisable for it to do so. When making such references, courts must discuss
materials that have no authoritative power, do not directly contribute toward the
holding in a case, and yet demand an understanding of foreign laws and cases in
all their complexity.97 Because of this, referrals seem to be an unnecessary
burden that may even distract attention from the rationale for a holding. By
definition, foreign cases do not refer to the case at hand. Foreign cases not only
take place in a different social setting, but also in a different factual setting. The
informational advantage gained through deciding cases or controversies only,
much emphasized when describing the courts’ proper functions, would simply
be lost. Courts should not decide issues abstractly, but stick to the relevant case
facts. Foreign precedents necessarily demand discussing issues abstractly, as
those cases have little to do with the case before the court. The reason for
referring to foreign cases might then only be to demonstrate that the judge has a
broad “liberal education,” which does not seem to be a valid reason for using
comparative materials.98
C. Conclusion
Judicial use of foreign precedents as a source of ideas and arguments can be a
useful enterprise. In any case, this use cannot be prohibited, as such use is not
uniformly documented in the written opinion. However, a court’s public
admission that it was inspired by foreign decisions does not add or diminish
weight from the legal argument. This admission may only serve strategic
purposes about what the court wants to achieve with the decision. At the same
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 This is how Tushnet legitimizes expressivist uses of comparative constitutional law.
See Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1236–37 (“[J]udges of wide learning — whether in
comparative constitutional law, in the classics of literature, in economics, or in many
other fields — may see things about our society that judges with a narrower vision miss.
. . . In this aspect, comparative constitutional law operates in the way that general liberal
education does.”).
97
 R v. Town Planning Board, ex parte Kwan Kong Ltd, 5 H.K.P.L.R. 261, 300 (1995)
(Waung, J.) (Courts should “decline to be seduced by the complex foreign jurisprudence
and the seemingly inexhaustible literature from the European Court of Human Rights.”).
98
 Drobnig, supra note 11, at 17 (“such tributes to comparative learning are super-
fluous ornaments at best and may even do a disservice to the serious study of compara-
tive law.”). Similarly Choudhry, supra note29at 828 (asserting that comparative
jurisprudence is often used as “judicial ‘window-dressing.’”).
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time, courts need to balance potential strategic gains with the possibility of
misunderstanding and misapplying foreign case law.
IV. THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN MAKING NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS
Constitutions often use terms that are difficult to interpret, such as the U.S.
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punish-
ment, or the German constitutional directive to protect “human dignity.”99
Similar difficulties are met in judicial balancing. Balancing is a process of
weighing different values and making normative judgments on preferred values.
Balancing different constitutional values, although often criticized,100 is both
common and theoretically unavoidable.101 Most courts explicitly admit this, and
some, like the German102 or South African103 constitutional courts, elevate
balancing to the center of constitutional jurisprudence.
Much of constitutional jurisprudence is about deriving meaning from these
broad principles and finding the right balance between different values. In
determining the content of such broad principles and finding the right balance
between conflicting values, one may apply different methods. One such method
is moral philosophy.104 Others evaluate constitutional content by looking at the
constitutional framers’ intent.105 Further, some advocate the use of comparative
materials.106
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 Article 1 of the Basic Law of Germany: “Human dignity is inviolable.”
100 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987).
101 The philosophical underpinnings of balancing decisions in constitutional law derive
from the claim that the constitution embodies principles, and not rules with all-or-
nothing character. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, passim (1977).
102 The German lawyers talk about the principle of “practical concordance” (praktische
Konkordanz), according to which the different constitutionally protected values need to
be harmonized. See Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon,
40 EMORY L.J. 837, 851 (1991); Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and
Personality in German and American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 970.
103
 Richard J. Goldstone, The South African Bill of Rights, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 451, 460–
64 (1997) (overview of the principles of interpreting the Bill of Rights of the South
African Constitution).
104 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND
PERSPECTIVES 181-210 (2nd. ed., 2000)
105 Id. 99–136.
106 Kathryn A. Perales, It Works Fine in Europe, So Why Not Here? Comparative Law
and Constitutional Federalism, 23 VT. L. REV. 885, 904–05 (1999) (“These broad
principles of justice demand natural law arguments, found in international law and the
practice of other countries.”). The approach is even recommended by the advocates of
pragmatic jurisprudence. See Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication Approach, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (arguing that the standards of decency can be determined
through comparative adjudication).
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A. The Opinions of the World Community in the Jurisprudence
Cases where comparative materials are used in normative reasoning abound.107
As an example, this is seen in the area of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
of “cruel and unusual punishment,” a leading area of U.S. constitutional
analysis. In Atkins v. Virginia, an Eighth Amendment case mentioned in the
beginning of this article, much of the court’s analysis utilized normative use of
comparative materials. The Atkins decision is preceded by several other cases.
In Trop v. Dulles, one of the arguments against denationalization as a punish-
ment was that statelessness is a condition “deplored in the international com-
munity of democracies.”108 In Rudolph v. Alabama, the dissenters from denial
of writ of certiorari contested the permissibility of the death penalty for rape
based, in part, on international experience.109 Finally, the Court’s decision in
Coker v. Georgia, which finally held the death penalty for conviction of rape
unconstitutional, directly discussed international experience in its analysis of the
                                                
107 Often, two different types of normative reasoning are identified — positive and
negative. In positive analysis, the court refers to the practice of several countries,
determines that such practice is widespread, and argues that the court should follow this
practice. In negative reasoning, the court refers to the foreign practice, determines that
this kind of practice is associated with unacceptable regimes, and rejects the practice as
normatively unacceptable. See Fontana, supra note 33, at 551. However, there is no
clear-cut difference between the two approaches. The positive argument assumes that
the unacceptable regimes do not have similar practice — otherwise the practice could be
rejected as being widespread among those countries under the negative argument. The
argument would be consistent only if it could be shown that the practice is widespread
among the acceptable regimes and non-existent among the unacceptable regimes. This,
of course raises a practicability issue discussed below.
108 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (Warren, CJ). “The civilized nations of the world are in
virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime. It is
true that several countries prescribe expatriation in the event that their nationals engage
in conduct in derogation of native allegiance. Even statutes of this sort are generally
applicable primarily to naturalized citizens. But use of denationalization as punishment
for crime is an entirely different matter. The United Nations' survey of the nationality
laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two countries, the Philippines and
Turkey, impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion. In this country the Eighth
Amendment forbids that to be done.” (footnotes omitted).
109 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice
Goldberg thought that the following question was worth answering: “In light of the
trend both in this country and throughout the world against punishing rape by death,
does the imposition of the death penalty by those States which retain it for rape violate
'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of [our] maturing society,' or
'standards of decency more or less universally accepted?'” Id., 889–90 (footnotes
omitted).
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issue.110 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court invalidated the death penalty for
persons under age 16, and again noted that a contrary decision would be
inconsistent with the practice of many advanced democracies.111 The use of
foreign experience did receive a blow in Stanford v. Kentucky, a death penalty
case for juveniles under age 18,112 but has been reestablished, as indicated by
the Atkins v. Virginia decision.113
Atkins v. Virginia was succeeded by Patterson v. Texas,114 where Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, argued in a dissent from
denial of stay of execution that there is an “apparent consensus that exists
among the States and in the international community against the execution of a
capital sentence imposed on a juvenile offender.”115
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 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (“It is . . . not irrelevant here that out of 60 major
nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where
death did not ensue.”).
111
 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (“The conclusion that it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the
time of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed . . . by
other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of
the Western European community.”). The case is especially interesting for the remark
that “[J]uvenile executions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union.” Id. at 831.
References even to the practices of non-democratic countries may thus play a role.
112
 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989).
113
 See supra n. 1–5.
114
 536 U.S. 984 (2002). About two months later, Justice Stevens, with whom Justice
Souter, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer joined, dissented from denial of petition for
writ of habeas corpus, but the six-page dissent did not refer to foreign experience at all.
See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). However, on the same
day, Justice Breyer referred to foreign experience when dissenting from denial of
certiorari in a case dealing with the delays in carrying out capital punishment.  Foster v.
Fla., 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Courts of other nations have found
that delays of 15 years or less can render capital punishment degrading, shocking, or
cruel. . . . Consistent with these determinations, the Supreme Court of Canada recently
held that the potential for lengthy incarceration before execution is a ‘relevant
consideration’ when determining whether extradition to the United States violates
principles of ‘fundamental justice.’”). Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence from denial
of certiorari, condemning the use of the foreign precedents. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring)
115
 Patterson v. Tx., 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The issue was
decided by the court in favor of the constitutionality of this punishment in Stanford v.
Ky., 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The dissent is more remarkable because in Atkins v. Va.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, implicitly denied that Stanford v. Ky. should be
overturned. The majority discussed the difference between the death penalty for
mentally retarded and juveniles: “A comparison to Stanford v. Kentucky, in which we
held that there was no national consensus prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders
over age 15, is telling. Although we decided Stanford on the same day as Penry,
apparently only two state legislatures have raised the threshold age for imposition of the
death penalty.” Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, at 316 (2002) (citation omitted). It has been
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Courts engaging in other areas of constitutional analysis have also utilized
comparative analysis. For example, the dissent by Justice Rehnquist in California
v. Minjares, where he claimed that he felt “morally certain that the United States
is the only nation in the world in which the most relevant, most competent
evidence as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is mechanically excluded
because of the manner in which it may have been obtained”116 implies that other
nations would not condemn at least some use of illegally obtained evidence.
Justice Harlan argued in his Poe v. Ullmann dissent that criminal punishment for
the use of contraceptives is unconstitutional, supported by the fact that other
democracies take no similar measures.117 In Washington v. Glucksberg,118 foreign
experience was used to show that suicide has been condemned by many
countries,119 and that assisted suicide is prohibited by most.120 The Supreme Court
has in several instances referred to the importance of free speech, arguing that
freedom of speech is essential for democracy by referring to contrary practices in
non-democratic countries.121 However, at the same time, the Court has justified
certain limitations on free speech by referring to the practice of similar democratic
                                                                                                                       
speculated that this change of mind might be a result of the growing influence of the
international community of judges on the Supreme Court Justices. Michael C. Dorf, The
Story Behind the Supreme Court’s Refusal to Hear a Recent Juvenile Death Penalty
Case, FINDLAW’S LEGAL COMMENTARY (Sept. 4, 2002), available at
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countries.122 There are several cases where the Court has condemned the practice
of some countries that would not serve as a good example to the United States.123
Foreign courts and legislative bodies have also utilized foreign materials.
The House of Lords has rejected the right to assisted suicide based on the lack
of consensus among different countries.124 The South African Constitutional
court, when limiting the use of deadly force for making arrests, declared that
“South African law on this topic is brought into line with that of comparable
open and democratic societies based on dignity, equality and freedom, for
instance Tennessee v. Garner in the United States and McCann v. United
Kingdom in Europe.”125 In a case involving the constitutionality of mandatory
life sentences, the court noted that “there are many examples of other open and
democratic societies which permit the legislature to limit the judiciary’s power
to impose punishments.”126 The court has noted that “open and democratic
societies permit reasonable proscription of activity and expression that pose a
real and substantial threat to such values and to the constitutional order itself.
Many societies also accept limits on free speech in order to protect the fairness
of trials.”127 In Jordan v. State, where the court decided that the prohibition of
prostitution does not excessively infringe the constitutional right to economic
activity or privacy, it explicitly relied on comparative arguments.128
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Sometimes, courts admit that a single foreign case amounts to persuasive
authority. The Irish Supreme Court, for example, referred to the German
experience as being “persuasive authority (as a comparative constitution) on
fundamental principles of democracy and equality which, as a basic tenet, are
common to both Constitutions.”129
Supranational courts, such as the European Court of Justice, use similar
ideas.130 Already, in the very first group of cases before the court, comparative
analysis was the basis for creating principles of Community law.131 The practice
was continued in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, where the court
mentioned that in determining the extent of fundamental rights in the com-
munity, it was “inspired by the constitutional traditions of the Member
States.”132 The parties to the cases usually refer to the practice of Member
States, and opinions of the Advocate General often contain comparative
                                                                                                                       
quality of life as contemplated by [the constitution] and that it is a measure considered
justifiable in open and democratic societies based on freedom and equality. It is
therefore not inconsistent with the right [freely to engage in economic activity].”). In
regard to privacy, the court held that “open and democratic societies vary enormously in
the manner in which they characterise and respond to prostitution. Thus practice in such
countries ranges from allowing prostitution but not brothel-keeping to allowing both;
suppressing both; to setting aside zones for prostitution; and to licensing brothels and
collecting taxes from them. The issue is generally treated as one of governmental policy
expressed through legislation rather than one of constitutional law to be determined by
the courts. We are unaware of any successful constitutional challenge in domestic courts
to laws prohibiting commercial sex. The matter appears to have been treated as one for
legislative choice, and not one for judicial determination. The issue is an inherently
tangled one where autonomy, gender, commerce, social culture and law enforcement
capacity intersect. A multitude of differing responses and accommodations exist, and
public opinion is fragmented and the women’s movement divided. In short, it is
precisely the kind of issue that is invariably left to be resolved by the democratically
accountable law-making bodies.” Id. ¶ 90 (footnotes omitted).
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assessments of the legal situation in the Member States,133 although the Court
itself normally refrains from express citations to foreign cases and laws.134
Commonalities between countries, such as a common history or constitu-
tional approach, have also been used as the basis of normative reasoning
through reference to foreign materials.135 The most obvious example of
“genealogical,” or historical commonality reasoning, is the jurisprudence by the
Commonwealth courts. For example, the Australian,136 Canadian,137 and
Pakistani138 courts have long held examples from English law to be persuasive,
as did the U.S. Supreme Court in the beginning of its existence. Justice
Calabresi famously argued that “[w]ise parents do not hesitate to learn from
their children.”139 The main reason for this is the shared heritage of common
law. Similarly, in Knight v. Florida, Justice Breyer argued for review of a case
involving the execution of death row inmates after long delays (19 and 25
years), arguing that the Courtourt “has long considered as relevant and
informative the way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly
comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable
circumstances. In doing so, the Court has found particularly instructive opinions
of former Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect a legal
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tradition that also underlies our own Eighth Amendment.”140 However, Justice
Breyer viewed these precedents as “useful even though not binding,”141 though
he did not delineate the features of that “usefulness.”
These positive examples of applying foreign experience in normative
reasoning are by no means conclusive evidence that the courts unequivocally
do, or should, accept the use of international standards or the practice of courts
in similarly situated countries. The dissenters in Atkins v. Virginia have made it
clear that the use of foreign materials continues to be viewed as illegitimate by
some.142
B. The Legitimacy and Weight of Comparative Normative Reasoning
There are two basic arguments against courts drawing normative conclusions
based on foreign experience. The first of them is a general argument against
normative reasoning and balancing as such and warrants no thorough discussion
here.143 The second argument, based on the democratic basis of judicial
decision-making, is directed against comparative reasoning and warrants closer
inspection.
1. The World Community and the Democratic Nature of Judicial Decision-
Making
The democratic basis argument n is concerned with the fact that courts are part
of a national constitutional system, and thus exercise public power “for the
people.” Only the views and the values of the people living in the particular
country are thus argued to be relevant.144 Each country is based on different
culture and values, and thus it is argued that their experience is hardly transfer-
able to another system. This argument is concerned with cultural relativism.”145
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Cultural relativists argue that standards of justice in the Western world are not
similar to standards in the East, and the standards are not similar in the countries
of the Western world, even within the same country.146 A specific country may
consider certain values much differently than others because of historical147 or
present concerns in the society. For example, the fear of terrorism after the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 has considerably changed notions of
justice and the permissible extent of limiting civil liberties in the U.S. general
population. Whether the courts will reflect this shift in case analysis is not yet
certain. Past experience certainly demonstrates that this is possible in crisis
situations.148 The fact that many other countries have particular values does not
mean that these values will be shared by all countries, nor that such values
should be enforced by the courts in those countries. Only if the values are
contained in binding international law and if courts have to enforce international
law should this be the case.
The same problems in evaluating international law arise in balancing diffe-
rent legal values. The most common form of legal balancing deals with
juxtaposing individual and community values. Certainly, there are some
guidelines in a constitution’s structure regarding its balance between indivi-
dualist and communitarian values. However, the most significant determinant of
finding the right balance of legal values lies in the present society. If the society
supports communitarian values, the courts should be more able to uphold limits
on individual rights such as free speech.149 Social scientists have spent
considerable time researching the extent to which countries are ‘individualist’ or
‘collectivist.’ The results of this research support the hypothesis that countries
differ in legal values and that these differences are at times quite significant,150
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as in where values of democratic and authoritarian countries are compared.
Therefore, balancing decisions in some countries will not necessarily reflect the
values of other countries.
Even assuming that international opinions can contribute to the determina-
tion of domestic rights, one must still determine what the international consen-
sus is, leading to several practical problems. Is it enough if the numerical
majority of all countries have adopted a certain position? Or is it enough if most
of the “democratic” countries151 have adopted such position?152 How does one
determine what the opinion of a country is? One could certainly argue that one
only needs to look at the laws adopted in the particular state. If different
parliaments would adopt similar positions on a moral issue, a consensus among
societies would be evident.153 There are additional problems with this method,
however. What if the Supreme Court has determined the law, overriding the
opinion of the parliament? What if the opinion of the parliament does not reflect
the consensus within the state? The opinion polls might reveal different
dominant values within the society. Such questions are hard to answer and
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demand careful comparative analysis of the countries that are being studied.
Often a thorough comparison is simply not possible.154
As mentioned in the introduction to this article, comparative analysis was at
the center of the dispute in Atkins v. Virginia. In Atkins, the majority found
evidence that there was a consensus among states that executing mentally
retarded criminals constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, the
finding was based on complex considerations: “It is not so much the number of
these States [abolishing death penalty for mentally retarded] that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change.”155 The dissenters could not
agree with this analysis:
The Court attempts to bolster its embarrassingly feeble evidence of
“consensus” with the following: “It is not so much the number of these
States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”. . .
But in what other direction could we possibly see change? Given that 14
years ago all the death penalty statutes included the mentally retarded, any
change (except precipitate undoing of what had just been done) was bound
to be in the one direction the Court finds significant enough to overcome the
lack of real consensus. . . . In any event, reliance upon “trends,” even those
of much longer duration than a mere 14 years, is a perilous basis for
constitutional adjudication. . . .156
In fact, it is quite hard to figure out what a “national consensus” is. It is doubtful
that there can be such thing at all, particularly considering the difficult nature of
cases involving broad principles of justice. Even if a court decision on an issue
exists, it is not guaranteed that the decision is accepted by the majority of the
population. Also, the decision could be based on the fad of the time and could
later be overruled.157 These issues show that even if one is compelled to follow
a single foreign court, deciphering a consistent view informing a consensus is
difficult. Employing the stare decisis principle in a single legal system is
difficult enough.. Overturning and distinguishing precedents is what a lawyer
faces in all countries, not only common law countries, every day.158
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These legitimacy and practical problems can be overcome with several types
of different arguments, depending of the type of normative reasoning used.
These arguments stem from international law, the text of the constitution, and
the borrowed statute doctrine.
2. International Law as a Basis for Comparative Normative Reasoning
The use of international law is the principal way of legitimizing normative
reasoning through comparison. This is somewhat surprising. Surely, if a court
does not consider itself bound by international law, customary or treaty-based,
international arguments lose their force. Even if the courts do have to apply
international norms, the use of foreign cases and laws might seem surprising.
When obligatory norms of international law exist, it is those norms that the
court should follow, not the practice of other countries. However, if binding
international law does not exist, it is for the particular states to determine how to
balance values and how to interpret broad principles of justice.159 One must bear
in mind that international custom does not become customary international law
merely because of general state practice — international legal doctrine demands
that the practice be “accepted.”160 Therefore, one might argue that, where no
general state practice exists, the opinions of the other countries are in fact
irrelevant.
Three arguments can be put forward against this assertion. First, comparative
analysis is still necessary to determine whether customary international law in
fact exists. Second, it might be efficient to interpret constitutional norms
“internationally.” Third, one must take into account the way international law is
developed.
The first argument is based on the fact that courts must refer to foreign
practice whenever they analyze whether customary international law exists
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regarding an issue.. For example, one can make a legitimate argument that the
death penalty as applied to the mentally retarded violates customary inter-
national law.161 Therefore, it is unavoidable to analyze foreign practice in a case
involving the alleged unconstitutionality of juvenile death penalty. In a similar
vein, the German Constitutional Court analyzed international practice when it
had to determine whether constitutional rules against double jeopardy prohibit
bringing criminal charges if an earlier criminal sentence had been applied
abroad.162 The existence of customary international law needs to be determined,
even if it does entail similar practical problems mentioned above. The courts, if
bound to apply international law, cannot simply argue that they lack the time
and resources needed to determine what the international practice is.
The second argument for uniform application of international law among
different countries involves policy considerations. For example, use of foreign
practice when interpreting public policy clauses in when resolving conflicts of
laws “eliminates the parochial character of the clause and it tends to narrow and
internationalize its application.”163 This argument reflects the international
duties of the state and the courts in ensuring efficient communication between
different states. Uniformity is not a norm in itself, but a means to other ends.
The third argument for uniform application deals with the development of
international law. The application of international standards is most clearly
visible in international human rights adjudication. The European Court of
Human Rights repeatedly refers to the state of law in the Member States when
deciding controversial issues, thus deciding international disputes according to
the standards common to the Member States.164 For example, the court has
demanded recognition of gender re-assignment of transsexuals in official
government documents as part of the right to privacy based on the “clear and
uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favor not only of
increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new
sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.”165 In Dudgeon v. United
Kindgom,166 the court relied on the European consensus in striking down laws
criminalizing sodomy in Northern Ireland. Further, an array of cases concerning
minority rights have discussed the need to protect the lifestyles of minorities. In
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these cases, the court has relied on an “emerging international consensus
amongst the Contracting States of the Council of Europe recognizing the special
needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their security, identity and
lifestyle.”167
In contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is not as eager to
analyze the human rights standards of the parties to the American Convention of
Human Rights, but this might be caused by the fact that it mostly deals with
gross human rights violations where reference to such norms is simply
unnecessary.168
When national courts cite international human rights cases in determining the
content of domestic civil rights,169 the use of comparative experience by the
international human rights court indirectly impacts the jurisprudence of
domestic courts. In these cases, domestic courts follow the lead of other
countries, “brokered” by the international human rights court.170
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Similar justifications for using comparative experience exist for federal
systems and the European Union.171 The member states of a federation are
surely not bound by the practice or jurisprudence of the other states. However,
they are bound by the practice of federal courts. The federal courts, in turn,
engage in “law canvassing” of the states.172 The state courts thus follow the
practice of other states “brokered” by the federal courts.
3. Constitutional Text
In some cases, a country’s constitution directs national courts to take into
account foreign experience. The most famous provision directing this type of
analysis is probably contained in the South African Constitution, stating that the
courts “may consider foreign law.”173
Some courts use more implicit constitutional provisions to justify utilizing
foreign materials. Where a constitution contains standards that that refer to
“democratic society” in general,174 courts may look at standards common to
democratic societies. The European Convention on Human Rights contains
similar clauses in Articles 8–11, allowing for restrictions to convention rights
only if the restrictions are “necessary in a democratic society.” This clause has
warranted inter-state comparisons to determine the permissibility of such
restrictions.
                                                
171
 The European Court of Justice is obliged to turn to the jurisprudence and legislation
of the member states as a matter of the EU Treaty. Article 6.2 provides: “The Union
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4
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of the EC Treaty, the Court has to create its jurisprudence on the tort liability of the
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forum — (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society
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limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.” The South African Interim Constitution, section 35(1) provided: “In inter-
preting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which
underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.” Can. Const.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1.
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However, these provisions could also be interpreted as providing that con-
vention restrictions must be necessary for democracy to function in a particular
state. This second interpretation demonstrates that relying on a constitutional
provision mandating to use standards necessary in a democratic society is more
controversial than it might seem at first. Moreover, interpretation of
supranational clauses by the European Court of Human Rights shows that using
international consensus as a human rights standard is problematic also because
of the wide latitude left to individual states. Namely, the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights has often allowed states a wide “margin of
appreciation” to determine what is really necessary for democracy in a
particular state.175 Occasionally, as shown before, the court attempts to
determine what is necessary through examining standards adopted by the
signatories to a treaty. This approach is troubling because the commonality of
standards between the states does not tell us when we should appreciate a
divergence from these standards in a particular country.176 Similarly, a domestic
constitutional provision calling for adopting a standard necessary in a
democratic society has to take into account that different societies have different
values and different necessities. It is the duty of the court to appreciate these
differences.
The preceding discussion has shown that international law, federal law, and
the text of the constitution can legitimize the use of international standards.
However, it must be borne in mind that not all courts are part of a federal
system or have to apply international norms themselves, and that not all
constitutions contain general clauses directing courts to look at international
standards. Moreover, it may actually be the duty of the court not to succumb to
international pressures and thereby preserve the particular culture of the society
in which it operates. Further, the legitimacy of applying international standards
does not eliminate the practical problems of determining what the international
standards actually are. This problem must be kept in mind when determining the
content of broad constitutional principles or making balancing decisions.
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 Carozza, supra note 159, at 1233 (“inter-state comparison will not itself give us the
reasons to choose in any instance whether to affirm a uniform international standard of
human rights or whether to allow the play of difference and discretion among states.”).
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4. The Borrowed Statute Doctrine
The final argument for the legitimacy of comparative normative reasoning is
concerned with the borrowed statute doctrine. This doctrine provides that when
a statute or constitution has foreign origins, the court may feel especially
compelled to follow foreign interpretation of that statute or constitution.177 In
such cases, the courts are not bound by a hard-to-establish “international
consensus,” but rather by a more limited set of cases. Thus a court would look
to the “parent” constitution and its interpretation in resolving constitutional
problems. The very fact that a constitutional provision has been borrowed, or
that the legal system more generally has roots in a foreign system, makes the
courts in this other system an authority. Choudhry178 and Fontana179 call this
“genealogical” interpretation. Dammann justifies this approach with the fact
that this might have been what the drafters of the constitution or the statute
wanted, thus making this type of comparative reasoning an ‘intentionalist’
comparison.180
However, the borrowing statute doctrine is not very persuasive on closer
inspection, as demonstrated by how the common law has developed in the
Commonwealth. The influence of English precedents has waned a lot in recent
decades, as in Australia and Canada.181 The use of precedent from previous
colonial powers is sometimes even seen as inherently unnecessary. For
example, a justice in the Namibian Supreme Court has stated that “the
Namibian people are now in the position to determine their own values free
from such foreign values imposed by their former colonial rulers.”182 Therefore,
the borrowed statute doctrine may provide great interpretive assistance, but may
not possess enough legitimacy to be extensively relied upon in interpreting
domestic laws.
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C. Conclusion
It appears that the use of comparative experience when defining broad
constitutional categories or balancing conflicting values is rather limited. Each
country has its own unique values and, unless binding international obligations
exist, domestic courts should not import foreign values. Moreover, foreign
values are hard to determine. Instead of applying some mathematical method to
determine the “average” or “dominant” foreign values, courts should look at the
values of its own society. The majority opinion of the world community might
in fact be worthy of rejection.
V. THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT
A. Comparison and Prediction
Balancing decisions in constitutional jurisprudence not only involve normative
issues, but also involve empirical questions. One of the basic tenets of
proportionality analysis is to ask whether the challenged measure in fact pursues
the aim that has been brought forward to justify the measure. In order to
determine this, a prediction has to be made.183 Use of comparative experience in
creating empirical arguments184 thus seems logical. In fact, how else can one
find empirical evidence that an interpretation is valid? Governments and courts
are not equipped with laboratories where they could have two “experiments”
run at the same time, with different interpretations of the law. Similarly, as the
states in a federal system might serve as laboratories,185 foreign countries could
serve as laboratories in the world community.
As an example of this method, the famous Brandeis brief in Muller v. Oregon
contained scientific evidence collected from several countries in 1908.186 In Printz
v. U.S., Justice Breyer argued that the court should look at the experience of the
European federal systems in order to determine whether it is dangerous to
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assign the States some enforcement powers under federal laws.187 In
Washington v. Glucksberg, the experience of Netherlands was discussed
thoroughly.188 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Justice Breyer referred to the
British and French experience of regulating religious schools.189 However, this
type of comparative analysis is not extensive and the foreign courts appear to
make similar inferences with even less frequency than the U.S. Supreme
Court.190
B. The Legitimacy and Weight of ‘Empirical Use’
There is one fundamental objection to the use of comparative experience in
constitutional empirical argument, which relies on the rejection of empirical
arguments across the board. Thus, some authors reject the use of empirical
arguments of any type, arguing that these kind of arguments cannot solve
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constitutional questions.191 However, the objection is weak, as courts do in fact
rely on empirical predictions. If a court’s holding is based on empirical
predictions, one needs any evidence possible to support those predictions.
1. The Practical Problems of Comparison
The weight and legitimacy of comparative reasoning depends on successfully
solving practical problems by drawing inferences from comparative empirical
analysis. Whereas the legitimacy of comparative reasoning for empirical
purposes raises few questions, there is much less agreement on whether
comparative reasoning can in fact produce a sound basis for decision making.
Some are optimistic, but many are cautious.192 There are several reasons for
this.
First, courts use economic and social data in making empirical arguments, as
opposed to statutes or cases.193 Courts are often not equipped with the skills
necessary to deal with this kind of data. Empirical analysis, or “constitutional
fact-finding,” has not been the strongest skill of the U.S. Supreme Court.194
Second, experience gathered from one country might shed very little light on
its possible consequences in another country. This argument is usually brought
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 For a critical overview of the Supreme Court, see Donald N. Bersoff & David J.
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Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279 (1995) and Faigman, supra note 183 at
565–600. In the comparative constitutional law context see Fontana, supra note 33, at
541.
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forward by opponents of transplanting legal theories from one country into
another.195 Legal transplants might not work when there are significant
differences between the “donor” and “recipient” countries. Political differences
between countries are a great impediment to such transplantations because
differences in the form of government or the prominence of interest groups may
be significant. Further, complex relationships between different institutions
complicate the transferability of just a part of the legal system from one country
to another.196 In constitutional law jargon, “[p]articular institutions serve
complex functions in each constitutional system, and there is little reason to
think that directly appropriating an institution that functions well in one system
will produce the same beneficial effects when it is inserted into another.”197
Following these arguments, we cannot predict how a certain legal institution
will work in one country based on its performance in another.
Such obstacles to learning from foreign experience are alleviated by the
insights that comparative political research has given, particularly the
methodological advances of social sciences in comparative research. However,
despite these advances, obstacles to gaining significant and meaningful
empirical evidence remain.
2. Comparative Politics and Empirical Inferences
Drawing inferences from social and economic data is the basis for empirically
oriented social sciences. A considerable amount of literature dealing with the
methodology of drawing such inferences has been developed by social science
research. Courts usually draw inferences from foreign experience in two
ways — either by making references to a single foreign case,198 or by utilizing
several cases.199
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The most obvious advantage of case studies200 is that they enable a court to
analyze the experience of another country in detail. Thus, when referring to
foreign experience, the court is essentially concluding that similar outcomes
would be expected at home. This conclusion is based on the assumption that
there is a causal linkage between rules and outcomes and that this causal linkage
also exists in the different system, possibly even under different circumstances.
Both of these assumptions are heavily contested in evaluating the usefulness of
case studies.
The first assumption, that a causal link between rules and outcomes exists,
presupposes that it is relatively easy to identify the consequences of adopting a
rule. We could thus easily determine that what followed was caused by the rule,
rather than merely being a coincidental byproduct of the rule. The critique to
this assumption points to the fact that there is no certain way to establish the
causal linkage between adoption of a rule and subsequent consequences. Any
number of variables might actually have caused the observed outcome, not just
the adoption of the rule. The experience is thus hard to generalize to a wider
array of cases.201 For example, a recognition of multi-variable causation was
seen in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, where the court noted that a long period
without serious religious strife, such as experienced in Great Britain and in
France, may be a consequence of a number of factors. Religious financing of
schools may in fact have had nothing to do with this. Rather, other factors might
have had such a strong influence on the relationships of the different religious
groups that the financing of religious schools did not cause major upheavals.
Thus, relying on the experience of a single or a few countries provides barely
anecdotal evidence. When using anecdotes in comparative legal analysis, the
winner of the case is the one who knows a better anecdote than those arguing
for a different outcome. This “battle of anecdotes” should not be viewed as a
permissible legal strategy. For example, the deterrent effect of the death penalty
cannot be dispositively proven by comparing crime rates in a death penalty state
to rates in  another state where the death penalty has been abolished. Similarly,
one may argue that it is not wise to base constitutional analysis on the
experience of a single foreign country. For social scientists, selecting only those
cases that support an argument, or selecting cases because they support an
argument, is one of the basic violations of the rules of empirical inference.202
Zelman, the school voucher case, is a good example of this error. The dissenters
in Zelman relied on the experience of France, Great Britain, and the countries in
the Balkans, where they found evidence that religious schools might have
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harmful effects. The dissenters never discussed contrary foreign experience, as
extensively discussed in the respondent’s brief.203
Case studies, when supported by sound theory, can assist in legal analysis.
However, case studies by themselves do not warrant generalized conclusions.204
Case studies at best offer tentative hypotheses that must be tested before any
generalized conclusions can be made.205 An anecdote may assist in refuting
absolute claims, by referring to positive experience from other countries. This
does not mean, however, that the foreign solution is necessarily reasonable or
acceptable in the domestic context.
Besides case studies, comparisons involving just a few countries (small-n)
and statistical studies involving a large number of countries can be utilized. In
the first instance, comparisons usually rely on evidence from countries selected
consciously for the analysis. The “most similar systems design” method is based
on the assumption that if two “otherwise similar” countries adopt different
institutions or legal rules on one issue and obtain different outcomes, the
difference in these outcomes is most probably explained by the difference in the
institution or the rule.206 The basic argument in support of legal transplants is
similar — any difference in outcomes between two countries must be caused by
different legal rules, as the other variables are held constant.207 However, such
comparisons suffer from similar deficiencies as case studies, simply because
different countries are never sufficiently similar.
Statistical studies involving a large number of countries purportedly
compensate for the impossibility of drawing general conclusions from case
studies. The statistical methods (usually multiple regression analysis) attempt to
find relationships when controlling for the variation in other variables. The use
of statistical methods in judicial decision-making seems limited, though, as such
studies establish general trends that might not apply in specific cases. The U.S.
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Supreme Court is likely not interested in what happens in the world 95% of the
time; it is interested in what will happen in the United States.  Therefore, it is
not surprising that there is no single U.S. Supreme Court decision where a
comparative statistical study has been used,208 in contrast to other types of
statistical analyses.
These methodological problems clearly show that conclusive evidence is
almost never found through comparative analysis209 When courts base their
decisions on inconclusive evidence, the results are neither beneficial to
comparative law nor legal analysis. Some empirical inferences are clearly
reasonable. For example, the advantages of democracy over authoritarianism
may not always be clear in detail,210 but generally the benefits of democracy are
evident. The purpose of preserving human rights is quite tangible, yet the
impact of specific human rights may not be clear.211 In addition, the con-
sequences of limiting human rights are not clear.
Many major issues in comparative politics are still open to argument. Thus,
even the use of expert witnesses in the courtroom to explain and support the
transferability of foreign law212 to the domestic context helps little. Meaningful
comparative studies take time, and the results of such studies would be far from
conclusive evidence for judges. Of course, the situation would be different if
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comparative research were already available, but research is  is rarely available
on the very issue before the court.213
C. Conclusion
The use of comparative experience to make empirical predictions is
theoretically a cure for many ills of legal reasoning. However, its “wrong” use
can be as harmful as the misapplication of any social science data. The “right”
use of comparative experience, however, is enormously difficult to achieve.
Even when accomplished, there are few clear-cut conclusions to be drawn from
its application. The practical hopes for finding help from comparative analysis
are thus modest.
The benefits of comparative empirical reasoning appear to be greatest when
foreign experience is taken from a very similar country or system, as is the case
in comparative normative analysis. When using similar countries, comparative
empirical reasoning benefits from the “most similar systems design,” whereas
comparative normative analysis benefits from federal or international
“brokerage.” Comparative experience can serve as a persuasive authority in
legal decision-making when utilized to compare similar countries.
VI. THE STRATEGY OF COMPARATIVE REASONING
Thus far, this article has discussed the role of comparative analysis in reaching
conclusions in a legal argument. As shown, comparative constitutional law can
provide only modest help to judges. At the same time, it is suggested that the
reasons for inserting comparative elements into judicial opinions may be
strategic. I will now turn more closely to the issue of strategic considerations
and discuss the circumstances where one can expect to find such strategically-
based comparative references. The following is a positive analysis. Its goal is
not to persuade or justify comparative references, but to explain them. The
question at hand is why some courts utilize comparative analysis more than
others.214
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A. Comparative Reasoning as an Element of Judicial Strategy
The search for explanations regarding comparative reasoning must begin with
analyzing the motivation of the relevant actors — the judges or the court in
general. This is a field that has drawn considerable attention from scholars from
both political science215 and the law.216 Based on the motivation of judges,
specific models can be set up. This can be done on two levels — individual and
institutional.
B. Institutional Motivation to Engage in Comparative Reasoning
Institutional analysis evaluates the court as a unitary actor and deals with the
goals of the court as a single institution. Institutional predictions look at the
strategic behavior of the court, hypothesizing that the court wants to persuade
its audience.217 One prominent predictive model is based on separation-of
powers considerations, which hypothesizes that the court wants to make policy
that will not be overturned by subsequent executive or legislative action.218 In
applying this predictive model to a court’s use of comparative reasoning, one
would hypothesize that courts use comparative arguments in order to persuade
other branches of government that the court’s analysis is sound. However, if the
comparative arguments would have a negative impact on the view of other
political bodies, the court would probably refrain from using these arguments.
The previous analysis has provided a rationale for the greater use of
comparative experience by relatively young constitutional courts than es-
tablished regimes. This may not be a consequence of legal necessity, but of the
need to seek judicial legitimacy by referring to more experienced constitutional
courts. Young constitutional courts can justify entering certain areas of
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policymaking by referring to other courts which have acted similarly.219 In
addition, these courts can persuade other governmental bodies that their
judgment is substantively in line with the practice of other democratic
countries.220 This might be especially true for courts in countries undergoing
political transition, in order to show the way for democratic development.221
Further, showing that courts all over the world have dealt with a question might
help prevent accusations that the court is interfering with political questions
more appropriately addressed by other branches of government.
This discussion pertains only to the legitimacy of the court, which is
important for how its decisions will be perceived, not for making the legal
argument better in and of itself. Moreover, for some courts referring to foreign
case law might diminish the legitimacy of a holding, rather than enhance it.222
Indeed, people may view borrowing ideas from foreign decisions as
surrendering to “legal imperialism.”223 The courts in more powerful countries
might be less enthusiastic than courts in less powerful countries, because the
powerful political organspossess unilateralist aspirations and would normally
not consider the country bound by the opinions and attitudes of other countries.
For example, this might explain why the U.S. Supreme Court does not readily
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nation in dealing with other nations. On the other hand, an advocate arguing before such
a court can urge the government to get in line with fellow governments, suggesting the
possibility of exclusion if a government remains a hold-out.”).
221
 Developments in the Law--International Criminal Law, The International Judicial
Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2049, 2060–62 (2001) (“[T]he new constitutional courts use comparative
experience both in order to find persuasive legal arguments as well as to remedy
“unfortunate international reputations” and to “improve their status in the world
community.”). The argument is similar to the contention that emerging democracies are
more willing to enter into international human rights organizations with supranational
adjudicative powers. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes:
Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000).
222
 This seems to be the case with the U.S. Supreme Court. Even courts that use
comparative case law often make the point that they do not apply foreign law, but just
get ideas from it. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
223
 JAMES A. GARDINER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID
TO LATIN AMERICA (1980) (on United States’ assistance to South America);
TRANSPLANTS, INNOVATION, AND LEGAL TRADITION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
(Elisabetta Grande ed., 1995) (on the dangers of one-sided exportation of legal rules).
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use foreign experience.224 The fact that the Court is left out o  international
dialogue may be troubling,225 but is an unfortunate result of strategic
calculations. The desire to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic
constituency might also explain the fact that courts in liberal democracies cite
precedent from liberal systems only, to the exclusion of authoritarian
regimes.226
Another reason why the courts are motivated to cite foreign precedents is
that the court identifies itself with other courts around the world. Citing foreing
precedent would contribute to the legal discussion worldwide. By engaging in
comparative analysis, the court may be seen as a part of an “international
community” of higher courts.227 In this way, the American courts could exert
influence on foreign judicial practices228 and spread the American way of
thinking and legal reasoning, announcing the American “constitutional
gospel.”229 One of the reasons that the U.S. Supreme Court has not been cited
by foreign courts recently is arguably because it does not engage in international
discussions.230 The court that wants to have international influence, and who
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 Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ABROAD 392 (L. Henkin & A. J.
Rosenthal eds., 1990) (“To some extent there is an unwillingness by Americans to admit
such influence: that we should be governed by ideas from foreign sources is not
congenial to us.”); McCrudden, supra note 27, at 519–20.
225
 Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM.. L.
Rev. 537, 561 (1988) (“[T]he apparent reluctance of the U.S. Supreme Court to consider
overseas interpretations of its own cases [is troubling].”); L’Heureux-Dube, supra note
40, at 40 (“It is to be hoped . . . that the United States Supreme Court will begin to
consider, in more depth, the opinions of other high courts around the world.”).
226
 McCrudden, supra note 27, at 517–18.
227
 Bernard E. Harcourt, Mature Adjudication: Interpretive Choice in Recent Death
Penalty Cases, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 255 (1996) (while discussing the jurisprudence of
the South African Constitutional Court, arguing that “the court uses comparative law to
define its own peer group while simultaneously creating its individual identity in the
international community”); Slaughter, supra note 40, at 123 (arguing that the judges in
higher courts are autonomous actors with autonomous relationships with foreign or
supranational judges); Amnon Reichman, “When We Sit to Judge We are Being
Judged.” The Israeli GSS Case, Ex Parte Pinochet and Domestic/Global Deliberation,
9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 41 (2001) (arguing that the judgments of domestic
courts are discussed by other courts, creating a system of dialogue and peer-review).
228
 Justice Stevens has explicitly argued this in a dissent: “The Court of Appeal of
South Africa, indeed, I suspect most courts throughout the civilized world — will be
deeply disturbed by the ‘monstrous’ decision the Court announces today.” U.S. v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 687 (1992).
229
 Fontana, supra note 33, at 572. Again, whether this is the proper role of the court
and the proper source of legitimacy is not clear.
230
 See supra note 221, at 2072. (“The Canadian court's citation in Burns to Justice
Breyer's dissent, rather than to any other recent U.S. state or federal court decision
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perceives that its audience is the international community of lawyers and
judges, is expected to pay more attention to comparative arguments.
C. Individual Motivation to Engage in Comparative Reasoning
Another perspective on comparative reasoning offered by political science
models focuses on the attitudes and goals of individual justices. This approach
is based on the fact that a court, as such, cannot have preferences and
opinions — courts always reflect the preferences and opinions of the individual
justices sitting on the bench. There is little controversy among political
scientists that justices seek to influence legal policy. Political scientists do differ
on their theories of how justices behave in order to achieve their policy
objectives. The attitudinal model suggests that justices vote their sincere
preferences.231 According to rational choice models, judges are constrained by
both internal and external factors. Internally, they need to accommodate and
bargain in order to gain support from the other justices. Externally, they need to
consider interaction between different branches, like the court as a single actor
would.
Applying these notions to comparative constitutional analysis, we may posit
the following hypotheses: attitudinalists would predict that judges use a
comparative constitutional law argument whenever it supports their position.232
Under a rational choice model, however, a judge would not use comparative
arguments so readily, but would first consider how these arguments might be
perceived by the other institutions as well as by other judges. We know that
three of the justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, namely Rehnquist,233 Scalia,234
and Thomas,235 have openly declared that they do not consider comparative
analysis appropriate in legal analysis . Given these declarations, if the remaining
Supreme Court justices desire to have an impact on their peer justices’ votes,,
they should probably avoid the use of comparative arguments. A possible test of
this hypothesis would involve analyzing individual opinions in order to find
                                                                                                                       
regarding the death row phenomenon, suggests that Justice Breyer’s willingness to look
to outside jurisprudence renders his opinions more influential in foreign and
supranational jurisdictions.”) (footnotes omitted); L’Heureux-Dube, supra note 40, at
30, 37–38 (arguing that the opinions of the Rehnquist court, which does not often cite
foreign precedents, are less often cited by foreign courts).
231
 JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
232
 In fact, almost all of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have used comparative
constitutional law arguments. See Fontana, supra note 33, at 545–48 for the overview.
233
 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 2252–54 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
234
 Id. at 2264 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235
 Patterson, 536 U.S. 984 (2002).
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patterns of agreement or disagreement where comparative arguments are used in
comparison to opinions not using foreign materials.236
D. A Role for Law in Comparative Constitutional Reasoning
The individual and institutional approaches described above seem to neglect the
position of law in judicial decision-making. Should we not expect to find
comparative arguments in those cases when reference to foreign opinions makes
the legal argument better? At the very least, the foreign experience might offer
pedagogical guidance in finding good legal arguments or help the court to fill a
vacuum that exists. Would we not expect a court to use comparative reasoning
at least in the early years of its jurisprudence? After enough time has passed and
domestic precedents suffice, the recourse to foreign judgments would become
unnecessary.237 Smithey, using case law from the Canadian Supreme Court and
African Constitutional Court, finds evidence that judges rely on precedent
because of its utility in cutting information costs and decreasing uncertainty.238
Using foreign decisions might thus offer self-assurance for courts that they have
employed a sound method of legal analysis.239 However, self-assurance could
be achieved after consulting foreign experience, and it would thus be
unnecessary to engage in time-consuming discussions in the opinion, thereby
saving the court from the possibility of embarrassing itself and the public by
misunderstanding an area of foreign law.
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 Of course, this analysis cannot explain why Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas reject
comparative arguments.
237
 McCrudden, supra note 27, at 523–24.
238
 Smithey, supra note 27; See also Koopmans, supra note 25, at 545 (stating that the
use of comparative experience is “occasioned by the lawyer’s search for fresh
perspectives, in particular when completely new legal problems are to be solved”);
Glenn, supra note 90, at 280 (“The idea gains currency that the extent of borrowing of
foreign authority is a simple function of the adequacy of local sources, and that local
sources can be adequate if enough law is produced suitable to local conditions”); Yash
Ghai, Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Woolf’s Clothing? Judicial Politics and the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights, 60 MOD. L. REV. 459, 479 (1997) (“The courts are willing to
consider cases from foreign jurisdictions, although as some areas get explored, there is
less need for them.”); Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights
Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205, 281
(1998) (“As the Court gains experience and precedents take root, the Court's need to
canvass international and foreign comparative jurisprudence for insights and guidance
may diminish.”).
239
 McCrudden, supra note 27, at 518.
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We would still expect a court to use comparative constitutional arguments
for legal purposes, if they help to improve a legal argument.240 There are several
factors that make comparative reasoning a good argument in one court, but not
another. For example, different societies might disagree on what appropriate
legal decision-making entails. Whenever consensus exists that the constitution
should be interpreted according to original intent behind a constitutional
provision, references to foreign precedent are less likely to occur than when
judges assert that the constitution should be interpreted in light of the evolving
societal standards.241
The foregoing analysis shows that for some courts comparative arguments
are more compelling than for others. The courts in a federalist system or the
courts bound by international law should use comparative arguments more
readily than courts in a more independent system. Also, courts in similar
societies and legal systems should be better able to use empirical arguments
based on comparative analysis.
However, the legal model cannot account for the “soft” use of precedent.
Citing and discussing foreign decisions does not add to a holding’s legal
significance as a matter of precedent. There are necessarily other strategic
factors which a court keeps in mind when citing foreign authorities. Maximizing
an argument’s persuasive power is argely determined by legal strategy, and not
by some abstract rules of what counts as a good legal argument.
VII. CONCLUSION
The analysis has shown that the use of comparative constitutional law by courts
is rather limited. Discussing foreign judgments may provide inspiration for
judges, but citing them in the opinion does not make the argument itself
                                                
240
 Of course, no consensus as to what constitutes a perfectly legitimate argument
exists. However, there are some lines of analysis that are universally accepted as being
sources of legal argument, such as text, intention of the framers, precedent, and purpose
of the statute. For a comparative overview, see D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers, Interpretation and Justification, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 511–44 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
This article cannot answer the empirical question whether the courts actually do follow
legal arguments, a claim contested by political scientists. See e.g., JEFFREY SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED
279–311 (2002); HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO THE PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999)
(arguing that the individual justices do not follow precedent). But see Howard Gillman,
What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of
Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001) (arguing that the
behavioralists oversimplify the “legal model”).
241
 McCrudden, supra note 27, at 524–25.
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stronger in terms of precedential authority. Interpreting broad constitutional
principles or balancing constitutional values needs to take into account the
particular cultural and social setting of the court more than the hard-to-establish
“international consensus.” Learning from the experience abroad may help to
conceptualize legal approaches, but foreign experience will not provide
information about a decision’s potential domestic impact.
However, analysis of comparative constitutional reasoning has shown its
potential utility. Empirically analyzing predictive theories on the use of
comparative reasoning by different courts may help shed light on judicial
decision-making itself. Do the younger constitutional courts indeed discuss
foreign decisions more than their more experienced counterparts? If yes, why do
they do so? Is it because these courts want to deceive their public that they are
interpreting law even though they have in fact entered the realm of politics —
whatever the difference between these two disciplines may be? Or do courts
refer to foreign experience because they genuinely want to reach the best legal
conclusion? Support for the latter hypothesis would certainly be an important
finding for those who believe that judges are generally not over-ambitious
policy-makers, but sincerely aiming to reach the best legal decisions.
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I. Einleitung
Die Verfassung der Republik Estland, die vor nunmehr einer Dekade — bald
nach Untergang der Sowjetunion — durch Referendum vom 28. Juni 1992
angenommen wurde,1 hat mittlerweile eine fast ebenso lange Zeit der
Anwendung absolviert. An die Verfassung waren mit Recht hohe Erwartungen
geknüpft worden, u.a. war sie als „sehr modernes, in vielen Punkten äußerst
innovatives Dokument“ bezeichnet worden, welches für die vergleichende
Verfassungsjurisprudenz interessant bleiben dürfte.2 Die einzelnen Be-
stimmungen der Verfassung sind bereits mehrfach beschrieben und analysiert
worden, weswegen im vorliegenden Aufsatz vor allem die Entwicklung der
Anwendung dargestellt und damit auch diskutiert werden soll, ob auch die
estnische Verfassungsjurisprudenz diesen hohen Erwartungen gerecht geworden
ist.3 Vor allem werden wir die Rechtsprechung des Staatsgerichtshofs, des
                                                
1
 Eine deutsche Übersetzung von H.-J. Uibopuu findet sich in Brunner (Hrsg.), VSO,
Estland, 1.1.a; wiederabgedruckt in C. Thiele, Selbstbestimmungsrecht und
Minderheitenschutz in Estland, 1999, S. 190ff. Auf Englisch siehe State Chancellery of
the Republic of Estonia and the Estonian Translation and Legislative Support Centre
(Hg.), Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus / The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, 1996.
Einführend siehe R. Steinberg, Die neuen Verfassungen der baltischen Staaten, in: JöR
43 (1995), S. 55ff.; S. Kofmel, Rechtsentwicklung in Baltikum: die neue Verfassung der
Republik Estland vom 28. Juni 1992, ZaöRV, 53. Jg. (1993) Nr. 1, S. 135ff.; M.H.
Wiegandt, Grundzüge der estnischen Verfassung von 1992, in: JöR 45 (1997), S. 151ff.,
die wohl beste Veröffentlichung zu diesem Thema.
2
 M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 174.
3
 Für eine allgemeinen Beschreibung des estnischen Staatsrechts siehe R. Narits / K.
Merusk, Estonia, in: International Encyclopaedia of Laws. Constitutional Law, 1999;
auf Estnisch T. Annus, Riigiõigus [Verfassungsrecht], 2001. Über die estnische
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estnischen obersten Gerichts, und besonders seiner Verfassungskammer4
behandeln (obwohl Estland kein selbständiges Verfassungsgericht hat, wurden
dem Staatsgerichtshof die Funktionen des Verfassungsgerichts zugeordnet5),
unter Einbeziehung zumal der deutschen Literatur.6 Hierbei liegt der Schwer-
punkt auf der Darstellung des notwendigen Diskussions- und auch Handlungs-
bedarfs. Bei solch einem Verfahren ergibt sich naturgemäß eine gewisse
Konzentration auf Schwächen und Fehlstellen der Verfassungsentwicklung, was
nicht davon abhalten sollte, diese, zumal im Vergleich mit Ländern ähnlichen
Hintergrunds, als insgesamt erfolgreich zu bezeichnen.
II. Staatskontinuität oder Staatsgründung?
Die estnische Verfassung wurde laut Präambel „aufgrund § 1 der 1938 in Kraft
getretenen Verfassung“7 durch Referendum angenommen. Anders als Lettland
                                                                                                                       
Verfassungsentwicklung wird regelmäßig in der East European Constitutional Review
von V. Pettai berichtet.
4
 Der Begriff Staatsgerichtshof (oder Staatsgericht) entspricht am besten dem
estnischen Begriff Riigikohus, weniger passend ist „Oberstes Gericht“ oder
„Nationalgericht“; vgl. M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 167.
5
 Der Staatsgerichtshof hat vier Kammern, von denen eine oder das Plenum zu
Verfassungsfragen entscheiden. Zum System des estnischen Verfassungsprozesses R.
Maruste / H. Schneider, Constitutional Review in Estonia — its Principal Scheme,
Practice and Evaluation, in: R. Müllerson / M. Fitzmaurice / M. Andenas (Eds.),
Constitutional Reform and International Law in Central and Eastern Europe, 1998, S.
91ff.; P. Roosma, Constitutional Review under the 1992 Constitution, Juridica
International 3 (1998), S. 35ff.; T. Marauhn, Supreme Court or Separate Constitutional
Court: The Case of Estonia, European Public Law 5 (1999), S. 301ff.
6
 In Estland erscheint nur eine einzige juristische Zeitschrift, „Juridica“, her-
ausgegeben von der Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Tartu [ehem. Dorpat]. Die
Artikel sind mit englischsprachigen Kurzzusammenfassungen versehen. Jährlich wird
eine englischsprachige Ausgabe, „Juridica International“, veröffentlicht, die für den
ausländischen Leser wohl die beste Quelle für Diskussionen zum estnischen
Rechtssystem ist. Rechtswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen auf Englisch oder Deutsch
kann man auch in der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift „Trames“ finden.
Estnische wissenschaftliche Monographien gibt es kaum; selbständige Veröffent-
lichungen sind überwiegend entweder (Kurz-) Lehrbücher oder Übersetzungen
ausländischer, nicht Estland-bezogener Texte (siehe aber unten Fn. 87). Für der Herbst
2002 ist das Erscheinen eines vom Justizministerium in Auftrag und von E.-J. Truuväli
herausgegebenen Verfassungskommentars geplant.
7
 Im Folgenden verwenden wir die Übersetzung von Uibopuu. Sie ist jedoch nicht
ganz fehlerfrei; so bestimmt § 64 Abs. 2 Nr. 4 der Verfassung, daß das Mandat eines
Parlamentsmitgliedes vorzeitig erlischt, wenn, so Uibopuu, „die Staatsversammlung
entschieden hat, daß er ständig unfähig ist, seine Aufgaben zu erfüllen.“ Statt
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hat Estland sich nie für eine Fortgeltung der Verfassung von 1938 entschieden,
jedoch hat die These der Staatskontinuität für die heutige Republik Estlands
konstitutiven Charakter. Die Staatskontinuität ist daher ein Tabuthema des
öffentlichen Diskurses.8
Die praktische Ausführung der Staatskontinuität ist jedoch in den ver-
gangenen zehn Jahren nicht konsequent gehandhabt und nur in einigen Fällen
bedeutsam geworden. Die bei weitem folgenreichste der darauf beruhenden
politischen Entscheidungen ist die Wiederanwendung des Staatsangehörigkeits-
gesetzes von 19389 mit der Folge, daß Menschen, die in Zeiten der Sowjetunion
nach Estland übersiedelten, die Staatsbürgerschaft nur durch einen Ein-
bürgerungsprozeß erlangen konnten und können.10 Ein anderer in diesem Zu-
sammenhang relevanter Bereich ist der des Eigentums der Republik Estland.11
Auch der Staatsgerichtshof12 hat in völkerrechtlichen Disputen die Konti-
nuitätsthese vertreten.13
                                                                                                                       
Staatsversammlung (d.h. Parlament, Riigikogu) muß es jedoch Staatsgerichtshof
(Riigikohus) heißen.
8
 Zur Staatskontinuitätsfrage siehe W. Drechsler, The Estonian State at the Threshold
of the 21st Century, in: Eesti maailmas 21. sajandi künnisel, Conference in Honor of the
President of the Republic of Estonia, Lennart Meri, on Occasion of his 70th Birthday,
Aula Lectures, University of Tartu, 1999, S.27ff.; L. Mälksoo, Professor Uluots, the
Estonian Government in Exile and the Continuity of the Republic of Estonia in
International Law, Nordic Journal of International Law 69 (2000), S. 289ff.;
R Müllerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the Former
USSR and Yugoslavia, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42 (1993),
S. 473ff.; T. Kerikmäe / H. Vallikivi, State Continuity in the Light of Estonian Treaties
Concluded before World War II, Juridica International 5 (2000), S. 30ff.; M.H Wiegandt
(Fn. 1), S. 153.
9
 Übersetzung in W. Meder, Das Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht der UdSSR und der
baltischen Staaten, 1950, S. 89ff.
10
 C. Thiele (Fn. 1), S. 63ff. Dadurch bleiben nach zehn Jahren Unabhängigkeit noch
fast 300 000 Einwohner ohne estnische Staatsangehörigkeit; mehr als 100 000 haben
diese bekommen; etwa 100 000 weitere Einwohner haben sich für die russische
Staatsangehörigkeit entschieden. Die genaue Zahl der russischen Staatsangehörigen in
Estland ist unbekannt.
11
 Z.B. die Gebäude der diplomatischen Vertretungen im Ausland (darunter diejenige
im Berliner Tiergarten) oder die nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in England befindlichen
und jetzt zurückgegebenen Goldreserven. Jedoch werden alte Schulden nicht
konsequent zurückgezahlt, siehe Paper Chase, The Economist, 18. Nov. 2000, S. 88.
12
 Englische Übersetzungen der Entscheidungen der Verfassungskammer des Staats-
gerichtshofs werden im Internet unter www.nc.ee/english/const/decisions.htm (Stand
Jul. 2001) veröffentlicht. Die Entscheidungen der Zivil-, Straf- und Verwaltungs-
kammer werden nicht übersetzt. Sie werden hier nach dem Veröffentlichungsort im
estnischen amtlichen Anzeiger Riigi Teataja (RT) zitiert.
13
 Entscheidung vom 21. Dez. 1994. Der Staatsgerichtshof entschied, daß die
Okkupation Estlands nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg völkerrechtswidrig war, und daß
98
In den meisten dem Gericht vorgelegten Fällen wurde die Kontinuität und
eine vollständige restitutio ad integrum aber abgelehnt, was sicher auch die
einzig praktikable Möglichkeit ist. Während der allgemeinen Eigentumsreform
wurde ehemaligen Eigentümern nur ein subjektives Recht auf Rückerstattung
und kein Recht auf Vindikation zugesprochen.14 Bis zur Übertragung des
Eigentums bleibt der estnische Staat selbst Eigentümer.15
Die Frage der estnisch-russischen Grenze bleibt weiterhin ungelöst. Einen
Vertrag zwischen Estland und der Russischen Föderation gibt es bisher nicht.
Der Friedensvertrag von Dorpat vom 2. Februar 192016, der laut § 122 Abs. 1
der estnischen Verfassung17 die Grenzen festschreibt, bleibt ohne praktische
Bedeutung, da Rußland ihn als mittlerweile ungültig betrachtet. Das Prinzip, das
die Russische Föderation benutzt, ist klar — ex factis ius oritur. Dies stellt den
Gegenpol des von estnischen Politikern benutzten ex iniuria ius non oritur
dar.18 Verhandlungen über einen neuen Grenzvertrag brachten, selbst nach zehn
Jahren Unabhängigkeit, immer noch keine Ergebnisse.19
Vielleicht das größte Problem in diesem Zusammenhang ist aber die
Tatsache, daß die Diskussion in Estland sich vor allem auf den Beweis der
Kontinuität an sich konzentriert. Die praktischen Folgen und notwendigen
Maßnahmen für den heutigen Staat, sowohl innerstaatlich als auch in völker-
rechtlicher Hinsicht, sind bisher ungeklärt. Das ausschließliche Rekurrieren auf
die Kontinuitätsthese, die als Grundlage der politischen und nationalen Identität
                                                                                                                       
damit die Streitkräfte der Sowjetunion nie Eigentümer estnischen Bodens und estnischer
Gebäude geworden sind. Damit wurde ein Gesetz für verfassungskonform erklärt, das
alle Verkaufsverträge mit sowjetischen Streitkräften über Boden und Gebäude für
nichtig erklärte. Zur Staaskontinuitätsdiskussion siehe allgemein C. Marek, Identity and
Continuity in Public International Law, Genf 1968.
14
 Als Estland der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und
Grundfreiheiten, die eine Eigentumsschutzklausel beinhaltet, beitrat, geschah dies unter
Vorbehalt bezüglich der Eigentumsreform, da derartige subjektive Rechte auch gegen
jetzige gutgläubige Besitzer durchgesetzt werden können. Eine verfassungsrechtliche
Diskussion wurde jedoch nicht ausgelöst, obwohl § 32 der Verfassung eine ebensolche
Eigentumsgarantie festsetzt. Die Besitzer versuchten vielmehr, politische Mittel zum
Schutz ihrer Rechte einzusetzen, was aber ohne Erfolg blieb. Auf der Verfassung
basierende Klagen gegen die Restitution wurden erst nach mehreren Jahren erhoben, als
die Gerichtsschutzfristen bereits weitgehend abgelaufen waren.
15
 Z.B die Entscheidung der Verwaltungskammer vom 8. Dez. 1995 (RT III 1996, 5,
72).
16
 RT 24/25 (1920); League of Nations Treaty Series 11 (1932), S. 30ff.
17
 Im Folgenden beziehen sich alle Paragraphenangaben ohne weitere Kennzeichnung
auf die Verfassung der Republik Estland.
18 R. Müllerson (Fn. 8), S. 487.
19
 Es kann wohl gesagt werden, daß dies an rein strategischen Erwägungen der
Russischen Föderation liegt.
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des Staates gesehen wird, läßt jedenfalls außer Acht, daß faktisch jetzt durchaus
ein anderer Staat besteht als vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.20
III. Hauptprinzipien der Verfassung
Die Hauptprinzipien der estnischen Republik entsprechen weitgehend den in Europa
gemeinhin akzeptierten Werten. Laut Kommissionsbericht der Europäischen Union
(EU) erfüllt Estland die von ihr gesetzten politischen Kriterien für Beitrittskandidaten,
da es die Merkmale eines demokratischen Staates aufweist und stabile Institutionen
besitzt, die Rechtsstaatlichkeit und den Schutz der Menschenrechte gewährleisten.21
Jedoch ergeben sich durch die stark nationalstaatliche Tendenz der Verfassung und
ihrer Interpretation immer wieder Spannungen.
1. Demokratie
Das Demokratieprinzip ist in der estnischen Verfassung von erheblicher
Bedeutung. Die Entwicklung hat gezeigt, daß die demokratischen Institutionen
gut funktionieren und daß keine grundsätzlichen Probleme aufgetreten sind. Es
gibt jedoch einige Bereiche, in denen die Entwicklung besser verlaufen könnte.
a) Minderheitenschutz
Der Minderheitenschutz ist der außerhalb Estlands wohl meistdiskutierte Aspekt
des estnischen Rechtssystems. Schon vor Annahme der Verfassung wurde
besondere Vorsicht empfohlen, um die Prinzipien des Minderheitenschutzes,
des Pluralismus und der Toleranz nicht zu vernachlässigen.22 Seit Inkrafttreten
der Verfassung wurde immer wieder geprüft, ob die estnischen Gesetze23 dem
Völkerrecht und der Verfassung entsprechen. Immer wieder wurde dabei
festgestellt, daß höherrangige Normen nicht24 oder nicht eindeutig verletzt
werden;25 allenfalls wird auf einige völkerrechtliche Probleme hingewiesen.26
                                                
20
 Siehe das ausführliche Argument hierzu in W. Drechsler (Fn. 8), S.27ff.
21
 European Commission, 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Estonia’s
Progress towards Accession, 8. Nov. 2000, S. 20.
22
 P. Häberle, Dokumentation von Verfassungsentwürfen und Verfassungen ehemals
sozialistischer Staaten in (Süd)Osteuropa und Asien, in: JöR 43 (1995), S. 105ff., S.
174, 179.
23
 Die wichtigsten estnischen Gesetze werden von einer Behörde, dem „Zentrum für
Juristische Übersetzung“ (Estonian Legal Translation Centre), übersetzt und sind auf
Englisch im Internet unter www.legaltext.ee (Stand Jul. 2001) verfügbar. Sie finden sich
auch in der von derselbe Behörde herausgegebenen Veröffentlichung „Estonian
Legislation in Translation“.
24
 Zuletzt eindeutig C. Schmidt, Die Rechtsstellung der Minderheiten in Estland, in: G.
Brunner / B. Meissner (Hrsg.), Das Recht der nationalen Minderheiten in Osteuropa,
1999, S. 327ff. Ihr Fazit lautet: „Gegen völkerrechtliche Bestimmungen verstoßen
Regelungen und Praxis sicherlich nicht“, S. 349.
25
 M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 157ff.
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Es wird weiter die — auch sonst gelegentlich angeführte — Meinung vertreten,
daß die estnische Situation eine Notwendigkeit der Neuauslegung völkerrecht-
licher Regelungen erfordere; so soll etwa der Minderheitenbegriff auch diejeni-
gen Volksgruppen einbeziehen, deren Mitglieder keine Staatsbürgerschaft
besitzen.27
Gleichzeitig wird immer wieder auf Probleme hinsichtlich des Minder-
heitenschutzes hingewiesen, die nicht rechtlichen, sondern politischen Cha-
rakter haben. Das allgemeine Fehlen eines pluralistischen Konzepts in den
osteuropäischen Verfassungen wird vielfach betont.28 Wiegandt beschreibt diese
Situation zutreffend: „Insgesamt ergibt sich ein sehr nationalistischer Zug der
Verfassung, der den nichtestnischen Einwohnern sublim zu verstehen gibt, daß
sie im Prinzip unerwünscht sind. Dabei wird dieser Weg zwar auf dem Boden
geltenden Völkerrechts beschritten. Dieses wird auf der anderen Seite aber auch
so weit wie möglich für die nationalistischen Ziele ausgeschöpft.“29 Die Ent-
wicklung der estnischen Praxis zeigt in dieselbe Richtung.30
Der bekannteste und auch bedeutendste Fall in diesem Bereich ist jedoch ein
rechtlicher, und zwar die durch Gesetz eingeführte Beschränkung des passiven
Wahlrechts.31 In Parlaments- und Kommunalwahlen kann nur kandidieren, wer
ausreichend Estnisch beherrscht; die Überprüfung der Sprachkompetenz unter-
liegt der Wahlkommission. Diese Gesetzesbestimmung wird auch angewandt.
Da die Verfassung (§ 60 i.V.m. § 12) und völkerrechtliche Verträge wie der
Internationale Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte (Art. 25 i.V.m. Art. 2
Abs. 1) und die Europäische Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und
Grundfreiheiten (EMRK, Art. 3 1. Zusatzprotokoll) Freiheit der Wahl und
                                                                                                                       
26
 C. Thiele (Fn. 1), 1999, S.179f. für die Zusammenfassung der Probleme; generell zum
Thema T. Annus, German Authors on Estonian Minority Rights, Trames 3 (1999), S.
223ff., mit der Besprechung von G. Brunner / B. Meissner (Fn. 24) und C. Thiele (Fn. 1).
27
 C. Thiele (Fn. 1), S. 182; viel vorsichtiger R. Visek, Creating the Ethnic Electorate
through Legal Restorationism: Citizenship Rights in Estonia, Harvard International Law
Journal 38 (1997), S. 315ff., S. 356f.
28
 P. Häberle, Verfassungsentwicklungen in Osteuropa — aus der Sicht der
Rechtsphilosophie und der Verfassungslehre, in: AöR 117 (1992), S. 169ff., S. 184.
29
 M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 159.
30
 Vgl. „Multiculturalism as such and in Estonia“, Podiumsdiskussion mit J.M. Berry,
M.H. Bond und M. Heidmets, geleitet und herausgegeben von W. Drechsler, Trames 2
(1998), S. 274ff.
31
 Ebenfalls von Interesse ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Möglichkeit der
Beschränkung des passiven Wahlrechts der ehemaligen Mitarbeiter der Sicherheits-
organe. Da das Einführungsgesetz zur Verfassung eine solche Beschränkung nur bis
zum 31. Dez. 2000 vorgesehen hat, wird z.Zt. diskutiert, ob einfachgesetzlich eine
Verlängerung möglich wäre. Am 21. Feb. 2001 fand eine erste Anhörung dazu statt;
seitdem hat es jedoch keine weiteren Entwicklungen gegeben.
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Diskriminierungsverbot auch hinsichtlich der Sprache garantieren, wird geltend
gemacht, daß das Sprachgebot verfassungswidrig sei.32
Die Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer des Staatsgerichtshofs zu dieser
Frage33 fiel jedoch so aus, daß die Sprachanforderungen zwar das passive
Wahlrecht beschränken und daher einen Eingriff in dieses Grundrecht dar-
stellen, daß aber dieser Eingriff in einem demokratischen Staat notwendig sei.
Die Präambel der Verfassung konstituiere nämlich „die Erhaltung des
estnischen Volkes und der estnischen Kultur durch alle Zeiten“ als Verfassungs-
ziel, für deren Schutz die Sprachanforderungen eine sowohl notwendige als
auch verhältnismäßige Maßnahme seien.34 Zusätzlich wurde darauf hinge-
wiesen, daß Demokratie „funktionieren“ müsse und daß Parlamentsmitglieder
ohne Sprachkenntnisse nicht an der Parlamentsarbeit ausreichend teilnehmen
und daher keine vernünftigen Entscheidungen treffen könnten. Die Sprachan-
forderungen wurden damit für verfassungskonform erklärt. Eine Klage beim
Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) wurde bisher nicht
eingereicht.35
Nicht von Bedeutung ist bisher § 52 Abs. 2, der die Möglichkeit einer
anderen Sprache als Estnisch für den inneren Geschäftsverkehr von Kommunen
mit mehrheitlich anderssprachigen Einwohnern schafft,36 da gemäß Sprach-
gesetz hierfür eine Genehmigung der Regierung notwendig ist.37 Bisher hat die
Regierung alle derartigen Anträge der Kommunen abgelehnt, von denen aber in
Nordostestland viele fast rein russischsprachig sind. Diese und andere von der
nationalstaatlichen Tendenz der Verfassung geleiteten Maßnahmen38 haben
auch der Europäischen Kommission Anlaß gegeben, den Integrationsprozeß in
Estland zu kritisieren.39
                                                
32 C. Thiele (Fn. 1), S. 144: „Sprachanforderungen als Voraussetzung für ein passives
Wahlrecht widersprechen sowohl der estnischen Verfassung als auch völkerrechtlich
bindenden Verträgen“.
33
 Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer von 4. Nov. 1998 (RT I 1998, 98/99, 1618).
34
 Dies entspricht auch der generellen Perspektive in Estland, zumal der der politisch-
intellektuellen Elite, die einen engen Zusammenhang von Sprache und Identität
vermutet und daher zahlreiche diesbezügliche Regelungen in vielen Bereichen aufstellt
und auch implementiert.
35
 Jedoch wurde ein ähnlicher Fall gegen Lettland vom EGMR angenommen, s.
Podkolzina contre la Lettonie, Décision sur la recevabilité de la requête nº 46726/99, 8.
Feb. 2001.
36
 „In Ortschaften, in denen Estnisch nicht die Sprache der Mehrheit der Einwohner ist,
können die Kommunen im gesetzlich festgelegten Umfang und Verfahren die Sprache
der Mehrheit der ständigen Einwohner dieser Ortschaft als interne Geschäftssprache
verwenden.“ Sehr ähnlich lautete schon § 22 der Verfassung von 1920.
37
 § 11 des Sprachgesetzes, „Estonian Legislation in Translation“ 2000, Nr. 4;
abgedruckt in C. Thiele (Fn. 1), S. 241ff.
38
 Übersichtlich vor allem C. Thiele (Fn. 1), passim.
39
 European Commission (Fn. 21), S. 20ff.
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b) Kommunale Selbstverwaltung
Die kommunale Selbstverwaltung in Estland hat eine lange Tradition und ist im
XIV. Kapitel der Verfassung verankert. Estland ist 1994 der Europäischen
Charta der Kommunalen Selbstverwaltung des Europarates beigetreten. Zur Zeit
gibt es in Estland 247 Gemeinden und Städte, die die einzige Selbstver-
waltungsstufe darstellen.40 Die der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung zu-
grundeliegende Idee, den Bürgern die Möglichkeit zu geben, selbst für ihre
kommunalen Angelegenheiten verantwortlich zu sein, ist in Estland aber in
vielen Punkten gefährdet.
Zunächst betrifft dies die Frage der kommunalen Kompetenzen. Die
Verfassung garantiert den Kommunen Selbstverantwortlichkeit in „Fragen des
örtlichen Lebens“ (§ 154 Abs. 1); eine Konkretisierung oder gar Definition
dieser Bestimmung haben die Gerichte aber bisher nicht vorgenommen. In
denjenigen Fällen, in denen der Staatsgerichtshof hier urteilen mußte, ging es
für ihn jeweils um offensichtlich staatliche Fragen.41 Der Staatsgerichtshof hat
nie eindeutig festgestellt, daß der Gesetzgeber örtliche Angelegenheiten nicht
durch Gesetze regeln und in den Kompetenzbereich der Gemeinden und Städte
nicht eingreifen darf. Es wurde lediglich festgestellt, daß die Kommunen keiner
gesetzlichen Ermächtigung fürs eigene Handeln bedürfen, wenn es um örtliche
Angelegenheiten geht.42 Auf der anderen Seite dürfen die Gemeinden und
Städte ohne gesetzliche Ermächtigung nicht in die Grundrechte eingreifen.43
Stärker noch würde die kommunale Selbstverwaltung durch die seit einigen
Jahren geplante und nach einem Regierungserlaß vom Juni 2001 nunmehr wohl
anstehende Verwaltungsreform eingeschränkt, wenn diese auch in jüngster Zeit
innerhalb der Regierungskoalition parteipolitisch umstritten ist. Obwohl die
meisten Kommunen der Reform, gemäß der von den 247 Einheiten nur etwa 80
übrigbleiben würden, nicht zustimmen,44 wird der Plan von den Zentralbe-
                                                
40
 Bis 1993 hatte Estland auch eine zweite Ebene der Selbstverwaltung, die aber
aufgelöst wurde. In der Verfassung wurde die Frage nach den Ebenen der Selbstver-
waltung absichtlich offengelassen. Zur Übersicht über das estnische Selbstverwaltungs-
system s. T. Kungla, Die estnischen Kommunen und ihre Finanzen, in: W. Drechsler
(Hrsg.), Die selbstverwaltete Gemeinde: Beiträge zu ihrer Vergangenheit, Gegenwart
und Zukunft in Estland, Deutschland und Europa, 1999, S. 111ff.
41
 Etwa in der Entscheidung vom 6. Sept. 1993 (RT I 1993, 61, 890, Referendum für
eine Autonomie für einige nordöstliche Gemeinden) oder vom 9. Feb. 2000
(RT III 2000, 5, 45, Verkehrsregulierung an der Grenze).
42
 Entscheidung vom 22. Dez. 1998 (RT I 1998, 113/114, 1887; Einführung einer
Gebühr zur Einfahrt in die Altstadt der Stadt Tallinn).
43
 Entscheidung vom 6. Okt. 1997 (RT I 1997, 74, 1268, kommunale Sperrstunde für
Minderjährige).
44
 A. Ammas, Alla 8000 elanikuga vallad kaovad [Gemeinden mit weniger als 8 000
Einwohnern verschwinden], Eesti Päevaleht, 29. Dez. 2000; siehe Regierungserlaß vom
25. Jun. 2001 (RTL 2001, 80, 1102).
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hörden vehement verfolgt. Dabei wird der wirtschaftliche Nutzen nur postuliert,
aber nicht einmal überschlagsmäßig kalkuliert (er wäre bestenfalls gering,
wahrscheinlich sogar negativ); die Bedeutung der Selbstverwaltung für die
Demokratie wird nicht bedacht.45 In der Diskussion dieser Fragen, soweit sie
vorkommt, wird die Herabstufung der Gemeinden und Städte zu bloßen
Verwaltungseinheiten und die Zuweisung einer Rolle fast außerhalb des Staates
kaum einmal problematisiert.46
2. Rechtsstaat
Obwohl die Verfassung Estland nicht ausdrücklich zum Rechtsstaat erklärt,47
hat der Staatsgerichtshof den Rechtsstaatscharakter zu einem ihrer tragenden
Prinzipien werden lassen. Die allgemein anerkannten rechtsstaatlichen Prinzi-
pien wie Gesetzesvorrang und -vorbehalt,48 Gewaltenteilung,49 Rechts- und
                                                
45
 Umfassend zur Gemeindegebietsreform W. Drechsler, Kommunale Selbstver-
waltung und Gemeindegebietsreform: Deutsche Erfahrungen, prinzipielle Erwägungen,
estnische Perspektiven, in: ders. (Hrsg.) (Fn. 40), S. 97ff.
46
 Die besondere Rolle der Kommunen zeigt sich auch darin, daß Parlamentsmitglieder
an der Arbeit der Kommunalvertretungen teilnehmen können, obwohl sie laut
Verfassung (§ 63 Abs. 1) „kein anderes Staatsamt ausüben“ dürfen. Daß diese letztere
Bestimmung alle Verwaltungspositionen umfaßt, wurde vom Staatsgerichtshof
bestätigt, s. die Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer vom 2. Nov. 1994 (RT I 1994,
80, 1379). — Wir werden auch im Folgenden gelegentlich auf mangelnde gesell-
schaftliche Diskussion derartig zentraler Fragen stoßen. Wir müssen uns aber mit dem
Hinweis selbst zufrieden geben, da „nationalpsychologische“ Erwägungen nicht Sache
dieses Aufsatzes sein können. Siehe aber A. Annist, Progress without Protest, Central
European Review 2, No. 27, 10. Jul. 2000; historisch vgl. W. Drechsler / R. Kattel, Karl
Bücher in Dorpat, Trames 1, S. 322ff., S. 346ff.
47
 Auch von M.H Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 160, bemerkt.
48
 Übersichtlich K. Merusk, The Right to Issue Regulations and its Constitutional
Limits in Estonia, Juridica International 1 (1996), S. 38ff., und die Entscheidung der
Verfassungskammer vom 20. Dez. 1996 (RT I 1997, 4, 28).
49
 Übersichtlich H. Schneider, The Principle of Separate and Balanced Powers in
Estonian Constitutions, Juridica International 2 (1997), S. 35ff. Aus der Rechtsprechung
z.B. die Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer vom 2. Nov. 1994 (RT I 1994, 80,
1379), wonach Parlamentsmitglieder nicht im Bereich der vollziehenden Gewalt tätig
sein können, oder die vom 14. Apr. 1998 (RT I 1998, 36/37, 558), nach der alle
Verfassungsorgane eine gewisse Organisationsautonomie haben müssen, auch gegen-
über dem Gesetzgeber. Also hat das Gewaltenteilungsprinzip eine Bedeutung bekom-
men, die auch den „Kernbereich“ der Funktionen der Verfassungsorgane schützt — a.A.
M.H Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 168.
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Vertrauensschutz50 sind gut bekannt und haben auch einen mehr oder weniger
klaren Inhalt bekommen.
Das Rechtsstaatsprinzip ist daher keine abstrakte Erscheinung mehr.
Dennoch kommt es nicht selten vor, daß die rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien allzu
starr gesehen werden.51 Das hängt schon mit dem unten (V.2.) behandelten
Problem der Auslegung zusammen, denn wenn man sich ausschließlich auf den
Gesetzestext konzentriert, was in Estland generell der Fall ist, wird der
Rechtsstaat leicht zum unflexiblen Gesetzesstaat.
Eines der wichtigsten rechtsstaatlichen Probleme selbst hat mit der Rolle der
Gerichte in Öffentlichkeit und Staatsleben zu tun. Der Rechtsweg ist nicht nur
etwas Neues, sondern auch kompliziert und in vielen Fällen teuer. Noch fehlt
ein effektives System für eine Prozeßkostenhilfe in Zivil- und Verwaltungs-
verfahren,52 obwohl dies sogar ein menschenrechtliches Problem darstellen
könnte.53 Die Reputation der Gerichte ist ebenfalls nicht besonders hoch. Dazu
tragen einige unpopuläre bzw. nicht nachvollziehbare Entscheidungen54 sowie
gelegentliche Bestechungsaffären in bei Gerichten liegenden Registern bei. Die
Europäische Kommission hat — u.a. aufgrund von Berichten des Justizministe-
riums — wiederholt auf die Schwächen des Justizsystems hingewiesen.55 Das
Spannungsverhältnis zwischen der Notwendigkeit einerseits, dieses weiter zu
reformieren, und der Wahrung der Unabhängigkeit der Gerichte andererseits
bleibt für Estland ein Problem.
                                                
50
 Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer vom 30. Sept. 1994 (RT I 1994, 66, 1159),
wonach eine Steuerbefreiung, die den Landwirten für fünf Jahre gewährt wurde, nicht
vorzeitig aufgehoben werden konnte.
51
 Siehe W. Drechsler, Avalik haldus kui riigiteadus [Verwaltungswissenschaft als
Staatswissenschaft], in ders. (Hrsg.), Avaliku halduse alused [Grundlagen der Verwal-
tung(swissenschaft)], 1997, S. 11ff., S. 17.
52
 Im Strafprozeß wird ein Pflichtverteidiger vom Staat benannt. Alle bisherigen
Versuche, ein allgemeines Rechtshilfesystem durch private, vom Staat berufene
Anwälte oder durch Staatsbeamte zu garantieren, sind gescheitert.
53
 Airey vs Ireland, European Court of Human Rights Judgements and Decisions
Series A (1979) 32 (Rechtshilfe in komplizierten Fällen nötig).
54
 Z.B. wurde eine Anwältin von der Anklage der Bestechung einer Richterin
freigesprochen, obwohl ihre Handlungen auf Videoband aufgezeichnet worden waren.
Paradoxerweise hat das Gericht gerade in dieser Entscheidung wichtige rechtsstaatliche
Prinzipien verteidigt, da erklärt wurde, daß rechtswidrig erworbene Beweismittel nicht
vor Gericht zulässig sind. Entscheidung der Strafkammer von 17. Juni 1997
(RT III 1997, 23, 244).
55
 Der „Progess Report“ von 2000 hat deutlich die Verbesserung des Justizsystems
verlangt. Für eine kritische Meinung über das estnische Justizsystem allgemein siehe
J.  v. Altenbockum, Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit. Die Reform der Justiz in
Estland, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27. Okt. 1998.
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3. Sozialstaat
Das Sozialstaatsprinzip hat noch keine eigenständige Bedeutung erlangt. Es
bleibt abzuwarten, ob sich aus diesem Prinzip unmittelbar subjektive Rechte
ergeben können. Mit der Ratifizierung verschiedener Artikel der Europäischen
Sozialcharta hat Estland auch einige diesbezügliche Pflichten übernommen.56
Subjektive Rechte im Sozialbereich hat man aufgrund der Verfassung nicht
durchgesetzt.57 Auch dies steht im Einklang mit der herrschenden politischen
Meinung in Estland, der das Sozialstaatsprinzip dem Sozialismus wohl zu sehr
zu ähneln scheint und daher suspekt ist.58
IV. Grundrechtsschutz
Im Bereich des Grundrechtsschutzes führt die estnische Verfassung einen
umfangreichen Katalog auf.
1. Die Rolle der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte
und Grundfreiheiten
Estland ist 1996 der EMRK beigetreten. Nur das 6. Zusatzprotokoll (Verbot der
Todesstrafe) wurde erst 1998 nachträglich ratifiziert.59 Der EGMR hat schon
                                                
56
 Ob völkerrechtliche Verträge unmittelbar anwendbar sind und ob sich aus ihnen
subjektive Rechte überhaupt ergeben können, ist in Estland wie überall strittig. Die
herrschende Meinung und Rechtsprechung hat sich zugunsten der Unmittelbarkeit
entschieden. Für die Anwendbarkeit der EMRK siehe die Entscheidung der Ver-
waltungskammer des Staatsgerichtshofs vom 6. Juni 1997 (RT III 1997, 21/22, 234),
wonach der Schutz des Familienlebens das Recht verleihen kann, in Estland seinen
Wohnsitz zu wählen. Aus der Literatur: U. Lõhmus, Välismaalased ja õigus perekonna-
elu puutumatusele [Ausländer und das Recht auf Schutz des Familienlebens], Juridica
2000 Nr. 7, S. 415ff.
57
 In der Rechtsprechung der Zivilkammer wurde jedoch befunden, daß es Pflicht des
Staates sein kann, einen Mietvertrag nicht vorzeitig zu beenden, wenn der Mieter
objektiv nicht in der Lage ist, die Miete zu bezahlen. Es wurde auch auf § 28
hingewiesen, wonach kinderreiche Familien und Behinderte unter besonderer Fürsorge
des Staates stehen; Entscheidung der Zivilkammer vom 18. Okt. 2000 (RT III 2000, 25,
278). Ein ähnlicher Fall wurde jedoch abweichend entschieden: ein Unternehmen wurde
von einer solchen Pflicht freigesprochen, obwohl der Staat sämtlich Aktienanteile an
ihm hielt; siehe Entscheidung der Zivilkammer vom 16. Nov. 2000 (RT III 2000, 28,
307). Insofern hat die „Flucht ins Privatrecht“ in Estland wirklich stattgefunden.
58
 Vgl. Annist (Fn. 46).
59
 Zuvor hatte der Staatsgerichtshof abgelehnt, die Todesstrafe — die allerdings seit
langer Zeit nicht mehr angewandt worden war — für verfassungswidrig zu erklären;
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nach kurzer Zeit Einfluß auf die estnische Verfassungspraxis ausüben können.
Daß der Staatsgerichtshof schon mehrfach bei seinen Entscheidungen die
Straßburger Rechtsprechung herangezogen hat, deutet darauf hin, daß die
Auslegung der Verfassung unter dem Einfluß der europäischen Rechtsprechung
vollzogen werden wird.
Der erste vom EGMR entschiedene, Estland involvierende Fall betraf einen
Strafgefangenen, dessen Korrespondenz ständig geöffnet und durchgelesen
wurde. Nach Klage beim EGMR akzeptierte Estland, daß damit Rechte aus Art.
8 EMRK verletzt werden, und schloß ein „friendly settlement“.60 Schon
während der Vorbereitung der Vereinbarung hat der Gesetzgeber die not-
wendigen entsprechenden Änderungen in das Haftgesetz61 eingefügt.
Die Bestimmungen der EMRK im Bereich der Freiheit der Meinungsäuße-
rung (geschützt von § 45) haben lebendige verfassungsrechtliche Diskussionen
ausgelöst. Der Status von Presse und Journalisten gemäß der Verfassung war
eines der Hauptthemen in einem Fall, in dem ein Journalist wegen Beleidigung
verurteilt wurde. Da auch der Staatsgerichtshof die Verurteilung bestehen ließ,62
wurde Klage beim EGMR eingereicht. Der Straßburger Gerichtshof befand
zugunsten des Staates.63
                                                                                                                       
Entscheidung des Plenums des Staatsgerichtshofs vom 25. Sept. 1996 (RT III 1996, 28,
369) mit einem Sondervotum des damaligen Vorsitzenden Richters R. Maruste, der jetzt
estnischer Richter am EGMR ist. Das Fehlen des Verbots der Todesstrafe in der
Verfassung wurde von M.H Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 163 als „auffällig“ bezeichnet. Siehe
auch N.J. Brennan, European integration and human rights’ cultures in Eastern Europe:
the EU and abolition of capital punishment in Estonia, University of New Brunswick
Law Journal, vol. 47 (1998), S. 49ff.
60
 Slavgorodski vs Estonia, Application no. 37043/97, Entscheidung des EGMR vom
12. Sept. 2000.
61
 Vangistusseadus (RT I 2000, 58, 376), unter www.legaltext.ee als „Imprisonment
Act” übersetzt.
62
 Enscheidung der Strafkammer vom 26. Aug. 1997 (RT III 1997, 28, 285) und des
Plenums des Staatsgerichtshofs vom 9. Apr. 1998 (RT III 1998, 19, 190), wieder mit
einem Sondervotum von Richter Maruste (siehe Fn. 54).
63
 Tammer vs Estonia, Application no. 41205/98, Entscheidung vom 6. Feb. 2001
(Beleidigung innerhalb eines Zeitungsinterviews). Im Lichte der vorherigen Ent-
scheidungen des EGMR bleibt jedoch anzumerken, daß diese Entscheidung nicht recht
nachvollziehbar ist; vgl. etwa Oberschlick vs Austria (No. 2), European Court of
Human Rights Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1997-IV, 1276; Oberschlick vs
Austria, European Court of Human Rights Judgments and Decisions Series A (1991)
204.
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2. Grundrechtstheorie
Den „allgemeinen Teil“ des Grundrechtskatalogs hat der Staatsgerichtshof in
seinen Entscheidungen zwar herangezogen, jedoch ist es noch zu früh, hier eine
Verallgemeinerung der Rechtsprechung vornehmen zu können. Es gibt bisher
lediglich Ansätze einer allgemein gültigen Grundrechtstheorie. Die Fragen der
Drittwirkung und Verhältnismäßigkeit64 sind nur in einigen Fällen näher unter-
sucht worden. In früheren Entscheidungen hat der Staatsgerichtshof fast keine
Grundrechtseingriffsprüfungen aufgrund des Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzips
durchgeführt.65 Die Entwicklung geht aber eindeutig in diese Richtung, sehr
ähnlich der deutschen Lösung. Es wird vom Staatsgerichtshof demgemäß unter-
sucht, ob in den Schutzbereich des Grundrechts eingegriffen wurde und ob
dieser Eingriff gerechtfertigt und auch verhältnismäßig war.66
Die Problematik der Drittwirkung wird in der Rechtsprechung fast gar nicht
behandelt.67 Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob § 14, der der gesetzgebenden, voll-
ziehenden und auch rechtsprechenden Gewalt die Pflicht zuordnet, Rechte und
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 M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 162, hat angedeutet, daß das Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip
nicht ausdrücklich in der Verfassung normiert ist und es die Aufgabe der Rechts-
prechung sei, entsprechende Kriterien zu entwickeln.
65
 Der Staatsgerichtshof hat etwa befunden, daß die Versetzung eines Polizeibeamten
aufgrund dienstlicher Notwendigkeit ohne Zustimmung des Beamten verfassungswidrig
sei, da gem. § 34 keine Schranke der Freiheit der Wohnsitzwahl existiert. Ob eine
verfassungsimmanente Schranke gegeben ist, oder ob gar ein solcher Eingriff im
demokratischen Staat notwendig oder verhältnismäßig ist, wurde nicht untersucht.
Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer vom 25. Nov. 1998 (RT I 1998, 104, 1742). Bei
der oben behandelten Entscheidung zu den Sprachgesetzen (Fn. 33) handelt es sich
ebenfalls um keine Verhältnismäßigkeitsüberprüfung, da diese nur postuliert, aber nicht
untersucht wurde.
66
 Dies wird auch aus § 11 abgeleitet, der für Beschränkungen eine „Notwendigkeit im
demokratischen Staat“ verlangt. Die beste Entscheidung gemäß dieses Instituts betraf
die Aufhebung der Alkoholverkaufserlaubnis. Laut Gesetz mußte diese Erlaubnis
aufgehoben werden, wenn der Unternehmer Alkohol an Minderjährige verkaufte, auch
wenn es nur einmal und in geringer Menge geschah. Der Staatsgerichtshof befand, daß
hierdurch ein Eingriff in die Freiheit der unternehmerischen Tätigkeit (§ 31) vorlag. Es
sei unverhältnismäßig, in solch einem Falle ohne jegliche Abwägung die Erlaubnis
aufzuheben. Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer vom 28. Apr. 2000 (RT III 2000,
12, 125).
67
 Die Verfassung bietet jedoch eine interessante Möglichkeit zur Frage der
Drittwirkung: gem. § 25 hat jeder das Recht, vom jeweiligen Verursacher für jeglichen
Schaden kompensiert zu werden. Dadurch erlangt wenigstens § 25 unmittelbare
Drittwirkung, wie auch in der Rechtsprechung bestätigt wurde, z.B. Entscheidungen der
Zivilkammer vom 12. Dez. 1996 (RT III 1997, 2, 11) und vom 26. Feb. 1998 (RT III
1998, 9, 96).
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Freiheiten zu gewährleisten, einen eigenständigen Inhalt gewinnen kann. Wie
die Zivilgerichte diese Bestimmung auslegen würden, ist noch völlig offen.68
3. Einzelne Grundrechte
Hinsichtlich der einzelnen Grundrechte existiert bereits höchstrichterliche
Rechtsprechung in erheblichem Umfang.69 Familie,70 Privatleben, Wohnung
und Korrespondenz,71 Eigentum,72 Vereinigungsfreiheit73 und Berufs- und
Unternehmensfreiheit74 des Einzelnen hat der Staatsgerichtshof erfolgreich
geschützt. Dies ist als sicherlich einer der positivsten und wichtigsten Aspekte
der Verfassungsentwicklung Estlands deutlich zu unterstreichen.
Jedoch gibt es Bereiche, denen bisher keine angemessene Aufmerksamkeit
zuteil wurde. Obwohl § 1075 häufig als eine der interessantesten Klauseln der
Verfassung bezeichnet wurde, ist dieser Paragraph nur für einige wenige Fälle
bedeutsam geworden. Vor allem hat § 10 allen rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien
Geltung verschafft.76 Die weitgehende Fortentwicklung der Idee einer
                                                
68
 In der Literatur wird nur die mittelbare Drittwirkung empfohlen, M. Ernits, Holders
and Addressees of Basic Rights and Freedoms in Estonian Constitutional Jurisprudence,
Juridica International 4 (1999), S. 11ff.
69
 Als Übersicht siehe P. Roosma, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in
Estonian Constitutional Jurisprudence, Juridica International 4 (1999), S. 35ff.
70
 Siehe oben (Fn. 56).
71
 Ein Gesetz, das den Steuerbeamten das Recht gab, breite Maßnahmen im Prozess
der Steuererhebung zu treffen, wurde für verfassungswidrig erklärt; Entscheidung der
Verfassungskammer vom 4. Nov. 1993 (RT I 1993, 72/73, 1052). In zwei Ent-
scheidungen vom 12. Jan. 1994 (RT I 1994, 8, 129; 130) hat die Verfassungskammer
des Staatsgerichtshofs Sondermaßnahmen der Polizei ohne ausführliche gesetzliche
Regelung für verfassungswidrig erklärt.
72
 So die Entscheidungen vom 12. Apr. 1995 (RT I 1995, 42, 655) und vom 8. Nov.
1996 (RT I 1996, 87, 1558), in denen die Verfassungskammer in der Pflicht einer
juristischen Person des Privatrechts, die Wohnungen ihrer Mieter zu privatisieren, eine
Enteignung sah.
73
 In der Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer vom 10. Mai 1996 (RT I 1996, 35,
737) wurde etwa Minderjährigen das Recht zugesprochen, Vereine zu gründen.
74
 Entscheidung der Verfassungskammer vom 28. Apr. 2000 (RT III 2000, 12, 125),
siehe oben Fn. 65 (Verhältnismäßigkeitsgebot; Aufhebung der Alkoholverkaufser-
laubnis).
75
 „Die im vorliegenden Abschnitt aufgezählten Rechte, Freiheiten und Pflichten
schließen keine anderen Rechte, Freiheiten und Pflichten aus, die sich aus dem Sinn der
Verfassung ergeben oder mit ihr im Einklang stehen, sowie den Grundsätzen der
Menschenwürde und des sozialen und demokratischen Rechtsstaates entsprechen.“
76
 Aus der Verfassungsrechtsprechung ist auf die Entscheidung zum Vertrauensschutz
hinzuweisen; siehe oben Fn. 48.
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Konstituierung der Rechte und Pflichten, die sich „aus dem Sinn der Verfassung
ergeben oder mit ihr im Einklang stehen“,77 hat aber bisher nicht stattgefunden.
Die Vorhersage von Wiegandt, daß eine so offene Fortentwicklungklausel die
Rechtsprechung vorsichtig machen würde,78 hat sich nur zur Hälfte erfüllt, da
solche Fragen bislang überhaupt nicht diskutiert wurden. Die Furcht, daß § 10
wegen der Möglichkeit der Fortentwicklung von Pflichten „eine Aushöhlung
der Garantietatbestände der verfassungsrechtlich verbürgten Grundrechte“79 zur
Folge haben würde, hat sich aus den gleichen Gründen ebenfalls nicht bestätigt.
Das Prinzip Menschenwürde80 ist bisher praktisch ohne Bedeutung
geblieben.81 Einen dem deutschen Grundgesetz vergleichbaren Wert haben die
estnischen Gerichte der Menschenwürde nicht zugesprochen. Die neuerdings
immer öfter diskutierten Fragen wie Datenschutz, Bioethik oder Asyl —
Grundrechte, die jüngst in der Charta der Grundrechte der EU festgeschrieben
wurden82 — haben in Estland kaum verfassungsrechtliche Relevanz.83 Ebenso
ist es hinsichtlich anderer ähnlicher Fragen, z.B. der akademischen Freiheit, und
selbst eine Diskussion zum Schwangerschaftsabbruch hat es in Estland nie
gegeben.84
                                                
77
 Eine solche Bestimmung sei „meisterhaft“, P. Häberle (Fn. 22), S. 177.
78
 M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 161.
79
 M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 151.
80
 Menschenwürde als ein Hauptwert wurde nicht ausdrücklich in der Verfassung
verankert, obwohl z.B. Häberle dies empfohlen hat, P. Häberle (Fn. 22) S. 177. Auch in
Estland wird das Fehlen einer klaren Bestimmung zum Schutz der Menschenwürde
beklagt, siehe E. Kergandberg, Fundamental Rights, Right of Recourse to the Courts
and Problems Connected with the Guaranteeing of the Right of Recourse to the Courts
in Estonian Criminal Procedure, Juridica International 4 (1999), S. 122ff., 124f.
81
 Da Estland ein umfangreiches und außergewöhnliches Gesetz über Genomforschung
verabschiedet hat, könnte man annehmen, daß es öffentliche und rechtliche Diskus-
sionen über den Entwurf gegeben hat. Ein Diskussionsprogramm wurde zwar an-
geboten, s. T. Mullari, Genoomianalüüsi inimõiguslik problemaatika [Menschenrecht-
liche Problematik der Genomanalyse], Juridica 1998 Nr 5, S. 222ff., ist aber ohne
Folgen geblieben. Das Gesetz findet sich in Übersetzung unter www.genomics.ee (Stand
Apr. 2001); Auszüge mit Analyse: „‘Gesetz über die Forschung am menschlichen
Genom’ — Estlands Lex Genom in Auszügen“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3.
Feb. 2001. (Es sei hier angemerkt, daß die Berichterstattung der Frankfurter All-
gemeinen Zeitung über das estnische Genomprojekt und seine Kommentierung
sicherlich die ausführlichste und kenntnisreichste Darstellung eines estnischen auch
juristischen und staatstheoretischen Vorganges in Deutschland ist, das Projekt aber
relativ einseitig und kaum hinterfragend unterstützt.)
82
 Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, ABl. 2000, C364/1, Art. 3, 8, 18.
83
 Siehe jedoch J. Sootak / M. Kurm, A Wish to have a Baby and the Dignity of the
Child and Embryo: About the Law on Artificial Insemination and Embryo Protection of
the Republic of Estonia, European Journal of Health Law 5 (1998), S. 191ff.
84
 Eine solche Diskussion wurde für „vorprogrammiert“ gehalten, M.H. Wiegandt (Fn.
1), S. 163.
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Es gibt noch andere interessante und „fortentwicklungsfähige“ Normen der
Verfassung wie das allgemeine Gleichheitsrecht (§ 12) oder die freie Entfaltung
der Persönlichkeit (§ 19), die bisher relativ unbeachtet geblieben sind. Zehn
Jahre nach Inkrafttreten der Verfassung wurde ein Gesetzesentwurf über die
Gleichheitsgewährleistung der Geschlechter vorbereitet. Wenn man § 14
betrachtet, der die „Gewährleistung der Rechte und Freiheiten“ zur Pflicht des
Staates macht, hätte man ein solches Gesetz schon vorher erwartet.85 Was das
Recht der freien Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit betrifft, so hat der Staats-
gerichtshof nie überprüft, ob irgendwelche Handlungen oder Rechtsakte § 19
Abs. 1 entsprechen.86 Daher gibt es kaum Hinweise darauf, welche Bedeutung
dieses Recht haben könnte. Ob sich ein mit der deutschen Lösung ver-
gleichbares allgemeines Freiheits- und Persönlichkeitsrecht entwickeln wird,87
bleibt abzuwarten.88
Eine moderne Verfassungsbestimmung, der in § 44 Abs. 2 garantierte Aus-
kunftsanspruch gegenüber staatlichen Behörden, ist viele Jahre ohne wirkliche
Bedeutung geblieben. Erst am 1. Januar 2001 ist ein konkretisierendes Gesetz in
Kraft getreten;89 bis dahin hatten die Behörden solche Ansprüche einfach
abgelehnt. Der Gerichtsweg gegen diese Auskunftsverweigerungen wurde
jedoch nie eingeschlagen.
4. Pflichten
Die Auslegung der verfassungsrechtlichen Pflichten ist noch keiner allgemeinen
Systematik unterworfen. Von den einzelnen Fällen ist das Fehlen einer
Diskussion um Wehrpflicht und Gleichberechtigung interessant. Wiegandt hatte
vermutet, daß die Tatsache, daß es keine eindeutige Regelung zur Wehrpflicht
                                                
85
 M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 161: „Es darf sicherlich mit Spannung abgewartet
werden, welche Bedeutung diese Klausel bei der Interpretation des Gleichheitssatzes ...
erlangen wird.“
86
 Nur in einer späten Entscheidung hat die Verfassungskammer angedeutet, daß die
Entziehung der Erlaubnis, Waffen zu tragen, das Recht aus § 19 Abs. 1 beeinträchtigen
könnte. Eine weitgehende Analyse fehlt jedoch; Entscheidung vom 6. Okt. 2000
(RT III 2000, 21, 233).
87
 Dies wird empfohlen von R. Alexy, Grundrechte in der estnischen Verfassung.
Unveröffentliches Manuskript, angefertigt für das estnische Justizministerium, 1997.
(Hierzu mehr unten Fn. 116)
88
 Die Verfassung garantiert auch viele spezielle Persönlichkeitsrechte, die etwa in
Deutschland keinen ausdrücklichen Schutz genießen. Vor allem den Schutz der Privat-
sphäre kann man sehr weit auslegen. Das Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung
in der Praxis der Strafkammer wurde schon erwähnt; Entscheidung vom 26. Aug. 1997
(RT III 1997, 28, 285).
89
 Avaliku teabe seadus (RT I 2000, 92, 597), unter www.legaltext.ee als „Public
Information Act“ übersetzt.
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ausschließlich für Männer gibt, einen Trend zur Gleichbehandlung gezeigt hat.90
Jedoch ist in Estland die Wehrpflicht einfachgesetzlich nur für Männer gere-
gelt.91 Die Möglichkeit zum Ersatzdienst wird garantiert, auch wenn zunächst
nur ein Dienst ohne Waffe innerhalb der Streitkräfte möglich war.92 Die unter-
schiedliche Länge des Ersatzdienstes im Vergleich zum Wehrdienst ist bisher
kein verfassungsrechtliches Problem geworden.93
V. Verfassungsanwendung in Estland
Wie die Verfassungsnormen ihre wirkliche Geltung bekommen, muß näher aus
dem verfassungsprozeßrechtlichen System und der Praxis der Verfassungs-
auslegung erklärt werden. Obwohl die Verfassungsrechtsprechung bisher nur
geringen Umfang hat, können durchaus einige Verallgemeinerungen vorgenom-
men werden.
1. Institutionen
Noch fehlt im estnischen Verfassungsprozeß die Möglichkeit, Streitigkeiten
zwischen Verfassungsorganen zu lösen.94 Nur wenn der Gesetzgeber strittige
Punkte reguliert hat, kann eine Klage gegen das entsprechende Gesetz erhoben
werden. Bislang hat vor allem der Staatspräsident von dieser Möglichkeit
Gebrauch gemacht;95 in vielen Fällen ist dies aber nicht ausreichend.
                                                
90
 M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 166.
91
 Kaitseväeteenistuse seadus (RT I 2000, 28, 167), § 3 Abs. 1, unter www.legaltext.ee
als „Defense Forces Service Act“ übersetzt. Zum Rollenverständnis der Geschlechter in
Estland siehe kurz R. Taagepera, Estonia — Return to Independence, 1993, S. 226.
92
 Die Einhaltung sowohl des Wehr- als auch des Ersatzdienstes wird durch strafrecht-
liche Sanktionen gewährleistet; siehe die Entscheidung der Strafkammer vom 27. Aug.
1996 (RT III 1996, 26, 312). Auch hier wurde die Verhältnismäßigkeit des Eingriffs in
die Religionsfreiheit überhaupt nicht diskutiert. Ab Ende 2000 ist ein Ersatzdienst auch
in sozialen Einrichtungen möglich; siehe § 73 Wehrdienstgesetz (Fn. 91).
93
 Vgl. die Vorhersage von M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 166.
94
 Die Situation ähnelt der Verfassung von 1920, die schon damals dafür kritisiert
wurde: „Das Grundgesetz gibt leider keine Antwort auf die Frage: welches Organ ent-
scheidet Verfassungsstreitigkeiten.“ E. Berendts, Die Verfassungsentwicklung Estlands,
JöR 12 (1923/24), S. 195ff. Kritisch wegen des Fehlens eines Katalogs von Ver-
fassungsstreitigkeiten auch M.H. Wiegandt (Fn. 1), S. 167.
95
 So geschehen z.B. im Fall der Streitkräfte, bezüglich derer die Kompetenzen der
Regierung und des Präsidenten voneinander abgegrenzt waren, wobei dem Präsidenten
seines Erachtens nach eine zu geringe Leitungsfunktion zugeordnet wurde; Ent-
scheidung vom 21. Dez. 1994 (RT I 1995, 2, 35). Der Präsident hat sogar behauptet, daß
eine Regulation seiner Befugnisse durch Gesetz überhaupt nicht möglich sei. Dies
wurde von der Verfassungskammer zurückgewiesen. Der Gesetzgeber habe sogar die
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Die Kompetenzen des Präsidenten selbst sind nach wie vor unklar.96 In
Fällen, in denen er Nominierungsanträge für hohe Positionen anderer
Verfassungsorganen abgelehnt hat, wurde heftig diskutiert, ob er ein solches
Recht habe oder nicht. Der Staatsgerichtshof konnte bisher nicht klärend
einschreiten.97 Dies ist aber nur ein Beispiel; die Entwicklung des Staats-
organisationsrechts vollzieht sich insgesamt eher nicht im Rahmen der
Verfassungsrechtsprechung, sondern im politischen Willensbildungsprozeß.
Die Institution des Rechtskanzlers (Õiguskantsler) ist eine der interes-
santesten innerhalb der estnischen Staatsorganisationsrechtspraxis. Der Rechts-
kanzler übt laut § 139 die Aufsicht über die Verfassungs- und Gesetzesmäßig-
keit aller Rechtsnormen aus. Er hat die Befugnis, demgemäß Änderungen in
Rechtsakten vorzuschlagen. Wird der betreffende Akt nicht mit Verfassung oder
Gesetz in Einklang gebracht, kann er Klage beim Staatsgerichtshof erheben.
Schon früh wurde daher vorhergesagt, der Rechtskanzler als „Verfassungs-
und Rechtshüter“ werde eine zu wichtige Rolle spielen können.98 Sein Einfluß
auf die Entscheidungen des Staatsgerichtshofs ist recht gering, der auf die
Verfassungsüberprüfung von Rechtsnormen jedoch erheblich, denn seine
Meinung zu Verfassungsfragen wird fast immer akzeptiert — vor allem wegen
seiner hohen Autorität und wegen der Langwierigkeit des Prozesses, sollte man
ihm nicht zustimmen.99 So wird auf seine Vorschläge § 142 sehr oft einge-
                                                                                                                       
Pflicht, Verwaltungsverfahren innerhalb der Präsidentialkanzlei zu regeln, Entscheidung
der Verfassungskammer vom 14. Apr. 1998 (RT I 1998, 36/37, 558, Begnadigung).
96
 Wegen solcher Unklarheiten hat der Amtsinhaber einen großen Einfluß auf die Ent-
wicklung der Institution ausüben können. Da der erste Präsident, L. Meri, außergewöhn-
lich aktiv am politischen Leben teilnahm, wird die Institution des Staatspräsidenten
mittlerweile als viel wichtiger als z.B. der laut Grundgesetz mit ähnlichen Funktionen
ausgestattete deutsche Bundespräsident betrachtet. Zur Rolle des Präsidenten siehe das
(zum Gebrauch des Präsidenten angefertigte) Gutachten von H.-J. Uibopuu, Die
Kompetenzen des estnischen Staatspräsidenten nach der Verfassung von 1992, 1993
[auch in: ROW, 37 Jg. (1993), S. 65ff, S. 107ff.]. — Insgesamt kann festgestellt
werden, daß es sich beim gesamten politisch-administrativen System Estlands immer
noch um ein prä-Weberianisches handelt, da Amt und Amtsinhaber oft nicht getrennt
betrachtet werden können und z.B. das Amt des Präsidenten „an sich“ (noch) gar nicht
existiert.
97
 Zu den letzten Streitigkeiten über die Ernennung des Präsidenten der Zentralbank
siehe den Landesbericht Estlands, East European Constitutional Review Vol. 9 Nr. 3
(2000), S. 16f. Gerade in diesem Falle war die Qualität der aus dem Nominierungs-
prozeß zuerst hervorgegangenen Kandidaten jedoch so gering, daß dies das ganze
Verfahren in Frage stellte. Zu den entsprechenden Kompetenzen des Präsidenten
generell siehe Uibopuu (Fn. 96), 41–52.
98
 Diese Rolle des Rechtskanzlers stellt laut M.H. Wiegandt ein „interessantes rechts-
staatliches Experiment“ dar und es sei nicht sicher, ob seine „gewaltenübergreifende
Position“ sinnvoll sei; (Fn. 1), S. 168.
99
 Auch dies hat wieder mit der persönlichen Kompetenz und Reputation des bis ins
Jahr 2000 tätigen Rechtskanzlers E.-J. Truuväli zu tun.
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gangen, was für die öffentliche Verfassungsentwicklung durch die Gerichte
nicht gerade günstig ist. Der Rechtskanzler übt seinen Einfluß auf die Ver-
fassungsauslegung auch dadurch aus, daß auch die Verfassungsorgane wegen
der mangelnden Möglichkeiten für Organstreitverfahren ihm ebenfalls oft
Streitigkeiten vorlegen, und seine Meinung wird auch hierbei in der Regel
akzeptiert. Daß der Rechtskanzler seine Einflußmöglichkeiten auch während der
Vorbereitungsphase von Gesetzen, einschließlich seiner Beteiligung an
Kabinettssitzungen (§ 141 Abs. 2), ausübt,100 verstärkt seine Bedeutung noch.
Überraschend ist, daß der Kompetenzbereich des Rechtskanzlers 1999 durch
die Zuordnung der Funktionen des Ombudsmanns nochmals deutlich erweitert
wurde.101 Der Rechtskanzler hat laut Gesetz nunmehr auch das Recht, „alle
staatliche Behörden u.a. hinsichtlich der Gewährleistung der Grundrechte und
-freiheiten der Bürger zu kontrollieren.“ Seine Befugnisse sind dabei sehr weit
gefaßt. Man muß auch beachten, daß er für sieben Jahre ernannt wird und eine
vorzeitige Beendigung seiner Amtszeit nicht möglich ist. Ob eine solche
Machtkonzentration in den Händen der Einzelperson des Rechtskanzlers
prinzipiell gerechtfertigt ist, ist zu bezweifeln.102
Eine andere Ursache für die geringe Verfassungs-Interpretationspraxis in
Estland liegt in der Entwicklung der Interessengruppen. Es gibt fast keine
Gruppen, die vorwiegend gerichtliche Mittel für die Erreichung ihrer Ziele
einsetzen. Das ist einer der Gründe für die ja nicht nur negative Tatsache, daß in
Estland, im Gegensatz zu den meisten anderen europäischen Ländern, nicht alle
kontroversen Grundsatzfragen am Ende regelmäßig von den höchsten Gerichten
entschieden werden.
Es mag auch sein, daß die estnischen Juristen im Bereich des öffentlichen
Rechts zu wenig Erfahrung, oder die „falsche“ Erfahrung, haben.103 Es ist sehr
                                                
100
 In den Parlamentssitzungen hat der Rechtskanzler bisher fast nie das Wort ergriffen,
obwohl § 141 Abs. 2 ihm auch dieses Recht gibt.
101
 Das Gesetz über den Rechtskanzler (Legal Chancellor Act), „Estonian Legislation in
Translation“ 1999 Nr. 16.
102
 Der Rechtskanzler bildet mit dem Staats-Sekretär (Riigisekretär, § 95) und dem
Generalauditor (Riigikontrolör, Kap. XI; die Bezeichnung „Vorsitzender des
Rechnungshofes“ geht in die Irre, da alle Kompetenzen der Einzelperson zugeordnet
sind) die auffällige Trias höchst unabhängiger und einflußreicher Figuren der estnischen
Verfassung, deren Gestaltung nicht unproblematisch und dem System der Verfassung
eigentlich fremd ist. Hierbei hat sich der Staats-Sekretär zu einer Art Serviceminister
entwickelt; zum Generalauditor siehe das Gutachten von SIGMA unter
www.riigikontroll.ee/Eng/indexreview.html (Stand Jul. 2001).
103
 Eine Studie hat gezeigt, daß fast alle Richter in Estland ihre Ausbildung ausschließ-
lich während der Sowjet-Zeiten erhielten und keine ausreichende Fremdsprach-
kompetenz besitzen; siehe T. Anepaio, Eesti kohtunikud [Die estnischen Richter], in
Tartu Ülikool (Hg.), Akadeemiline õigusharidus ja juristide täienduskoolitus
[Akademische Rechtsausbildung und Weiterbildung der Juristen], 1997, S. 112ff.
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schwierig, erfahrene, aber politisch akzeptable Juristen sowohl für
höchstrichterliche als auch für andere höhere juristische Positionen zu finden.104
Hinzu kommt, daß der Beruf des Juristen in Estland fast völlig unreguliert ist,
da jeder, auch ohne juristische Ausbildung, eine Kanzlei eröffnen und
juristische Dienstleistungen anbieten kann. Unter den Universitäten, die
staatlicherseits für die Juristenausbildung akkreditiert sind, befinden sich zudem
auch Institutionen bezweifelbarer Qualität.105 Der Qualifikation und dadurch
auch der allgemeinen Reputation des Berufsstandes hat all dies keinen guten
Dienst erwiesen.106
2. Verfassungsauslegung
Wenn auch verfassungsrechtliche Fragen in Rechtsprechung und Literatur dis-
kutiert werden, so fehlt es doch vor allem an einer öffentlichen wissenschaft-
lichen Diskussion über den Staat, seine Verfassung und die politische
Ordnung.107 Ob die estnische Verfassung eine liberale oder eher eine soziale
Neigung hat, kann man auch deswegen noch nicht beantworten.108 Die
Rechtsprechung hat hierauf keine Antworten; die Einstellung der Richter spielt
keine bekannte Rolle. Das zeigt sich auch bei Richterernennungen, die nur sehr
selten politisch kontrovers gewesen sind, obwohl die Richter am Staats-
gerichtshof vom Parlament ernannt werden.
Die Diskussion leidet auch dadurch, daß nur eine einzige rechtswissen-
schaftliche Zeitschrift, „Juridica“, existiert, in der Rechtsprechungsübersichten
oder -analysen, zumal kritische, gänzlich fehlen. Die Zeitschrift wird von der
Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Tartu herausgegeben; ihre Autoren
stammen fast ausnahmslos ebenfalls von dort. Da viele von ihnen entweder als
                                                                                                                       
Letzteres ist in Estland wegen des Mangels an juristischen Literatur in der Staatssprache
(siehe Fn. 6 oben) von besonderer Bedeutung.
104
 Die Stelle des Rechtskanzlers konnte auch deswegen für fast ein ganzes Jahr nicht
besetzt werden. Der erste Versuch, einen kaum formell oder inhaltlich ausgewiesenen,
28 Jahre alten Beamten des Justizministeriums zu nominieren, wurde — obwohl
Vorschlag der Regierung — durch das Parlament abgewiesen. Ein folgender Bewerber,
der Londoner Völkerrechtsprofessor R. Müllerson, scheiterte u.a. aufgrund seiner
Haltung zur Staatskontinuitäts- (siehe II. und Fn. 8 oben) und Minderheitenfrage.
105
 Das Gesetz vertraut hinsichtlich der Qualitätskontrolle von Hochschulen weitgehend
auf die Kräfte des Marktes; das Akkreditierungsverfahren einzelner Studiengänge kann
nicht immer als völlig seriös bezeichnet werden.
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 Es gibt eine Anwaltskammer (eine juristische Person des öffentichen Rechts), die
jedoch nur sehr begrenzte öffentliche Kompetenzen hat; so haben nur ihre Mitglieder
das Recht, vor dem Staatsgerichtshof anzutreten.
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 Siehe W. Drechsler (Fn. 8), S. 27ff.
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 Zum Ansatz einer Diskussion siehe R. Narits, Comprehension of the Constitution
(from the Communitarian Point of View), Juridica International 4 (1999), S. 3ff.
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Richter oder als Berater oder Mitarbeiter beim Staatsgerichtshof tätig sind,
müßten sie aber auch gleichsam über sich selbst urteilen.
Ein besonderes Merkmal der Verfassungsauslegung in Estland ist der
immense Einfluß der deutschen Jurisprudenz.109 Vor allem im Grundrechtsbe-
reich sind deutsche Vorbilder sehr deutlich, was wegen der einfacheren
Übertragbarkeit der EGMR-Praxis eine gewisse Überraschung darstellt. (Es ist
sogar noch auffälliger, wenn man weiß, daß die meisten estnischen Juristen —
im Gegensatz zu einer noch häufig zu hörenden Meinung — als Fremdsprache
nicht Deutsch, sondern Englisch beherrschen.) Die Verhältnismäßigkeits-
kontrolle z.B. unterliegt mehr und mehr denselben Bedingungen wie in
Deutschland — ein Eingriff muß geeignet, notwendig und verhältnismäßig im
engeren Sinne sein. Ob die Grundrechte eine Drittwirkung besitzen, wird in der
Literatur fast nur aufgrund deutscher Autoren diskutiert.110 Ähnliches gilt für
das rechtsstaatliche Prinzip des Gesetzesvorbehalts und der damit verbundenen
Erfordernis, daß Rechtsverordnungen eine gesetzliche Ermächtigungsgrundlage
haben müssen. Die sehr strengen Anforderungen, die vom Staatsgerichtshof
aufgestellt wurden, ähneln denen der deutschen Rechtsprechung und
Literatur.111 Der Staatsgerichtshof knüpft häufig an diese Literatur an, obwohl
in den Entscheidungen selbst kaum auf Lösungen in anderen Ländern, darunter
Deutschland, verwiesen wird.112
Vielleicht am problematischsten ist, daß, z.T. aus obengenannten Gründen
des Hintergrunds der Richter, Gesetzesauslegung fast nur anhand der
grammatischen Methode geschieht. Obwohl z.B. die geschichtliche Entstehung
der Verfassung gut erforscht ist,113 wurde in keiner der Entscheidungen des
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 Allgemein siehe J. Sootak / M. Luts, Rechtsreform in Estland als Rezeptions- und
Bildungsaufgabe, JZ 1998, S. 401ff.
110
 Die Literaturhinweise von M. Ernits (Fn. 68) beziehen sich z.B. fast ausschließlich
auf deutsche Autoren. Die ähnliche amerikanische State Action — Doktrin ist z.B. völlig
unbekannt.
111
 Auch in diesem Bereich werden in der Literatur fast ohne Ausnahme
deutschsprachige Quellen verwendet; vgl. etwa die Literaturhinweise in K. Merusk (Fn.
48). Der unterschiedlichen Praxis des franzözischen oder gar amerikanischen Rechts
wird keine Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet.
112
 Der ehemalige Vorsitzende des Staatsgerichtshofs Maruste hat in einem
Sondervotum ausnahmsweise einmal die Entscheidungen des — für Estland ja nicht
zuständigen — Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften verwendet; Entscheidung
der Verfassungskammer vom 6. Okt. 1997 (RT I 1997, 74, 1268). In einem Sonder-
votum hat Richter Kergandberg darauf hingewiesen, daß die Richter ausländische
Vorbilder, vor allem russische und deutsche, diskutiert haben; Entscheidung des
Plenums des Staatsgerichtshofs vom 22. Dez. 2000. Entscheidungen des EGMR werden
häufiger herangezogen.
113
 Die Aufzeichnungen der Sitzungen der Verfassungsgebenden Versammlung wurden
in vollem Umfang veröffentlicht, siehe Eesti Vabariigi Justiitsministeerium, Põhiseadus
ja Põhiseaduse Assamblee. Koguteos [Verfassung und Verfassungsgebende
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Staatsgerichtshofs die historische Methode verwendet. Es gibt auch keine
Ablehnung dieser Methode; es scheint vielmehr, als ob sie gar nicht existiere,
obwohl in der Literatur oft auf sie hingewiesen wird. Für die Anwendung
systematischer oder gar teleologischer Auslegungsmethoden kann man kaum
Ansätze finden, von etwaigen rechtshermeneutischen Überlegungen ganz zu
schweigen.
Abschließend fällt das Fehlen des Anführens von sozialwissenschaftlichen
Grundlagen für Entscheidungen auf. Da der Staatsgerichtshof die Notwendig-
keit von Grundrechtseingriffen überprüft, müßte er auch eine Analyse der
Folgen der umstrittenen Rechtsnormen anstellen. Eine ökonomische Analyse
des Rechts z.B. ist jedoch nicht nur dem Staatsgerichtshof fremd, auch in der
Literatur wird sie kaum verwandt.114
VI. Verfassungsreform und Beitritt zur Europäischen Union
Das Einführungsgesetz zur Verfassung (§ 8) sah die Möglichkeit vor,
Volksinitiativen für Verfassungsänderungen zu nutzen.115 Diese Möglichkeit
wurde nie wahrgenommen, was aber kaum ein Zeichen dafür ist, daß die
Verfassung eine hohe Akzeptanz besitzt, sondern vielmehr darauf beruht, daß
einschlägige Probleme bisher nicht aufgetreten sind. Jedoch hat die Regierung
schon 1997 einen Sachverständigenrat berufen, um die Anwendungspraxis der
Verfassung zu untersuchen und Änderungsvorschläge zu unterbreiten. Mehrere
hundert Seiten von Materialien, darunter z.T. hervorragende Gutachten aus-
ländischer Experten,116 wurden zwei Jahre später dem Parlament übergeben;117
                                                                                                                       
Versammlung. Gesamtwerk], 1996. Einen geschichtlichen Überblick gibt R. Maruste
u.a. (Hrsg.), Taasvabanenud Eesti põhiseaduse eellugu [Vorgeschichte der Verfassung
des wieder selbständigen Estlands], 1997.
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 Ansatz der Diskussion bei E. Ilves, Miks juristid peaksid õppima majandust ehk
sissejuhatus õigusmajandusse [Warum die Juristen Ökonomie studieren sollten oder
eine Einführung in Rechtsökonomie], Juridica 1999 Nr. 1, S. 31ff.
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 Innerhalb von drei Jahren hatte eine Gruppe von zehntausend wahlberechtigten
Staatsbürgern das Recht, auf dem Wege eines Volksbegehrens eine Verfassungsände-
rung vorzulegen.
116
 U.a die Berichte von R. Alexy zum Schutz der Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, von
J.A. Frowein zur Regelung der Staatsorganisation und von R. Stober zu den
Bestimmungen über die örtliche Selbstverwaltung. Die erwähnten Gutachten stellen
wohl die besten Abhandlungen zur Estnischen Verfassung auf dem Gebiet des
öffentlichen Rechts dar.
117
 Leider ist fast nichts von diesen Materialien veröffentlicht worden. Nur die
Hauptergebnisse der Sachverständigengruppe wurden im Internet auf der Heimatseite
des Justizministeriums zugänglich gemacht (www.just.ee; Stand Jul. 2001). Diese
Materialien gäben sicherlich den Anstoß, eine lebendige Verfassungsdiskussion zu
beginnen; ihre Veröffentlichung in zugänglicher Form auf Estnisch und Deutsch oder
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es wurden insgesamt mehr als hundert Empfehlungen für eine Ver-
fassungsänderung vorbereitet. Daß diese sich vielfach auf unbedeutende Fälle
beziehen oder die Probleme auch durch Auslegung gelöst werden könnten,118
zeigt aber schon die Tatsache, daß das Parlament sich mit nur zwei Bereichen
der Gutachten ernsthaft beschäftigt hat: mit der Streitkräftereform und dem
Beitritt zur EU.
Die verfassungsrechtlichen Bestimmungen hinsichtlich der Streitkräfte und
des Staatsschutzes waren am meisten von der Vergangenheit geprägt und
werden dadurch dem Geist der heutigen Verfassung nicht gerecht. Daß der
Staatspräsident „Oberbefehlshaber“ der Streitkräfte ist, entspricht eher der halb-
präsidentialen Verfassung von 1938. Die Empfehlungen betrafen deshalb vor
allem die Demokratisierung der Streitkräfte und eine deutlichere Unterordnung
der Streitkräfte unter die Zivilgewalt.
Die Diskussion über die Verfassungsmäßigkeit des Beitritts Estlands zur EU,
der im Land generell und zumal innerhalb der politisch-wirtschaftlichen Elite
kaum umstritten ist,119 hat sich auf die Tatsache konzentriert, ob es notwendig
ist, vor Beitritt eine Verfassungsreform durchzuführen, und wenn ja, welche
Bestimmungen verändert werden müßten. Es wird von vielen Experten120 darauf
hingewiesen, daß der Beitritt einen Verlust an Souveränität bedeuten könnte, die
in der Verfassung aber sehr hoch eingeschätzt wird (§ 1).121 Was fehlt, ist eine
Diskussion über die Demokratisierung des Staates und über Entscheidungs-
strukturen im europäischen Prozess.122
                                                                                                                       
Englisch ist ein dringendes Desiderat und die Veröffentlichung von Alexy (siehe oben
Fn. 87) ein wichtiger Schritt zu dessen Erfüllung.
118
 Z.B. wurde der Änderungsvorschlag gemacht, den Schutz der körperlichen
Unversehrtheit in die Verfassung einzufügen. Laut Entscheidung der Strafkammer vom
30. Mai 2000 (RT III 2000, 19, 202) ist dieses Grundrecht jedoch bereits in der
Verfassung verankert.
119
 In der Bevölkerung aber schon, wie recht spät bemerkt wurde. Gegenüber den
Umfrageergebnissen der in Estland tätigen Meinungsforschungsinstitute ist jedoch
große Vorsicht angebracht, da diese nicht generell verläßlich sind.
120
 In diesem Bereich haben viele Experten ihre Meinung schriftlich abgegeben. Eine
Veröffentlichung der Gutachten fehlt auch hier; die Literatur diskutiert sie kaum. Siehe
v.A. A. Albi, Euroliit ja kaasaegne suveräänsus. Üks võimalikke vastukajasid põhi-
seaduse ekspertiisikomisjoni üleskutsele aruteluks [Europäische Union und heutige
Souveränität. Eine mögliche Antwort auf den Aufruf des Sachverständigenrates zur
Verfassung], Juridica 2000 Nr. 3, S. 160ff.
121
 Jedoch hat der im März 2001 nominierte neue Rechtskanzler eindeutig die Meinung
vertreten, daß eine solche Verfassungsänderung nicht nötig sei; siehe Riigikogu kinnitas
Allar Jõksi õiguskantsleriks, Postimees, 20. Feb. 2001.
122
 Einen Ausschuß für Europäische Angelegenheiten gibt es zwar im Parlament, aber
welche Bedeutung dieser hat, ist nur schwer einzuschätzen. Zur Rolle des Parlamentes
siehe K. Ahi, Rahvuslik parlament Euroopa Ühenduse õiguse kontekstis [Nationales
Parlament im Kontext des Rechts der europäischen Gemeinschaften], Juridica 1999 Nr.
6, S. 297ff.
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VII. Abschlußbemerkung
Obwohl die Verfassungsentwicklung in Estland sicherlich die eines demo-
kratischen Rechtsstaates ist und insofern zumal aus der Perspektive von 1992
einen Erfolg darstellt, hat sie nicht ganz den hohen Erwartungen entsprochen,
die mit dem Text der Verfassung verbunden waren. Eine Diskussion um die
genauere Bedeutung der Verfassung sowie ihrer Prinzipien und Bestimmungen
hat noch nicht wirklich begonnen. Vielmehr ist die Verfassungsinterpretation in
Estland noch rückwärts gewandt, da die meistdiskutierten Probleme immer noch
mit von der Vergangenheit bestimmten Fragen wie Minderheitenschutz oder
Eigentumsreform zu tun haben. Besonders bemerkenswert ist, daß der
Staatsgerichtshof selbst im Vergleich mit anderen Verfassungsorganen in der
Verfassungsentwicklung eine geringere Rolle spielt, als man angesichts der
Verfassung hätte erwarten können.
Es bleibt abzuwarten, welche Rolle die Verfassung im estnischen Staat
weiterhin einnehmen und auf welchen Wegen sich ihre Entwicklung vollziehen
wird. Gerade der kommende Beitritt Estlands zur EU gibt jedoch zu der
berechtigten Hoffnung Anlaß, daß eine Verfassungsdiskussion auf hohem
Niveau geführt werden kann. Die Verfasser sind sich sicher, daß gerade die
jüngste Generation der estnischen Juristen auf dem richtigen Weg ist.123
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 Für inhaltliche und formelle Kritik, die sie allerdings nicht immer beherzigt haben,
bedanken sich die Autoren bei Frau Gisela Drechsler (Marburg), Herrn Dr. Hans-Peter
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119
  III
120
Taavi Annus and Margit Tavits,
 “Judicial Behavior in Transition: The Effects of Judge and Defendant Characteristics”
Law & Society Review, in press.
121
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR IN TRANSITION:
THE EFFECTS OF JUDGE AND DEFENDANT
CHARACTERISTICS
Taavi Annus, University of Tartu, Estonia
Margit Tavits, University of Pittsburgh*
In a consolidated democracy, an independent, impartial and efficient judiciary is
an inevitable player for securing human rights, the rule of law and democracy.
After the fall of communism, countries in Central and Eastern Europe have all
faced the task of reorganizing their judiciaries to correspond to these values. In
many countries, however, this process is taking place in the context of
increasing conflict between different ethnic groups. In the former Soviet Union,
the democratic transition and the restoration of independence of small nation-
states brought about also the transformation of the minority status: the formerly
dominant ethnic group — the Russians — became a minority. Give these
developments, is it possible to build an impartial judiciary? To what extent do
the ethnic tensions enter the arena of judicial decision-making? In order to
answer these questions we need to understand the empirical regularities of
judicial behavior in ethnically divided transition societies. The fact that judges
decide cases not only based on the relevant legal provisions but are also
influenced by their individual attitudes, beliefs and values, is well known in the
political science literature. In the U.S., for example, this has been observed both
on the level of the Supreme Court (Baum 1997; Segal & Spaeth 2002) as well
as trial courts (Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, & Schwab 1995; Hagan & Bumiller
1983; Steffensmeier & Britt 2001).
In this paper, we examine two potential sources of bias in the transition
judiciary. First, we examine the assumption that service under the old regime
taints judges in their later decision making. The replacement of unqualified or
unacceptable personnel from the pre-transition period with newly trained judges
is an important aspect of the judicial reform in many transition countries. Such
replacement also assumes that judges from the previous regime behave diffe-
rently than the newly appointed ones, who are arguably not been “corrupted” by
the old system. Testing the empirical validity of this assumption both advances
our understanding of the judiciary in transition and has explicit policy relevance
to the decisions about the court personnel reform in new democracies.
Second, we analyze whether judges in the newly democratic courts can be
fair to people of the very ethnic group that used to oppress them. The
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integration of different cultures in a single society is a prominent challenge
facing former communist countries (and beyond). In Eastern Europe, ethnic
discrimination is a well-known problem, addressed by different international
organizations. Knowing that the courts can, in fact, be impartial and protect
minorities from discrimination assures that strengthening the judiciary is a
necessary part of the anti-discrimination policies.
The first section of the paper gives some background information about the
transition country under study — Estonia. This is followed by the presentation
of the theoretical framework, methods, and the results of our empirical analysis
on trial level courts. We have created for the analysis an original dataset of a
sample of decisions by trial level judges in Estonia. The findings indicate that
the judge’s experience under the previous regime does not seem to be an
important factor in judicial decision-making. We also find that the Russian
ethnic minority does not fare differently in the courts from the current ethnic
majority. We believe that the study serves as a useful basis for further
investigations and theory building on judicial behavior in nascent democracies.
JUDICIAL REFORM AND DISCRIMINATION IN ESTONIA
Estonia regained its independence in 1991 after half a century of Soviet rule
and, like other Central and East European countries, went through a regime
change. This country is a particularly interesting locus for the current study for
two reasons. First, during the judicial reform in the early 1990s, the court
personnel were partially replaced. As a result, those judges who were members
of the criminal justice system under the previous regime now work side by side
with the “new” judges. Second, Estonia is one of the countries that were
dominated by ethnic Russians under the Soviet regime. This dominant group,
however, suddenly became an ethnic minority after Estonia regained its
independence, creating a situation where discrimination against Russians was
especially prone to emerge.
The change in judicial personnel
After Estonia became an independent democratic nation in 1991, it faced a
challenge of transforming the Soviet judiciary into a democratic and
independent one. The selection of personnel was among the most difficult tasks
in this process. A supply of new personnel was never available, and the
dismissal of the “old” judges was not very easy — the mere fact that a person
had been employed by the government structures of the previous regime was
not sufficient for dismissal in Estonia.
The major judicial reform took place only in 1993. As part of this reform, all
judges, including those nominated during the Soviet regime, had to go through a
reappointment procedure. In order to become a judge, a recommendation by the
Supreme Court plenary and an appointment by the president of the Estonian
123
Republic were necessary. All new applicants (i.e. not including those who were
judges before the reform) had to pass a judicial examination before the Supreme
Court could consider their candidacy. The reform did not concern the Supreme
Court that was a new institution created after independence and whose members
had been appointed by the Parliament before the major judicial reform.
Before the reform in 1993, the courts employed altogether 83 judges. On
January 1, 1996, i.e. about three years after the beginning of the reform, the
number of judges had already increased to 206. Of those, 54 had worked as a
judge before the reform. Many others had previously worked in the criminal
justice system as prosecutors. The 29 judges who did not retain their position
were disqualified at various stages of the process: eleven of them did not apply
for reappointment, eight were dismissed by the Supreme Court plenary, and the
president refused to appoint another ten. Compared to the overall statistics, the
number of dismissals of the former judges was not exceptional: out of 276 total
candidates, the Supreme Court refused to recommend 48 candidates and the
president did not nominate a further 38 (data compiled from Riigikohus 1996).
Altogether, 75% of the applicants were appointed. Thus many of the judges who
wanted to stay in office could do so. This gives us a good variance on the
“Soviet experience” of a judge allowing to examine whether it makes a
difference for case outcomes if a judge has been in office before the transition
or not.
The reasons for not nominating or appointing certain candidates were not
publicly disclosed. We do know that several of the Supreme Court recommen-
dations were denied because no vacancies existed. However, we do not know
the exact criteria for choosing between different candidates. The refusal by the
president to appoint a candidate was made on a discretionary basis without any
justification at all (Maruste 1994). Even though we cannot identify any
discernable bias against the former judges or other representatives of the former
criminal justice system in this process, it may still be possible that the screening
effectively selected out certain types of judges, for example the ones who were
expected to perform significantly differently from the rest. Therefore, our
analysis cannot determine whether judges from previous regime would behave
differently from others. However, we can still test whether the “old” judges are
prevented from behaving similarly to the judges who had not participated in the
authoritarian criminal justice system.
Ethnic minorities and discrimination in Estonia
The territory of Estonia has for centuries been inhabited mostly by ethnic
Estonians, even though the country has rarely been under Estonian rule. In
1922, just after establishing an independent state for the first time, the Estonian
population of 1.1 million consisted of 87.7% Estonians, the biggest minority
being Russians with 8.2% (Raun 2001: 271). The ethnic homogeneity together
with effective minority rights protection remained unchanged until Estonia lost
its independence in 1940. However, the situation changed considerably under
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the Soviet rule. In 1989, the Soviet Population Census registered 34, 9% of
Russophones (30, 3% of whom were ethnic Russians) living on the territory of
Estonia (Zevelev 2001: 96-97). Although the Estonian government officially
supported the emigration of Russians to the Russian territory, not many took the
opportunity. According to the Estonian Population Census of 2000, ethnic
Russians formed 25.6% of the Estonian population, with the total of Russian-
speaking minority amounting to 29.7% (Statistical Office of Estonia 2001: 9).
Various international organizations and academics have undertaken surveys
of the minority situation in Estonia, reporting issues that demonstrate
insufficient attention towards the situation of minorities (e.g. UN Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2002; Council of Europe 2001).1 Thus,
the discrimination of the national minority is a topical issue in that country and
discrimination through the criminal justice system is highly plausible.
Obviously, there is no official policy mandating discrimination of national
minorities through the justice system. At the same time, the sentencing
outcomes demonstrate that the potential for discrimination exists. In 2001, only
41% of prison inmates were ethnic Estonians, although ethnic Estonians
committed most of the crimes (Saar et al. 2002). The overrepresentation of
minorities in the prison population is not surprising (see Mauer 1999 for the
U.S.), but demands explanation. Whether the difference is caused by legally
relevant criteria (e.g. non-Estonians commit more serious crimes) or is due to
discriminatory sentencing practices is relevant from the point of view of
securing basic human rights. Although our focus is not solely on testing the
sentencing practices regarding the in/out decision, our analyses are targeted
towards detecting different kinds of discrimination in the criminal justice
system.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Judiciary in transition
The literature on judicial behavior in transition societies is rather limited. The
existing political science (and also legal) studies on the judiciary in transition
have predominantly discussed the role of the supreme or constitutional courts in
the transformation process. This includes work on the highest courts in different
parts of the world, including Eastern Europe (Randazzo & Herron 2003;
Bugaric 2001; Epstein, Knight, & Shvetsova 2001; Schwartz 2000), East Asia
(Ginsburg 2003), South Africa (Gibson & Caldeira 2003; Webb 1998), the
Southern Europe (Magalhães 2003), and Latin America (Helmke 2002; Schatz
1998). Although this literature is useful for understanding the democratic pro-
cesses in those countries, most of such work ignores the fact that the supreme
courts or specialized constitutional courts handle just a fraction of all cases.
Ordinary courts may play a much greater role in the transition process than the
supreme or constitutional court especially because they are closer to the citizens
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and influence the public perception about the fairness and acceptability of the
new regime. An empirical study of ordinary courts also gives a broader basis for
making generalizations, while a study of the supreme or constitutional court
would necessarily remain limited due to the small number of judges and the
small number of cases handled.
The work of trial courts during and after transition has got some scholarly
attention. Markovits (1995) gives an observational account of the judicial
system, including the trial courts, during the East German transition. Hendley
has extensively worked on the Russian arbitrazh courts (e.g. Hendley 1999).
Widner (2001) discusses the role the courts play in post-conflict transitions in
Africa. Stotzky (1993) presents a compilation of studies on the role of the
judiciary in regime transitions in Latin America. There is plenty of literature on
the judges of Nazi Germany in terms of who they were and how they were
integrated into the post-World-War II German legal profession (e.g. Müller
1991). Similarly, there is research on the (mostly non-)integration of the East
German judges into the united German legal profession (Markovits 1996).
Some authors have discussed the politics of judicial reform in the ordinary
courts (Dakolias 1995; Rowat, Haider, & Dakolias 1995; Solomon & Foglesong
2000; Strohmeyer 2001). However, the approach is usually either descriptive or
policy-oriented, recommending possible solutions to the problems that a country
in transition faces. At the same time, the effects of the choices already made
during such reforms are not well understood, and the literature does usually not
examine the behavior of individual judges, but is limited to the outputs of the
whole court. There are also several studies, usually conducted by lawyers, on
the “transitional justice,” analyzing the substantive laws dealing with the past
(e.g. see Teitel 2000; Kritz 1995; and the reviews by Dyzenhaus 2003; Valls
2000). Yet this research does not involve analyzing the behavior of the old
judges after the regime change.
The literature on the Estonian courts and judicial system is extremely
limited, especially concerning the non-legal studies. The most interesting essay
is written by Pettai (2002/2003), who discusses the outcomes of several
ethnopolitically relevant cases from the Estonian and Latvian Supreme Courts.
He argues that by deciding both in favor as well as against minorities, the courts
have been balancing “issues of fairness with concerns regarding credibility,
since in both countries the courts are new, and they have yet to consolidate their
position within the political system.” However, more systematic analyses have
not been carried out so far.
In sum, there is little theoretical guidance for the current study in terms of
explaining and predicting the effects of judicial experience under the previous
regime and the existence as well as sources of discrimination towards the
representatives of the previously dominant but currently minority groups by
courts in transition societies.
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The effect of judge background characteristics and judicial discrimination
The lack of relevant theorizing and previous empirical studies makes the current
analysis an exploration guided by relevant literature developed for the advanced
democracies. The guidance, however, is anything but firm. Previous research on
judicial behavior, mostly based on the datasets collected from the U.S., is not in
agreement as to whether judges’ background characteristics are consequential to
how they make their decisions (Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, & Schwab 1995; Dixon
1995; Kramer & Steffensmeier 1993; Rowland & Carp 1996; Spohn 1994; for
an earlier review see Hagan & Bumiller 1983). For example, Steffensmeier &
Hebert (1999) show that women tend to be harsher in sentencing decisions.
Hogarth (1971) argues that judges with longer working experience impose
harsher sentences. The same is considered to apply for older judges (Spohn
1990). Partisanship is considered to be influential in that Democratic judges in
the U.S. tend to be more liberal than the Republican ones (Rowland & Carp
1996). One of the latest studies also indicates that black judges tend to be
harsher in the sentencing decisions than white judges (Steffensmeier & Britt
2001). However, the results are controversial — Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and
Schwab (1995) conclude, for example, that “[i]n the mass of cases that are filed,
even civil rights and prisoner cases, the law — not the judge — dominates the
outcomes.”
Discrimination in judicial decision-making, especially sentencing, has
attracted extensive interest again in the U.S., mostly from the perspective of
race relations. Among the most famous of them is the notorious Baldus study
(Baldus, Pulaski, & Woodworth 1983) on the death penalty considered by the
U.S. Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp. The contemporary literature on
sentencing disparities is voluminous. There are plenty of death penalty studies
claiming that discrimination does in fact exist (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski
1990; Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, & Broffitt 1998). In other sentencing
contexts, the research has found mixed results (for reviews see Mustard 2001;
Weitzer 1996). Modest discrimination has been found during the in/out
decision, as well as in the choice of sentence length (Sampson & Lauritsen
1997; Spohn 2000). However, after controlling for various legitimate grounds
for differences in sentences, no systematic bias against minorities has been
found (Sampson & Lauritsen 1997).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As already stated, two puzzles drive this research. We are, first, interested in
whether and how the working experience of a judge in the judicial system of the
communist regime influences his or her decision-making as a judge under the
new democratic regime. This question has not been researched before. In policy
arguments, however, it has been often claimed that “old” judges (and public
officials in general) are influenced by their past. This assumption has usually
127
been made by the policymakers. For example, the Estonian judiciary was
changed almost completely in the 1940 after the Soviet Union took over (Järve-
laid & Pihlamägi 1999). A notable example is the change among the East
German judiciary after the unification — less than 10% of the judges and
prosecutors could retain their offices by 1994 (Markovits 1996: 2271). The
dismissal of East German public officials, including judges, was motivated by
their perceived incompetence or political unreliability (see Kommers 1997 and
Quint 1997 for the reasons lying behind the change in personnel). Lustration
practices in Eastern Europe have been justified not only because of the need of
retribution, but also because of the risk that those former officials would pose to
the orderly functioning of democracy (Offe 1996: 93; Letki 2002).2
We are also interested in determining whether there is any ethnic-based
discrimination in the judicial decision-making. The dependent variable in our
study is the case outcome, including the guilty/not guilty decision and the
severity of the sentence. These are the most significant and easily observable
outcomes of any criminal case.
The judge’s background and the case outcomes
In the context of transition, the decision whether to convict or not is an
especially interesting issue. The analysis of the determinants of the conviction
rates is also relevant in the Estonian context as there are no jury trials. The
judge decides both on conviction or acquittal as well as sentencing. During the
Soviet regime, the acquittal of a person was rare, and even considered to be as a
failure of the criminal justice system. This exerted considerable pressure on the
judiciary to avoid acquittals (Solomon 1987). Even though towards the end of
the Soviet Union “telephone justice” was not as common as previously and
conviction rates dropped (Foglesong 1997), the pressure on the judges from the
Communist Party and the executive power still existed (Huskey 1992: 224).
High conviction rates are considered to be typical among the post-communist
judiciaries and, thus, the Soviet and post-Soviet judges are usually expected to
find defendants guilty.
Further, the judges from the previous regime may want to appear more loyal
to the state than the newly appointed ones. Regime loyalty may not be a unique
feature of the judges of the former Soviet Union (see Kritzer 2003), however,
the pressure to appear loyal to the state during the transition may be
exacerbated, as the representatives of the previous regime may fear reprisals.
For example, Helmke (2002) argues that the Argentine Supreme Court justices
showed considerable independence from the previous regime when it appeared
that the regime was changing, presumably in order to please the new regime that
was emerging. Thus, deciding in favor of the state can also be interpreted as
pledging allegiance to the new regime. This aspect is important for the “old”
judges as their legitimacy is constantly threatened and winning over the new
political elite is crucial for their well-being.3 At the same time, newly appointed
judges are expected to pay more attention to the rights of the individual (the
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suspect) and be better prepared in their mentality to overturn the prosecutor’s
case in favor of the suspect. They also feel less pressure to prove their
suitability to serve the new regime. These arguments can be summarized into
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: The judges who have worked in the criminal justice system of
the communist regime are more likely to convict suspects than the newly
appointed judges.
The Soviet background of the judges may also influence the decisions about the
harshness of the sentence. The “old” judges are more constrained by the
concern about their image not only in the eyes of the political elite of the new
regime but also in the eyes of the public. According to the popular belief, the
public servants of the old regime carry the ideological baggage of that regime
due to their training and working experience. Also, the public in the East
European countries has usually supported the screening and possible exclusion
of high officials, including judges, for their past activities (see Szczerbiak 2002
for the data on Poland) as the officials of the former regime are perceived to be
less able to adapt to the new environment. One way of gaining legitimacy in the
eyes of the public is to appeal to people’s immediate concerns. It is generally
accepted that the public expects judges to be “tough on crime.”4 Due to the
increasing crime rates after transition, lack of security has become an important
concern (see Saar 1999 for the discussion on Estonia). At the same time,
criminal cases receive the most widespread media coverage. The visibility of
criminal cases and their prominence in the eyes of the public may encourage
“old” judges to decide against the defendant and to hand harsher sentences in
order to advance their public image. The argument is summarized in the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: The judges who have worked in the criminal justice system of
the communist regime hand more severe sentences than the newly appointed
judges.
The discrimination of minorities in sentencing
According to the literature on sentencing, the judge selects between different
sentences based on three “focal concerns”: the offender’s blameworthiness, the
protection of the community, and practical or organizational reasons (Steffens-
meier & Demuth 2001; Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer 1998). The discrimina-
tion of ethnic minorities occurs usually due to the fact that the past and future
behavior of the defendant is associated with the prevalent stereotypes about the
ethnic group of the defendant. Thus, if a minority group is associated with
crime, the representatives of this group would receive harsher sentences,
because they are more blameworthy and dangerous to the community than the
representatives of the majority. That is, as those prejudices exist among the
majority of the population and the political elite, they may also be present
among criminal justice officials, including the judges. Such prejudices may lead
to the belief that minorities are less likely to rehabilitate if a mild sentence is
129
imposed, and that only harsh sentences would have a preventive impact (see
Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer 1998). This reasoning applies not only to the
sentencing decision, but also to the decision to convict, as evidenced by the
numerous experimental studies (Sommers & Ellsworth 2000).
The stereotypes of the Russians among Estonians are certainly not positive.
Kolstø and Melberg (2002: 53-54) report the results of a mass survey that asked
ethnic Estonians to compare themselves to ethnic Russians on 12 different
characterizations. They found that Estonians tended to “attribute good qualities
to ethnic Estonians and reserve the negative ones for Russians.” Among other
things, the Estonians perceived the Russians to be less trustworthy and more
drawn into conflicts.
Another aspect of the post-communist transition may breed discrimination in
many East European countries: During the Soviet regime, the Russian-speaking
population, and not locals, often occupied important political and judicial
positions. For example, after 1950, the two top positions of the Estonian
Communist Party were always occupied by ethnic Russians (Raun 2001: 191)
and many ethnic Russians occupied important positions in the criminal justice
system (Järvelaid & Pihlamägi).5 Moreover, in Estonia 73.3% of the ethnic
Estonians partly or completely agree with the claim that they as an ethnic group
were oppressed in the Soviet Union (Kolstø and Melberg 2002: 45). It is, thus,
reasonable to argue that after the transition, the ethnic majority would seek
“revenge” against the representatives of the former oppressing regime. Further-
more, at least 48.3% of the Russians living in Estonia believe that the Estonians
want to take revenge on them (Kolstø and Melberg 2002: 43). Whereas official
policies are under strict scrutiny from various international organizations,
informal policies and actions, including criminal justice practices, can most
effectively be used to seek such revenge. The arguments elaborated allow
concluding with the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Minority suspects are more likely to be convicted than majority
suspects.
Hypothesis 2b: Minority defendants are expected to receive harsher sentences
than their majority counterparts.
In addition to the Soviet background of the judge and the ethnicity of the
suspect or offender, other variables may account for the variation in judicial
decision-making. These include the factors foreseen by the laws that limit the
discretion of the judges such as the characteristics of the crime and the
background of the criminal (Steffensmeier & Britt 2001; Ashenfelter,
Eisenberg, & Schwab 1995). According to the Estonian criminal code, the
judges had to consider the offenders’ prior criminal record and/or voluntary
confession and regret in determining the sentence. The existence of a prior
criminal record should, thus, increase, and the voluntary confession decrease the
severity of the sentence.6 Further, there may also be other illegitimate factors
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determining the sentence. Studies have usually shown that women receive more
lenient sentences (Albonetti 1998; Simon & Landis 1991; Steffensmeier,
Kramer, & Streifel 1993; Nagel & Johnson 1994) and that less educated
criminals are often viewed as less capable of understanding the consequences of
their crimes and, thus, needy of harsher sentences.
Unfortunately, we cannot include a potentially influential variable — the
ethnic background of the judge — into our analysis because we cannot
determine the ethnicity of the judge with certainty, as this information is not
provided in the official records. One option would be to consider judges’ names
and code those with Russian-sounding names as Russians. There are two
problems related to such coding, however. First, although Estonian and Russian
names are very distinct, not everyone having a Russian name is necessarily
Russian and vice versa. Second, our dataset includes only 4 judges (who made
in total 45 decisions) with Russian-sounding names allowing for very little
variance on this variable. We still performed two alternative analyses to those
described below. For one of those alternative estimations we included a dummy
variable for decisions by judges with Russian-sounding names while for the
other we excluded all decisions by those judges. The control variable for
Russian judges did not have a significant coefficient and the substantive results
of either analysis did not differ from the ones presented below.
METHODS AND DATA
Our data comprise a sample of decisions of trial level judges for years 1995
through 2001. We obtained the decisions from the Estonian Supreme Court that
collected copies of the opinions of the trial courts under an informal agreement.
For these six years we selected all cases involving embezzlement. There are
both practical and theoretical justifications for such a decision. The total number
of embezzlement cases for the period covered is manageable so that we are able
to include the universe of all cases. Further, by concentrating on one type of
crime only, we can avoid comparing the severity of punishment for crimes with
significantly different levels of seriousness. Such comparison would have been
meaningful if we had been able to code a considerably large number of crimes
of different type — a task too difficult to accomplish for two researchers.
Further, our research questions require the range of sentences to vary. In order
to achieve this, we had to consider a complex crime that usually allows for more
variation than simple crimes on the decision about guilt. Indeed, the average
rate of acquittal in Estonian courts is 2.7% (Ministry of Justice 2001), compared
with 8.4% in the case of embezzlements. Unfortunately, there is no official data
on the acquittal rates when charges are contested (in our sample, the rate is
35.3%). We acknowledge that this makes embezzlement not a totally repre-
sentative crime for all crimes handled by the Estonian courts. Yet, to a certain
extent, such non-representativeness is also desired. That is, the embezzlement
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cases constitute the “hard” cases for a part of our theory: The effect of judge
characteristics on this type of crime may be more pronounced than on other
types of crime, as embezzlement — a crime against socialist property — was a
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of the Soviet era when the economic performance declined (Smith 1996: 142).
The perception of the seriousness of embezzlement cases may compel the “old”
judges to be stricter about conviction and to hand harsher sentences. However,
if we find that the Soviet background of a judge has no effect on the decision-
making in the embezzlement cases, there is less reason to believe that it has any
significant effect on judicial decision-making concerning other types of crime.
Further, we can see no theoretical reason for why embezzlement cases would
not be representative for the purposes of determining the effect of the other
variable of interest — the ethnic background of the defendant.
Our analysis would be impossible if the judges possessed no discretion in
determining the sentences or if the possible range of sentences would be limited
with no variation in our dependent variables. Fortunately, the Estonian criminal
justice system allocates a lot of discretion to the judge in determining the
sentence. Sentences are usually limited only by statutory lower and upper
bounds. A list of factors is given in order to help the judge choose the
appropriate sentence within the boundaries. However, there are no sentencing
grids similar to the U.S., and therefore, the list of sentencing factors does not
limit the discretion significantly. In exceptional cases, the judge may even
choose a sentence below the lower limit. In many cases, the judge may also
choose between a fine and a prison sentence. The mandated sentences for the
embezzlement were: a fine or a prison sentence of up to four years for little
damage, a prison sentence from three up to eight years for greater damage.
Within these limits, there are considerable differences in the decision outcomes
(see the Appendix for the descriptive statistics).
The cases and decision motivations were not centrally filed before 1995 and,
thus, not available for coding. However, the universe of a specific type of cases
for six years — involving altogether 749 suspects — gives us a reasonable basis
for making inferences. As stated, we coded most variables included in the
analyses from the motivations of the trial court decisions. The data about the
background information of judges were coded from Riigikohus (1996) and the
personnel files of the Ministry of Justice.
Operationalization of variables
In order to measure decision outcome, we coded four different variables. The
first of these measures captures the determination of guilt. As argued above, we
believe that it is a valid indicator of the harshness of a judge showing the
willingness of the judge to protect individuals against the state. That is, holding
the legal provisions constant, if a judge overturns the prosecutor’s case and
acquits the suspect, he or she is supportive of individual rights against the
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arbitrary intervention by the state. The measure for the determination of guilt is
binary, coded 1 when suspect is found guilty and 0 otherwise.
The severity of punishment is measured by three different indicators: the
in/out decision, the length of incarceration and the amount of fine. The first of
these measures indicates whether the prison sentence was administered or not. It
is coded 0 if the judge chose the punishment by fine and also if the prison
sentence was suspended. Thus, only those cases where the convict actually
faced imprisonment were coded 1.
In Estonia, even if the sentence were suspended, the length of imprisonment
would still be determined in the same decision in years and months. If the
offender were to break the parole rules, the length of imprisonment would be
automatically determined according to the previous decision. Thus, we also
coded a variable capturing the length of incarceration as stated in the decisions
(regardless of whether it was actually administered). Certain caution has to be
taken about using this measure, though, as in the overwhelming majority of
cases probation was administered instead of actual incarceration. Thus, it may
be that as the judge is aware that the convict will actually not face incarceration,
the length of punishment may appear not a real but only a symbolic punishment.
However, we believe that differences in the length of incarceration, even when
the sentence was not in fact administered, should be informative for detecting
discrimination. Indeed, given that various international organizations and
domestic actors constrain judges by scrutinizing the easily observable aspects of
their behavior, much of the actual discrimination may take a symbolic form.
The length of incarceration is measured in months coded from the court
decisions.
The amount of fine is yet another indication of the severity of punishment.
The variable is measured in FY 1995 constant Estonian kroons, coded from the
court decisions and re-calculated based on the official statistics of the Estonian
Statistical Office. In Estonia, the amount of fine is not dependent on the
offender’s income.
The two independent variables of interest — the defendant nationality and
the Soviet experience — are measured by dummy variables. We coded the
Estonian defendants as 0 and the rest of the defendants as 1. As the court
decisions contained explicit information on the ethnicity, we did not have to
infer the ethnicity from the names of the defendants. The overwhelming
majority of non-Estonians were Russians or Russian-speaking people.
The Soviet experience variable was coded 1 for those judges that had served
as judges or prosecutors during the previous regime and 0 for judges without
such experience. A note is in order about such measurement. One might argue
that any binary classification of judges to those with Soviet experience and
those without one is arbitrary because even if a judge is nominated or appointed
to office some years after the regime change, his or her previous experience and
education dates back to the Soviet era. However, we expect that the experience
of actively participating in the criminal justice system of the previous regime is
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more consequential to the behavior and attitudes of judges than just having lived
and studied under that regime.
The measurement of the control variables is explained in the Appendix,
which also presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the
analyses.7 Certain variables have some missing values, which is why the total
number of cases does not always add up to 749.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We estimated four different models according to the dependent variable used.
As we have multiple observations for individual judges, these observations are
not independent. Thus, we use the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of the
variance instead of the conventional MLE variance estimator within the clusters
of observations by judge for all four models. The first model uses logit
estimation to predict the determination of guilt. Excluding cases where the
suspects confessed their crime, 156 decisions are included in the analysis.
TABLE 1: LOGIT MODEL PREDICTING CONVICTION RATES
Variable Odds ratio b (robust SE)
Soviet experience .575 –.554 (.374)
Defendant nationality .695 –.364 (.394)
Defendant sex 4.872 1.583 (.494)***
Defendant education: secondary 1.119 .112 (.602)
Defendant education: higher 1.249 .222 (.690)
Defendant previously convicted 2.643 .972 (.836)
Constant 1.602 .471 (.614)
N 156
Chi square 17.212
Percent correctly predicted 69.4
Pseudo-R2 .146
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001.
As presented in Table 1, the logit model is significant with a chi-square of
17.212 and a pseudo-R-square of .146. The full model is able to predict
correctly 69.4 percent of times whether the suspect is found guilty or not. This
is a 5% improvement in the prediction over the model that does not include any
of the independent variables. With regard to the conventional indicator of
variable importance — the level of statistical significance — only one variable
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exceeds the significance level. We find that defendant’s sex has a significant
effect on the determination of guilt: the odds of female suspects to be found
guilty are estimated to be 4.9 times as high as male suspects, other things being
equal.
Most importantly, however, neither defendant nationality nor the Soviet
experience of the judge has a significant effect on the determination of guilt.
The failure to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between a
decision on conviction and suspect nationality supports the argument about non-
discrimination in judicial decision-making. Further, we find no support for the
argument that there is a significant difference between the “old” and the “new”
judges in their decisions about the determination of guilt.
Table 2 presents the results for the logit model predicting the probability of
actual incarceration. The analysis excludes the cases where the defendant was
not found guilty. Excluding also the observations with missing values, the
sample size for this analysis is 580. The overall model is significant with a chi-
square of 53.847 and the pseudo-R2 of .134. However, as was the case with the
determination of guilt, the probability of actual incarceration is independent of
the Soviet experience of the judge and the ethnicity of the defendant. The only
two significant predictors of the likelihood of actual incarceration are the level
of education and the previous criminal record of the defendant. That is,
defendants having secondary and higher education are less likely to face actual
imprisonment than defendants with primary education only, while the previous
criminal record of the defendant increases the probability of imprisonment
significantly.
TABLE 2: LOGIT MODEL PREDICTING ACTUAL INCARCERATION
Variable Odds ratio b (robust SE)
Soviet experience .502 –.688 (.479)
Defendant nationality 1.889 .687 (.384)
Defendant sex .756 –.279 (.475)
Defendant education: secondary .365 –1.007 (.394)**
Defendant education: higher .425 –.855 (.385)*
Defendant previously convicted 4.077 1.405 (.412)***
Defendant confesses 1.032 .031 (.629)
Amount of damage .990 –.009 (.322)
Constant .034 –2.514 (1.493)
N 580
Chi square 53.847
Percent correctly predicted 94.4
Pseudo-R2 .134
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001.
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The next two models estimate the severity of punishment — the amount of fine and
the length of incarceration respectively. The nature of these two dependent
variables creates a potential for selection bias as not all decisions impose a fine, and
those that do, cannot impose an incarceration. The result of this problem is that
simple OLS regression of the amount of fine or the length of incarceration on a set
of predictors may lead to downward-biased estimates. As standard with these types
of data, Heckman modeling is used to correct for the selection bias. (Peterson &
Hagan 1984). The Heckman procedure will account for the propensity to impose a
fine (or imprisonment) when estimating the effect of the set of independent
variables on the amount of fine (or the length of imprisonment).8 Both the amount
of fine and the length of incarceration are highly skewed with small fines and short
punishments being more frequent than big fines and lengthy punishments. Thus, as
common in the sentencing research (Albonetti 1997; Weisbud et al. 1991), we use
the natural log of both variables in the analysis.9
Table 3 presents the results for both the analysis of the amount of fine
(column 1) and that of the length of incarceration (column 2). The chi-square
and log likelihood statistics indicate a good fit for both models. The two models
are also rather consistent in terms of the significant explanatory variables
associated with the severity of punishment. This is comforting given the con-
cerns about the appropriateness of the length of incarceration measure discussed
above. That is, as the two alternative models behave in similar manner, we can
be somewhat more confident that both of these measures of the dependent
variable are capturing a similar underlying concept of the severity of
punishment.
In terms of substantive findings the null hypothesis that defendant’s nationality
and the severity of punishment are related cannot be rejected based on either
estimation. Similarly, the working experience within the Soviet judicial system
does not appear a significant predictor of the severity of punishment in both
models. Furthermore, neither of these variables is a significant predictor also in
the selection model. That is, defendant’s nationality appears to have no effect on
the decision of whether the punishment will be in form of a fine or
incarceration. This decision does also not depend on whether it is made by an
“old” or a “new” judge. In other words, we find no evidence of discrimination
based on nationality in court decisions and no significant difference between
judges with experience under different regimes. The consistency of these
findings across models increases the confidence in the empirical validity of the
non-discrimination claim.
Among the control variables, the most significant predictors of the severity
of punishment in both models are, intuitively as well as statistically, the amount
of damage and the prior conviction of the defendant. The increase in these
variables is associated with an increase in the severity of punishment. Guilty
plea is associated with smaller fines while it has no significant effect on the
length of incarceration. There is a weak effect of the defendant’s level of
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education on the length of incarceration with those having higher education
receiving lengthier sentences.
TABLE 3: HECKMAN MODELS PREDICTING THE DETERMINANTS OF THE SEVERITY OF
PUNISHMENT
Dependent variable:
the amount of fine
Dependent variable:
the length of incarceration
Selection equation
Variable b (robust SE) b (robust SE)
Soviet experience .117 (.113) –.119 (.181)
Defendant’s nationality –.192 (.139) .095 (.099)
Defendant’s sex –.210 (.131) .388 (.060)***
Defendant’s education: secondary .323 (.135)* –.323 (.079)***
Defendant’s education: higher .413 (.225) –.429 (.125)***
Defendant previously convicted –.135 (.157) .187 (.139)
Defendant confesses –.028 (.181) .498 (.098)***
Amount of damage –.985 (.032)*** .797 (.050)***
Constant 3.269 (.478)*** -3.053 (.274)***
Outcome equation
Variable b (robust SE) b (robust SE)
Soviet experience .012 (.055) .005 (.079)
Defendant’s nationality –.009 (.049) .103 (.099)
Defendant’s sex –.045 (.067) –.119 (.076)
Defendant’s education: secondary .060 (.055) .219 (.121)
Defendant’s education: higher .019 (.105) .346 (.141)*
Defendant previously convicted –.236 (.066)*** –.044 (.119)
Defendant confesses .392 (.078)*** .671 (.088)***
Amount of damage .172 (.065)*** .302 (.095)***
Probation .885 (.291)***
Constant 2.156 (.274)*** –1.072 (.505)*
Number of observations 656 656
Uncensored observations 218 419
Log likelihood –371.809 –840.081
Chi-square 60.12*** 289.6***
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001.
Overall, none of the four analyses performed provide evidence of any signi-
ficant discrimination based on the nationality of the defendant in judicial
decision-making. Non-Estonians are not more likely to be convicted than
Estonians and minorities do not face harsher sentences once convicted. Further,
none of the models supports the claim that there are significant differences in
the decision-making of “old” and “new” judges. Rather, the empirical findings
presented here allow concluding that in their most important decisions — the
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determination of guilt and of the severity of punishment — the former Soviet
judges are not different from the new generation of judges who have no
experience in the governing structures of an authoritarian regime.
CONCLUSION
The current study was an exploration of the judicial behavior in Estonia after
transition. Our empirical tests do not find difference in the behavior of the
judges with working experience in the judicial system of the previous regime
compared with the judges without such experience. Also, we find no evidence
that the Russian minority — who used to be the dominant group just a decade
before — is treated differently from the Estonian majority by the Estonian
judicial system. However, our study is limited by the focus on one type of crime
in one country only. Therefore, our findings about the impartiality of the
judicial system can form only a basis for further theorizing on and empirical
investigation of the determinants of judicial behavior in nascent democracies.
As the Estonian situation is similar to many other transition countries, our work
does have some general implications.
The finding of suitable court personnel is a problem faced by all transition
countries. Those judges who worked as a part of the totalitarian regime are
generally not perceived as suitable for the fulfillment of the judicial duties in the
democratic regime. Our finding that the Soviet era criminal justice system
experience in itself is not a significant determinant of judicial behavior in
transitional period leaves room for alternative explanations such as personal
characteristics of judges, their knowledge and competence. Our study implicates
that the screening of judiciary with the goal of establishing a qualitatively
different judicial system from the previous one should not result in dismissal of
most of the “old” judges. Replacing existing judiciary in toto appears much less
relevant than, for example, investing in the education and training of judges as
well as in the resources of courts.
The discrimination of ethnic minorities is also a problem facing many
transition countries. The activities of the OSCE High Commissioner for
National Minorities offer ample proof that discrimination is a serious issue
throughout Central and Eastern Europe (Kemp 2001). Moreover, like Estonia,
most transition countries were under international surveillance with regard to
their official policies towards minorities. Our analysis supports the argument
that the transition judiciary can be an independent actor established to fairly
determine case outcomes and not a tool in the service of promoting the fortunes
or agenda of the new ethnic ‘in’ group. The judiciary can be viewed as an
institution where ethnic minorities may claim equal rights with the majority.
Further studies in different national settings are necessary to make more firm
generalizations, but if it is confirmed that no discrimination occurs in general,
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new democracies might consider trusting their judges with more discretion so
that more equitable solutions can be found in specific cases.
Further work on judicial behavior in transition would be highly valuable.
People’s trust in the courts and the judicial system are important preconditions
for regime stability and the impartiality of courts is essential for securing this
trust (Rothstein & Stolle 2002). The more is known about the subjective
determinants of judicial decision-making, the easier it is to ensure the fairness
of that system.
NOTES
1
 There is a vast literature on the situation of minorities in Estonia as well as Estonian
minority policies. According to Ruutsoo (2002), more than 200 books, book
chapters, or journal articles have been written on the issue.
2
 There may be other reasons to exclude judges of the previous regime, including
retribution for past behavior or the need to bolster the trustworthiness and general
appeal of the criminal justice system. Therefore, no attempt is made here to
conclusively answer the question of whether former judges should be excluded or
not.
3
 Although there was no threat of outright dismissal after the judge was reappointed,
tenure was granted only after a three-year probationary period. This probation period
may have influenced the behavior of “old” judges and compelled them to appear
more loyal to the new regime in order to secure tenure. Later, however, it became
clear that the probation was only nominal, not substantive as no review was
performed on any judge after the three years (in fact, no procedures or institutions
were created to perform a review) and all of the judges were tenured automatically.
Further, it should be noted that insufficient knowledge of Estonian was also not a
reason for outright dismissal when the judicial reform started in 1993. The judges
were to learn Estonian by 1995, and a few judges who did not do so were then
dismissed.
4
 The 2003 elections point to this direction. One of the most visible campaign
promises of the newly founded Res Publica party, whose leader became the prime
minister after the elections, was to increase criminal penalties. This promise found
considerable support among the population.
5
 Even today Estonians express strong feelings about the injustice towards their ethnic
kin protesting against the Soviet regime. For example, in 2002, the Minister of
Internal Affairs was forced to resign after it became public that he participated as the
Soviet Supreme Court judge in a case on appeal where three young men were
sentenced to prison for vandalism, whereas vandalism mostly consisted of writing
anti-Soviet slogans on the walls.
6
 We cannot use sophisticated previous criminal record scores that are common in the
U.S. sentencing literature as such scores are not calculated in Estonia and the judges
are only obliged to take into account the previous record of the defendant in general.
7
 In addition to the variables listed in the Appendix, we also coded the following
indicators for the preliminary analyses: defendant’s employment, defendants’ age in
years, judge’s age in years, judge’s sex, the type of victim (either public or private
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entity), and dummy variables for decision years. As none of these variables appeared
significant in any of the preliminary analyses and we dropped them from the final
models presented here.
8
 The models are estimated using the full maximum likelihood (heckman) method in
STATA 7.0.
9
 For similar reasons, the independent variable of the amount of damage is also logged
before it is used in the analyses.
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APPENDIX
Description of control variables
Variable name Description
Defendant’s sex 1 = female
Defendant’s education: primary Defendant’s highest educational attainment, 1 =
primary
Defendant’s education: secondary Defendant’s highest educational attainment, 1 =
secondary
Defendant’s education: higher Defendant’s highest educational attainment, 1 =
higher
Defendant previously convicted The Estonian Criminal Code (Art. 38 (1)) states
that defendant’s prior record is a significant factor
in sentencing. A criminal with a prior record is
considered more dangerous and less likely to
undergo rehabilitation if sentences are too mild.
1 = yes
Defendant confesses The Estonian Criminal Code (Art. 37) states that
voluntary confession and regret should lead to a
milder sentence.
1 = yes
Probation Although the Estonian Criminal Code does not
mandate specifically when to administer probation
instead of incarceration, it allows for the former.
1 = yes
Amount of damage FY 1995 constant Estonian kroons, log-
transformed for the analyses.
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Descriptive statistics and frequencies for all variables in the analysis
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Amount of fine (Estonian
kroons) 232 1731.243 1365.864 61.6 9799.79
Ln(amount of fine) 232 3.103 .370 1.79 3.99
Amount of damage (Estonian
kroons) 705 124,092.4 780,146.5 92.4 18,542,000
Ln(amount of damage) 705 4.026 .831 1.97 7.15
Length of incarceration
(months) 439 22.331 14.248 .2 70
Ln(length of incarceration) 439 2.763 1.009 1.609 4.248
N 0 (count) 1 (count) 0 (%) 1 (%)
Guilty (excluding suspects
pleading guilty) 156 55 101 35.3 64.7
Soviet judge (number of
decisions) 729 390 339 52.1 46.5
Suspect sex 749 499 250 66.6 33.4
Suspect nationality 749 579 170 77.3 22.7
Suspect previously convicted 749 604 145 80.6 19.4
Suspect confession 748 156 592 20.9 79.1
Probation 455 38 417 8.4 91.4
Suspect education: primary 735 140 18.7
Suspect education: secondary 735 524 71.3
Suspect education: higher 735 71 9.7
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THE RIGHT TO HEALTH PROTECTION
IN THE ESTONIAN CONSTITUTION
Taavi Annus and Ants Nõmper1
Introduction
In April 2002, the headlines in the Estonian newspapers were dominated by a
story about a woman suffering from a rare form of leukaemia. There was a
medicine which had good, although not guaranteed, prospects for curing her.
The problem, however, was that she could not afford the medicine, and the
Estonian Health Insurance Fund refused to compensate for the expensive
medicine. This case stirred considerable debate. During this debate, also the
constitutionality of the refusal was raised as an issue.2
The right to “health”,3 the right to “health protection,”4 or the right to “health
care”5 has been included in the human rights discussion already for a con-
siderable time. The possibility of a person to live a healthy life is a necessary
precondition for a dignified life and for enjoying many other fundamental
rights. It is no wonder that the fight for a healthy life is one of the most impor-
tant activities of human rights organisations — one cannot enjoy political
liberties if one is critically ill.6 The right to health protection is tightly connected
                                                
1
 The authors would like to thank Ms. Berit Aaviksoo for her helpful comments on an
earlier draft of the article. The research was partly funded by the Estonian Science
Foundation grant No. 4532.
2
 E.g. T. Koch. Verevähi juhtum näitab ebaõiglust raviraha jagamisel (The Case of
Leukaemia Demonstrates the Injustice in Distributing Health Care Finances). — Eesti
Päevaleht, 10.04.2002. Available at http://www.epl.ee/leht/artikkel.php?ID=201161
(15.04.2002) (in Estonian).
3
 B. Toebes. The Right to Health. — A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds.).
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook. 2nd. ed. Dordrecht/Boston/London:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001, pp. 169-190; B. Toebes, The Right to Health as a
Human Right in International Law. Antwerpen et. al.: Intersentia, 1999; S. D. Jamar,
The International Human Right to Health. — S.U.L. Rev. 1994, p. 1; V. Leary. The
Right to Health in International Human Rights Law. — Health and Human Rights,
1994, Vol. 1 No. 1, p. 24.
4
 E.g. The Revised European Social Charter (hereinafter ESC), article 11 is titled
“The right to protection of health.”
5
 A. Exter; H. Hermans (eds.). The Right to Health Care in Several European
Countries. The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer, 1999; T. J. Bole III and W. B. Bon-
deson (eds.). Rights to Health Care. Dordrecht et. al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1990.
6
 Among the most important international organisations, the World Health
Organisation is devoted to the single issue of health. In the last years, however, even
150
to many other rights, such as the right to food, shelter, healthy working
conditions, healthy environment and access to health information.
The right to health protection has found its way into the Estonian
Constitution — § 28 provides that “everyone has the right to health protection.”
At the same time, the right to health protection and social rights in general have
so far drawn little attention in the Estonian legal literature. For instance the most
comprehensive legal analysis of the Constitution prepared under the auspices of
the Ministry of Justice7 does not contain guidelines on furnishing the scope of
the right to health protection.
We base our discussion on two main sources. Firstly, we show how the
social rights in the constitution have been applied by the Estonian courts and
interpreted by the Estonian scholars in general. The interpretation of the right to
the protection of health should fit into the general understanding of the nature
and importance, and especially the justiciability of social rights. Secondly, we
discuss how the international obligations Estonia has entered into influence the
understanding of the social rights in general and specifically the right to the
protection of health.8
As the constitutional right to health has not been an object of legal battles,
we show how the courts should interpret this provision and whether and to what
extent rights in the field of health protection actually do exist.
1. Historical and international background
of the right to health protection
1.1. The constitutional history
The constitutions of 1920 and of 1938 contained several provisions related to
social rights,9 although their general application and enforceability in the courts
was doubtful. In this respect, the provisions of the Constitution of the Soviet
                                                                                                                       
Amnesty International, known for its fight for civil and political rights, has broadened
its sphere of activity and promotes the protection of health, see
http://web.amnesty.org/rmp/hponline.nsf (15.04.2002)
7
 Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseaduse Ekspertiisikomisjoni lõpparuanne (The Final Report of
the Constitutional Expert Commission). Available at
http://www.just.ee/index.php3?cath=1581 (15.04.2002) (in Estonian).
8
 There are a couple of bibliographies available on the topic of health and human
rights. At the UC, Berkeley, Molly Ryan has compiled a bibliography as of Fall 1997,
see http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/humanrights/bibliographies (15.04.2002). Amnesty
International provides a bibliography also as of 1997,
http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ACT750031997 (15.04.2002).
9
 For example, Article 25 of the Constitution of 1920 provided that the regulation of
economic life should be based on the principle of justice, which aims to secure decent
maintenance in case of youth, old age, incapacity for work and accident.
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Union were radically different, providing for the maintenance of a net of health
care facilities (Art. 24) and for the right to health care (Art. 42). This right was
assured in practice in several ways, including the provision of qualified health
care services for free in state-owned health care facilities, implementation of
comprehensive disease prevention programs etc. Ability to provide services for
free had to do with the communist economy system, which kept salaries of
doctors low, set forth fixed prices for infrastructure services rendered to health
care facilities and allowed to use mainly only low-priced domestic pharma-
ceuticals and medical equipment.10
In contrast, the inclusion of social rights in the post-soviet constitutions has
not been easy in any Eastern European country. The need to abandon the
socialist system has also meant the tendency to neglect anything “social.” Civil
and political rights that people were deprived of under the previous regime
seemed to claim priority.11
However, some social rights do exist in the Estonian current Constitution.
Besides the most important article, namely Art. 28 (guaranteeing also the right
to health protection), several other rights like the right to education and several
work-related rights are ensured. Article 10 of the constitution enshrines the
principle of the social state and one may easily say that the specific social rights
give clear content to the general principle. As the constitution also determines
that the Estonian State is founded on justice and human dignity,12 the
constitution receives a certain social accent besides the generally liberal tone.13
However, a clear-cut choice between liberal, conservative or social democratic
welfare models14 has not been made in the Estonia, with all three models being
prominent in the political discussions.
The constitution provides for a dignified life for everyone. According to the
article 14, “guaranteeing rights and liberties shall be the responsibility of the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, as well as of local government.” The
                                                
10
 I.Sheiman. Excessive State Commitments to Free Health Care in the Russian
Federation: Outcomes and Health Policy Implications. — A. Exter, H. Hermans (eds.)
(Note 5), p. 103.
11
 C. Taube. Constitutionalism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: A Study in
Comparative Constitutional Law. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2001, p. 230ff.; W. Drechsler,
T.Annus. Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Estland von 1992 bis 2001. — Jahrbuch des
öffentlichen Rechts, N.F. Bd. 50, 2002, S. 481.
12
 According to the preamble, the Estonian State is founded on “liberty, justice and
law” and shall “serve to protect internal and external peace and provide security for the
social progress and general benefit of present and future generations.” Human dignity as
a value is protected by § 10.
13
 For the liberal interpretation of the basic rights see R. Alexy. Põhiõigused Eesti
Põhiseaduses (Basic Rights in the Estonian Constitution). — Juridica 2001.a.
eriväljaanne (in Estonian).
14
 G. Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1990.
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Estonian constitution deliberately does not distinguish between “positive” and
“negative” obligations, or civil/political rights and social rights. These rights are
universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.15
1.2 Impact of international Law on the right to health protection
An important source of interpretation of the right to health protection derives
from the international law. Its role in interpreting the Estonian constitutional
provisions, especially the human rights provisions, has been considerable.16
Most often, the Constitutional Court has used the European Convention on
Human Rights17, some references to the ICCPR18 and the Convention on the
Rights of Child19 have been made as well. Besides the fact that the international
human rights law has direct domestic applicability in the Estonian courts, the
treaty had often been used for interpretation of the Estonian Constitution and
other legal provisions. Considering the “friendliness” of the court towards
international law, the use of social rights treaties is highly probable.
Estonia has recently ratified several international documents regulating more
or less directly the right to health protection. Such provisions are included in the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 25 (1)),20 the International
                                                
15
 For the inseparability of civil/political and social rights see United Nations, World
Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN doc.
A/CONF.157/23, Part I, paragraph No. 5.
16
 Generally on the role of international law in the Estonian domestic system see
H. Vallikivi, Domestic Applicability of Customary International Law in Estonia. — In
the present issue, p. 28-38; H. Vallikivi, Välislepingud Eesti õigussüsteemis: 1992.
aasta põhiseaduse alusel jõustatud välislepingute siseriiklik kehtivus ja kohaldatavus
(Treaties in the Estonian Legal System: The Domestic Validity and Applicability of
Treaties Concluded under the Constitution of 1992). Tallinn: Õiguskirjastuse OÜ, 2001.
17
 H. Vallikivi, Euroopa inimõiguste konventsiooni kasutamine Riigikohtu praktikas
(Use of the European Convention on Human Rights in the practice of the Supreme
Court). — Juridica, 2001, No. 6, p. 399 (in Estonian).
18 For example, the decision of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 24
September 2001 (3-1-3-11-01). — Riigi Teataja (The State Gazette) I 2002, 2, 12
(concerning the right to be present during the court proceedings) (in Estonian).
19
 The decision of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, 10 May
1996 (3-4-1-1-96). — Riigi Teataja (The State Gazette) I 1996, 35, 737 (concerning the
right of minors to form unions) (in Estonian).
20
 “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.”
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 12 (2) d)21 and the
European Social Charter (Art. 11, 12 and 13), as well as in more specific human
rights treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (Art. 12), Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Art. 24) and the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Art. 3).22
Estonia is also a member of the World Health Organisation, whose constitution
states that the “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of
the fundamental rights of every human being.”23 The most recent human rights
instrument, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, also
provides for the right to health care (Art 35).24
These international provisions have been interpreted by the relevant treaty
enforcing institutions. Two important institutions should be mentioned here.
Firstly, in May 2000 the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights issued the General Comment No. 14, interpreting the right to the highest
attainable standard of health. Secondly, the European Committee of Social
Rights has developed a considerable case-law on the health protection rights.
The Estonian Supreme Court has not yet referred to a treaty guaranteeing
social rights, including the ESC. Part III of the Appendix to the ESC contains
the clause that it “is understood that the Charter contains legal obligations of an
international character, the application of which is submitted solely to the
supervision provided for in Part IV thereof.” However, the court is by no means
prevented from interpreting the domestic constitutional provisions by including
the ESC case-law in its considerations.25
                                                
21
 “States shall take steps, including the creation of conditions which would assure to
all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness, to achieve the full
realisation of everyone’s right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health.”
22
 “Parties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take
appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable
access to health care of appropriate quality.”
23
 WHO Constitution. Preamble. Available at:
http://www.who.int/ism/mis/WHO-policy/index.en.html (15.04.2002)
24
 “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit
from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices.
A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and
implementation of all Union policies and activities.”
25
 In fact, several courts have applied the charter in the domestic practice. See D.
Harris and J. Darcy. The European Social Charter. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers,
2001, pp. 395–396.
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2. Justiciability of the right to health protection
The enforceability of social rights in the courts (justiciability) is clearly
controversial.26 The court system and court procedures are usually designed to
protect the interests represented before it. Health care financing decisions are
called “polycentric”, which means that they involve a number of different
competitive and antagonistic interests and in a common legal procedure, where
a single plaintiff faces a single defendant it would be difficult to ensure that all
these interests were adequately represented before the court.27 It is accepted that
the legislator has considerable margin of appreciation in determining the
adequate measures for protecting social rights and that the courts must not
excessively interfere with social policy making.28 This is especially important in
the transition process from socialist to the market-based economic system.29 At
the same time, the justiciability is not a priori impossible. Whenever the social
rights provisions are clear enough and enable the courts to apply them to
concrete cases, they are fully entitled to do so.30 The European Committee of
Social Rights has taken the similar position and demanded that states provide
for a justiciable right to health protection.31
The Estonian Supreme Court has rarely considered social rights in its
decisions so far. However, it has clearly obliged the state to engage in positive
action to protect family life.32 The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court has
gone quite far and demanded that a municipality must not evict insolvent and
indebted tenants from municipal buildings even when they have not paid rent
                                                
26
 R. Maruste. Põhiseadus ja selle järelevalve (Constitution and Its Review). Tallinn:
Juura 1997, lk. 100 (in Estonian). Generally see T. Annus. Riigiõigus (Constitutional
Law). Tallinn: Juura 2001, lk. 92 (in Estonian).
27
 See e.g. N. W. Barber. Prelude to the Separation of Powers. — Cambridge Law
Journal, 2001, Vol. 60 No. 1, p. 75.
28
 Decision of the German Constitutional Court Bundesverfassungsgericht. — Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift, 1971, p. 366 (in German).
29
 A. Sajo. How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform. — East European
Constitutional Review, 1996, Vol. 5 No. 1, p. 31; generally in Eastern Europe after
transition see H. Schwartz. The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist
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for a considerable time period. If the tenants are qualified for social assistance
because of unsatisfactory income, the municipality must provide for housing.33
From these few decisions we see that the court is willing to enforce at least
some social rights. Therefore, the rights to health protection should also be
justiciable in principle.
The most important consideration behind not recognising justiciability of the
right to health protection is the financial one.34 The level of protection might
depend on the availability of resources. For example, the CESCR provides for
“progressive realisation” of social rights, accepting that full realisation of all
economic, social and cultural rights is not possible immediately or even in short
term.35 To this corresponds the “dynamic” interpretation of certain provisions of
the ESC, where “dynamic” represents the idea that level of protection is
dependent on the level of resources available.36
The Estonian Constitution does not explicitly provide for the dynamic or
progressive character of social rights, but it allows for restrictions in the
fundamental rights as long as they are necessary in the democratic society (Art.
11). Long-term economic stability, and the balance of economic development
might certainly be goals that justify the limitations for providing free health care
to everyone. Also, the social rights must not mean that some groups in the
society become privileged at the expense of others by demanding certain free
services from the state. Under limited resources, all public welfare services need
sufficient attention.37
The dynamic nature of the social rights does not mean, of course, that the
rights exist only at will of the state. Certain “core rights” should be guaranteed
immediately.38 The inactivity of the state must not mean that no constitutional
objections could be presented. The international law demands that the state has
to move as expeditiously as possible towards the full realisation of the rights.
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The state has to have at least a “plan of action” to achieve higher standards of
health protection.39
3. Elements of the right to health protection
The obligations of the state with respect to the right to health protection can be
divided into the obligation to respect, to protect and to fulfil. The obligation to
respect prevents the state from damaging one’s health; the obligation to protect
demands action from the state to prevent interference from third parties. The
obligation to fulfil forces the state to adopt various measures to protect the
health of the individuals.40 We do not follow this widely used distinction, but
discuss three types of most common rights concerning the health protection: the
liberal right to non-interference by the state, the right to “underlying
conditions”41 for healthy life and the right to health care.
It is inevitable that no state can guarantee the healthy life for everyone.42 As
health “is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not
merely the absence of disease or infirmity,”43 reasons for lacking health can be
various. Socio-economic reasons such as unhealthy nutrition, unsanitary
conditions of living, unhealthy working practices certainly play a role. For
many diseases, the unhealthy person is responsible him- or herself, for example
because of smoking or little exercise. It is obvious that the state cannot be
responsible for each and every health-related problem. Also, the state cannot be
held responsible for curing all health-related problems. Therefore, it is not
necessary and from economic point of view also impossible to interpret and
furnish the right to health protection and its elements as comprehensively as
possible.
3.1. Right to be free from invasion of health
The right to health protection includes traditional liberal self-determination
rights. Alexy points out that the Constitution does not explicitly include the
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obligation of the state to abstain from hazarding health of people calling this a
serious gap within the catalogue of the basic rights under the Constitution.44
However, the obligation of the state to refrain from interfering with the health
and bodily integrity has never been set in doubt by the courts45 and Alexy
adheres to point of view that it would be inconsequent to argue that the state has
an obligation to finance the protection of health but has no obligation to abstain
from invading health of its habitants.46
Additionally, the state is obliged to secure proper protection of different
aspects of self-determination rights such as right to informational or bodily self-
determination in case of providing health care services by third parties. The
principle voluntas aegroti suprema lex est (patient’s will is supreme) is some-
what controversially protected under Estonian law.47
The state has duties to protect people from the invasion of health by third
parties also when medical treatment is not involved. Probably the most well-
known situation when the state has neglected such duties involve direct
environmental risk. For example, the European Court of Human rights saw the
violation of the right to privacy in the fact that the government failed to protect
inhabitants from the high night noise level of the Heathrow Airport, operated by
a private enterprise. The court was clearly motivated also by health conside-
rations, accusing the government of conducting too little research on the
“impact of the increased night flights on the applicants,” especially in the areas
of “the nature of sleep disturbance and prevention.”48 As to the access to health
information, the ECHR has found that the state has to provide advice to people
if they are under risk to their health. This obligation arises for example when the
risk has created by the state in weapons testing49 or by private enterprise
through pollution.50
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Closely connected to the liberal right to bodily integrity is the principle of
non-discrimination in provision of health services. The ECHR has additionally
declared that depriving a person of medical care by expelling him or her while
the person is suffering from a terminal and incurable illness, might violate
Article 3 of the Convention, protecting from inhuman and degrading
treatment.51
3.2. Rights to “underlying determinants for health”
The “underlying determinants” for health are conditions such as “access to safe
and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food,
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and
access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and
reproductive health.”52 The interpretation of the ESC Art. 1153 has shown that
vaccination and epidemic control,54 AIDS prevention55 and environmental
protection56 all play a role. Such measures are more or less protected by the
Public Health Act57 and the Health Services Organisation Act.58 These rights are
rather general, and it is quite hard to find individually guaranteed subjective
rights for a specific individual in a specific case, especially as regards to
treatment on demand.
                                                                                                                       
radiation levels, see McGinley and Egan vs. The United Kingdom, 9 June 1998,
applications 21825/93; 23414/94.
50
 Guerra and Others vs. Italy, 19 February 1998, application 14967/89. The State did
not inform inhabitants for several years before advising them of risks associated with a
chemical factory.
51
 D. vs. The United Kingdom, 2 May 1997, Application No. 30240/96.
52
 UN CESCR General Comment No. 14 (Note 40), p. 11. See also B. Toebes 2001
(Note 3), p. 174.
53
 “With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of health,
the Parties undertake, either directly or in co-operation with public or private organi-
sations, to take appropriate measures designed inter alia:
1. to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health;
2. to provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of health and the
encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of health;
3. to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases, as well as
accidents.”
54
 C I, p. 60.
55
 C X-1, p 109.
56
 C IX-2, p 13; C X-1, p. 110 (air pollution in Italy)
57
 Rahvatervise seadus (Public Health Act). — Riigi Teataja (The State Gazette) I
1995, 57, 978; 2002, 32, 187 (in Estonian).
58
 Tervishoiuteenuste korraldamise seadus (Health Care Services Organization
Act). — Riigi Teataja (The State Gazette) I 2001, 50, 284 (in Estonian).
159
3.3. Rights to health care
The rights to health care are the most controversial area,59 as considerably more
resources are needed and spent in this area of health protection.60 At the same time,
they are the most important ones to the people. It is in human nature not to think so
much on protecting of underlying determinants of health, but worrying about
getting help in case of illness. Considering the opportunities and costs of modern
medicine it is clear that the state cannot provide for free all health care services
anyone wants or needs. It would be therefore more appropriate to speak about the
responsibility of the state to guarantee the availability of health care services. This
includes the question of financial availability, concerning both the regular health
care as well as treatment in extraordinary or emergency situations, where the right
to life plays an important role in interpreting the constitutional guarantees.61
3.3.1. Availability of health care services
The Constitution does not oblige the state to provide health care services by
itself. Privatisation of hospitals is not prohibited in principle, as is not
prohibited the organisation of the medical profession based on the liberal
professions tradition. As a result of a recent major reform Estonia has
established a system of private general practitioners for primary health care,
with mostly state-controlled hospitals on the second and third level. All health
care providers in Estonia are independent legal persons in private law, enjoying
considerable independence from the state and local governments.
The state still has the obligation to ensure that an adequate number of
hospitals and other health-related buildings exist.62 This means that the state has
to ensure that necessary legislation to carry out control over health care
providers is enacted and that the hospitals comply with it. Such legislation
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should regulate establishing of hospitals, borrowing limits, certificates of need,
state’s step-in rights in case of failure to operate a hospital or on bankruptcy of a
hospital, pre-emptive rights on transfer of hospitals etc. Currently, these issues
are not regulated in Estonia and the situation does clearly not correspond to the
state duties in ensuring the availability of health care.
Besides hospitals and other buildings, the number of qualified doctors
receiving a competitive salary must be sufficient. This includes a need for a
sound education and training system for the medical staff, when no private
universities provide these services.63
The right to health protection does not require only the availability of any
kind of health care services, but services of reasonable quality.64 This can be
secured by setting forth certain requirements for professional competence of
doctors, medical equipment, medicines, hospital buildings etc. Additionally,
there has to be a mechanism for supervising and monitoring the quality. Both
sides of the quality of health care services are well regulated under Estonian
law.65 There is a special agency being founded under the Health Services Orga-
nisation Act which purpose is to licence hospitals. Receiving a licence depends
on the quality of rendered services and adherence of quality management
guidelines. Recently a Bill on Patient’s Rights was submitted to the Estonian
Parliament. This Bill sets up a mechanism how patients can submit their
complaints about the quality of health care services to a patients’ ombudsman.
Protection of patients rights is one important instrument by assuring the quality
of health care services.
Probably the more important aspect of availability of health care is the
financial availability. The constitution does not explicitly oblige the state to
introduce a universal health protection system. However, under article 12 of the
ESC the state is obliged “to establish or maintain a system of social security.”
This includes the obligation to establish or maintain a health insurance system.66
Moreover, the system has to be maintained at a level “at least equal to that
necessary for the ratification of the European Code of Social Security” and even
more importantly, the states have “to endeavour to raise progressively the
system of social security to a higher level.” The health insurance system has to
be based on the solidarity principle, meaning that it must include people who
are not able to contribute themselves, e.g. minors and retired persons.67
Similar demands are also part of the constitutional principle of the social
state. This principle demands that the state must protect people from risks, in
case they are unable to do that themselves. This protection is effective only if
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there is some security for everybody that in case of need they will receive
assistance. This is possible only through a public health insurance system that is
based on the solidarity principle.68 Such a national compulsory tax financed
system based on solidarity of insured people already exists in Estonia, with
more than 90% of the people having insurance cover. This, however, does not
determine to what extent are the payments to the insured guaranteed.
3.3.2. Reducing the availability of health care services
It has been argued that the constitutional right to health protection does not
allow for co-payments by the insured patients. Such payments could put a heavy
burden on the people with lower income. There are several arguments why this
practice is necessary and constitutional, however. First of all, there is a
systematic argument that contrary to Art. 37 (1) of the Constitution, which sets
forth the right to education for juveniles without charge, Art. 28 (1) of the
Constitution does not state that the health protection has to be completely free
of charge to habitants. Secondly, the complete responsibility of the state does
not motivate people to protect their own health by abandoning unhealthy
practices, for example. Patients’ contributions may be considered as a kind of
self-liability. Thirdly, the financial burden might be unbearable for the state and
prevent the state to engage in other necessary policies.69
The adoption of legislation introducing self-liability and responsibility to
contribute towards the payment of health care services can be set under question
also in the light of the obligation to raise the health insurance system pro-
gressively to a higher level. This means that reducing benefits, increasing the
contributions of the patients for the services and restricting financing for certain
services demands clear justification. However, there is no absolute prohibition
of such measures. The European Committee of Social Rights has in principle
accepted such practice, as far as it is “necessary to ensure the maintenance of
the social security system and provided that any restrictions still allow members
of society to be effectively protected against social and economic risks and do
not tend to gradually reduce the social security system to one of minimum
assistance.”70 The need to consolidate public finances and the goal of preserving
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balanced health insurance budgets therefore allow to restrict payments from the
Health Insurance Funds.
Another mechanism for reducing availability of health care are waiting lists,
which are commonly used to reduce the financial burden on the Estonian Health
Insurance Fund’s budget. The maximum waiting periods are not set forth by any
legislative document. Moreover, criteria providing for preconditions to be
fulfilled in order to be entered into the list or moved upwards on the list are not
regulated. This causes a clear constitutional problem — the availability of
health care services is not guaranteed sufficiently well as the procedures for
decision-making are not well elaborated.
3.3.3. Provision of emergency and extraordinary care
In case a person has no resources to bear his or her burden of the services, or if
the person is not insured, the state still has to provide social assistance as
guaranteed by Art. 28 (2) of the Constitution. Art. 13 of the ESC provides that
the state has to undertake “to ensure that any person who is without adequate
resources and who is unable to secure such resources either by his own efforts
or from other sources, in particular by benefits under a social security scheme,
be granted adequate assistance, and, in case of sickness, the care necessitated by
his condition.”71 For those not covered by compulsory or voluntary insurance in
Estonia, the right to receive emergency care for free is granted by the Health
Care Services Organisation Act. Against that background it might be argued
that the State has created a system which guarantees financial availability of
health care services for all.
The controversial issue here is however, to what extent must the state
provide for the services for the poor or uninsured; and to what extent must the
state provide for care involving extraordinary costs for treatment, such as in the
case mentioned in the beginning of this article. The Health Services Organi-
sation Act understands under emergency care such services “which are provided
by health care professionals in situations where postponement of care or failure
to provide care may cause the death or permanent damage to the health of the
person requiring care.”
Such measures start from a simple injection of insulin and end with a hearth-
lung transplantation and gene therapy. Considering the life-preserving nature of
the essential services, the rights seem to be protected by the right to life instead
of the right to health protection. The human life has a very high value in the
Estonian society, and it does not seem to be justified simply to refer to tight
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resources when refusing potentially life-saving care. It seems unavoidable that a
rational decision-making procedure has to exist, together with rules for making
the decision.72 The right to life must be given enough attention and reasons for
refusing treatment have to be well founded, e.g. the probability of the treatment
to cure the disease might not be high enough to justify the costs (so called
principle of cost-effectiveness).
However, in this issue it is very hard for the courts to interfere with the
professional judgement of the doctors and health care organisations in a
concrete case. In some cases, it is justified to refuse potentially life-prolonging
treatment.73 Cost considerations also play a role. The long-term provision of
health care services is possible only if the short-term health budgets correspond
to the general economic situation in the country.74 Therefore, the court should
exercise considerable self-restraint in deciding on the issue whether the care
must be provided for or not.
Comparative law demonstrates that the rights to high-cost health care in
specific cases are in fact rarely enforceable in the courts. Under the English or
Scottish law the patients do not have a legal right to receive treatment or any
particular standard of health care services. The health care rights are not
justiciable.75 In Canada and the United States the right to receive health care
services has not been approved as a constitutional right at all.76 Despite the fact
that the Russian Constitution of 1993 states that health care is provided free-of-
charge in public and municipal health care facilities, the state is de facto giving
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up its commitments.77 Also the provision of the German Basic Law
guaranteeing the right to life has been interpreted as giving no right to free
medical treatment.
Conclusions
The right to health protection as guaranteed by the Estonian Constitution is a
big step towards the realisation of dignified life for everyone. The obligation of
the state to take measures in this respect must not be neglected. Also, the state
might be under the constitutional duty to provide treatment in order to protect
the lives of people. At the same time, the level of health protection, especially
the provision of health care services depends on the availability of resources.
The debate in newspapers in connection with the above mentioned leukaemia
case clearly showed that the newspapers and members of society are not capable
to see the scarcity of resources as an argument to refuse treatment when
someone is seriously ill. Even though the courts will face considerable social
pressure in making their decisions in such cases, they have to be careful in
interfering in these questions having a high impact on health policy. In order to
secure a just judgement while allocating resources available for health
protection clear guidelines for making such judgements must be adopted by the
Parliament.
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GERMAN AUTHORS ON ESTONIAN
MINORITY RIGHTS
Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Minderheitenschutz in Estland, by Carmen Thiele.
Berlin: Springer, 1999.
Das Recht der nationalen Minderheiten in Osteuropa, edited by Georg Brunner
and Boris Messner. Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1999.
The two books under review, published this year, contribute to the discussion on
the status and rights of national minorities in Estonia, and Central and Eastern
Europe generally. The first, by Carmen Thiele, is a monograph of legal
character, the other a collection of overview articles from all Central and
Eastern European countries, introduced by two general articles by Rainer
Hofmann (“Das nationale Minderheitenrecht in Osteuropa. Gegenwärtiger
Stand un aktuelle Perspektiven”, 9–37) and Georg Brunner (“Minderheiten-
rechtliche Regelungskonzepte in Osteuropa,” 39–73). The Estonian overview is
given by Carmen Schmidt (“Die Rechtsstellung der Minderheiten in Estland”,
327-350). For this review, which focuses primarily on Estonia, these three
articles are of main interest.
The aims of the two books are rather different. The editors of the collection
hope that it would provide “a better understanding of present legal situation of
national minorities in Eastern Europe, so that one can know more exactly where
the situation is satisfactory and where further improvements could be made” (6;
all translations from German are my own). Schmidt has higher aspirations —
besides presenting, she also aims at analyzing the situation compared with the
norms of international law (3). In fact, the book is a legal recommendation, very
much like a “Gutachten” written by a German lawyer, involving the presen-
tation of the international law provisions, the facts in Estonia and a sub-
sumption. The analysis is meant not only for the international audience
interested in the situation in Estonia, but also seems to be directed towards
Estonian decision-makers. The main conclusions of the paper have also been
published in English, after a presentation in a seminar including many Estonian
officials. (Thiele 1999)
Both goals require one common condition in order to be fulfilled —
updatedness. One cannot give an overview of the present situation if the data
date back several years; one cannot analyse the present situation and make
recommendations if the situation is already different or the recommendations
have long been adopted. This is especially true in the field of minority
protection in Eastern Europe, where changes in the legal situation have been
and are being made continuously. From this viewpoint, in spite of a certain
delay in the publication of scholarly books being both customary and un-
avoidable, the collection could easily be better — the most recent sources used
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by Carmen Schmidt date back to May 1997, which for an overview book of
1999 is certainly not good.
In that sense, Thiele is more successful. The work was completed in De-
cember 1998, according to the introduction (V), the legislation is incorporated
even up to February 1999. This does not mean, however, that some points are
not already outdated for the present reader. Two examples suffice. According to
p. 126, the translations of Estonian legal texts are published according to the
State Gazette Act of 1993, but a new Act was adopted in early 1999, and
besides, the 1993 Act had been amended several times after the 1994 version
which was used by the author — also on the topic of the translation of the acts.
Most importantly, the version of Law on Aliens used by the author, a crucial
tool for analysis, has been amended several times in 1999.
As to the literature, Thiele’s sources are far from excellent. The viewpoint of
the Estonian authorities is not handled thoroughly and many easily available
sources in English about the problems discussed are not used at all (see only
Heidmets 1998, Lauristin et. al. 1997; Realo 1998). Many current data have
been obtained from Russian newspapers — hardly a source beyond reasonable
doubt in accuracy, since they often, if not usually, have their own axe to grind.
Schmidt is rather different in that respect, using sources mostly from Estonian-
language newspapers. That the conclusions are finally different is not a surprise
considering this fact only. However, the negative side of this is that the
international reader is unlikely to get an objective view of the situation.
Thiele starts, quite rightly, with a historical overview of the Estonian situa-
tion. The argument most often heard in Estonia is that the historical situation
justifies the present policies. This is also the basis of the Government official
programme “Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society” (printed in
English in Järve and Wellmann 1999: 39–42). The starting point, therefore, is
good. One would then expect an analysis to the questions, if, why and how the
historical situation plays such an important role in the minority policies. This is
one of the questions where also Estonian positions are rather unclear. It has
been rightly pointed out that the Estonian language has been suppressed for
centuries, yet it has survived without any state protection and might not need
state protection through suppressing other languages today. (Järve and
Wellmann 1999: 34). Unfortunately, Thiele hardly refers back to the introduc-
tory part later in her analysis.
All authors neglect the question of discontinuation of the Estonian state
during the Soviet occupation. Thiele states expressly that this question bears no
importance to the legal requirements of attaining a minority status (2). This
simplification is very doubtful. Even if the acquisition of the minority status
does not depend on this international law question, the treatment of people
living in a country must depend on the time of the creation of the state. As for
the Estonian situation, this has been discussed by Drechsler (1999)
The main topics covered in Thiele and Schmidt include citizenship, minority
rights and the treatment of aliens.
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As to citizenship, all reviewed authors start from the assumption that it is up
to every country to whom this status is to be awarded. Both Schmidt and Thiele
admit that the requirements to the applicants in Estonia are not very easy.
Schmidt sees no big problems and supported by an opinion poll, concludes that
“the citizenship regulations have been generally accepted today” (332). Thiele
analyses the matter further in order to show that the Estonian rules are too strict
and leave many people stateless or force them to take another (mostly Russian)
citizenship.
The section on the Estonian situation starts with a comparison of the three
Baltic states. Thiele says without any further explanation that Lithuania, after
collapse of the Soviet Union, granted citizenship to all Lithuanian residents
(63), thus she points out the ease by which citizenship could be granted. This
fact has been often demonstrated elsewhere with the unavoidable addition that
in Lithuania, the non-Lithuanian population amounted to only around 10 per
cent, compared with over 35 in Estonia, which makes the situation wholly
different.
Another problematic conclusion is connected with the principle of genuine
link (or close connection), which she describes as the necessary criterion to
which the person to whom citizenship is given must correspond. She later uses
the genuine link argument for supporting one of her main conclusions, viz. —
that the granting of citizenship should be made much easier, with lesser
requirements as to the language skills and the knowledge of the constitutional
system. (181) According to her, a genuine link can be established with less. This
is surprising, as the purpose of this connection is to prevent the states from
granting citizenship to too many people.
Her strongest argument concerning citizenship rights is that integration
should be taken as a priority ahead of exclusion and this would require easier
naturalization. (181) That integration is important has been well recognized by
the Estonian government. The discussion in Estonia is, however, whether
citizenship laws are the best laws to achieve integration or whether integration
should happen before granting citizenship rights — not an unfamiliar discussion
in most European countries, including Germany, where this was one of the most
hotly debated public policy issues of the past year.
Surprisingly, the possible accession of Estonia into the EU and the
requirements concerning the naturalization do not receive attention from Thiele.
In fact, the European Union has been neglected for all issues. Of the reviewed
authors, only Hofmann (19) restates these requirements. As it is recommended
that Estonia would speed up the naturalization process, it is crucial that the EU
dimension is not simply forgotten in this context.
The minority rights discussion starts off with a definition of minorities.
Schmidt takes it as a traditional view of international law and practice, that the
minority status is granted only to the citizens. Thiele accepts this as the
traditional view, but argues that minority protection (e.g cultural autonomy) in
Estonia should also include non-citizens, as minority rights should be human
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rights. (176) This recommendation, not followed in most European countries, is
highly problematic. One cannot demand of the countries of Eastern Europe what
one oneself does not, is not willing, to have. As Hofmann says (17), “Nothing
would be more fatal to minority protection on the European level [...] than
accepting double standards for a longer time period.” The double standards,
often used in Estonian official argumentation cannot be neglected also
concerning the definition of minorities (Järve and Wellmann 1999:30).
These different arguments in two books have a deeper background. Hofmann
(12) says that it is certain both the point of view of both the international and
comparative law that membership of a minority depends in the first place on the
will of the respective person. Thiele does not think that this would be crucial.
This is not surprising considering her attitude towards minority rights as group
rights. The individual rights approach is based on subjective willingness to
identify oneself as minority and to act accordingly; the group rights approach
has inevitable problems with that, as Brunner (48) rightly points out. (see also
Hillgruber and Jestaedt 1994: 89-63).
This has a close connection with the opportunity of establishing a cultural
autonomy granted by the Estonian constitution. Brunner goes quite far in this
respect, stating that the fact that the non-Estonian population has not used the
right to form a cultural self-government means in a democratic society that they
are satisfied with their destiny and that no further steps are necessary (68). This
obviously corresponds to the overall attitude of the collection defining minority
rights as individual rights dependent on individual action. Thiele whose pre-
ference is group rights approach naturally contradicts that — according to her,
the cultural self-government has not been used because the non-citizens have
been left without the minority protection because of no citizenship. Had the
non-citizens of ethnically different origin than Estonian the right to form
cultural self-government, this would have certainly already been used (181).
Surprisingly, an analysis of the Estonian constitution shows that the
definition of minorities in Estonia is not clear at all. It is only certain that
minorities mentioned in Paragraph 51 include also non-citizens. In other places
of the constitution, the definition is left open to concretization by the legislation.
None of the authors mentions this question.
Of great interest is the handling of minority languages in connection with
political rights. Probably the most controversial case in the practice of the
Constitutional Review Chamber of the Estonian National Court involved the
question of the constitutionality of an Act which requires Estonian language
skills from candidates to the parliament and local councils. The quick and firm
conclusion of Thiele (144), without a single hint as to the argumentation of the
Court (the decision itself has been referred to in another context), who validated
the Act, is that the Constitution has been violated. The saying that “constitution
means what the supreme court says it means” might not be absolutely correct,
but a dissent needs far more support. The relevant literature on similar
provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights could be elaborated
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further; there is also case law which discusses the problems concerned with
restrictions to stand for elections. Thus, the book will certainly not convince
Estonian officials or lawyers that the decision of the Court validating the Act
was wrong, but might lead into misunderstanding that the issues were not
debated in detail, as they actually were.
As to the legal status of aliens, the conclusions are more on the positive side
from the Estonian viewpoint. The right to vote in local elections is quite far-
reaching compared with other European states. Thiele also admits that the
human rights and freedoms are guaranteed in Estonia — the minor problems she
sees have not been of practical importance.
As has been stated earlier, Thiele and Schmidt conclude differently. Schmidt
states (349): “The practice and rules certainly do not violate the rules of
international law.” The more reserved attitude of Thiele has been shown before.
At one point, she even sees “a serious danger of assimilation”, (118) which is
demonstrated by the fact that several hundred applications a year are submitted
to change Russian names to Estonian ones. She finally concludes that human
rights should acquire more importance compared with national sovereignty, that
minority rights should be defined as human rights and that the position of long-
term residents should be strengthened to match those of the citizens. By this, the
international law viewpoint is mostly lost, in order to better argue the
minorities’ case. “It would contribute to the integration of different national
groups in the Estonian society in a new Europe”. (182)
With these conclusions, Thiele leaves the realm of international law and
starts advising policy issues. She weighs the Estonian policy, based on national
identity and culture preservation (described in Smith et al 1998: 105–107)
against the need to preserve internal stability and piece, but does not bring out
the arguments in their entirety. Remarkably, the Estonian situation is rather
stable and conflicts based on ethnic nature are almost non-existent, which has
been pointed out by western authors as a comparison to other former Soviet
republics (Smith et al 1998: 95), but are noteworthy also in countries with much
less ethnic diversity.
Thiele unfortunately fails to produce an additional convincing argument to
change the Estonian policies. That changes in policy are necessary, has been
admitted by many, including the government itself when it adopted the official
policy paper on integration. The recommendations would never be considered
by Estonian authorities unless they were convinced that the one who makes the
recommendation understands the historical, political and cultural situation in
Estonia, especially if the recommendations are not based on certain and
universally accepted international law principles. Even then, the arguments used
at the moment in Estonia need to be considered. The mutual misunderstanding
can be overcome only if the language (and I do not mean that literally) is the
same.
The goals of the books, namely presentation and analysis with recommen-
dations, are not fully achieved. The presentation of both Thiele and Schmidt
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bear a certain bias by not presenting the cases of both sides fully. The
recommendations may fail acceptance for this very reason. At the moment, the
Estonian decision-makers, representatives of minorities, and also the inter-
national community need a balanced and objective argumentation which takes
into consideration all arguments. Only this would further the scholarly
discussion and help the situation of all people living in Estonia.
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